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 When we first appear in the world our errors are accepted and even encouraged. This 
is how we learn to walk and talk, to think and improve. Yet, the more we learn, the more we 
are expected to know, and the less acceptable our errors become. Until at some point the same 
world that earlier encouraged our errors starts to punish us for them. Suddenly, we are 
expected to be omniscient, flawless, reliable, infallible, to learn by avoidance without failing. 
But perfection is not in our nature. In fact, in nature, it is imperfection and random error that 
drives evolutionary change, while immutability and inability to adapt can only mean death. 
Errors present us with a paradox: on the one hand, to err is human, on the other, denying one's 
fallibility and struggling with accepting that life is uncertain and errors are likely, is equally 
human. We are socialized to avoid errors while living in an error-prone world. We seek 
predictability in the midst of probability. Are we sending ourselves on a fool's errand or is 
there an alternative - a strategy that is more realistic, more tolerant, and more forgiving, a 
strategy that allows us to keep on learning and improving? 
Defining Errors 
 Errors are defined as potentially avoidable (i.e., not due to some unforeseeable chance 
agency), unintended deviations (i.e., not purposeful), occurring during goal directed action 
(i.e., errors imply a non-achievement of goals, with achieving the goal as the intention, and 
the error causing the non-achievement as the deviation; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & 
Frese, 2011; Reason, 1990). An everyday example of an error, is a computer user who while 
trying to minimize a browser (goal) unintentionally clicks on the close button (an unintended 
deviation), closing all open tabs (Chrome users have probably made this error more than 
once). Another everyday example of a very common error is sending an e-mail without its 
attachment.  
 Errors should be differentiated from several related concepts, namely, inefficiencies, 
violations, risks, and failure. Inefficiencies (a.k.a., suboptimal results) are conceptually 
similar to errors, but unlike errors eventually reach the intended goal, even if not in the most 
direct way (Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, 1990; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). An everyday 
example of an inefficiency is sending the same e-mail separately to multiple recipients instead 
of sending a group e-mail. The goal is achieved - the e-mail is sent to everyone - but the 
process itself is flawed in the sense that the same goal could have been achieved with a single 
e-mail. Violations are "intentional deviations from task goals, rules, or some standard" 
(Hofmann & Frese, 2011, p. 3). For example, purposefully crossing at a red light while in a 
hurry or talking on a cell phone during driving are considered violations. Risks involve an 
assessment of whether the potential benefits of some action outweigh the potential losses and 
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are similar to violations in that both risks and violations are calculated and intentional, 
although they may have unintended consequences (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). A stock market 
trader who decides to speculate on high-yield but also high-risk stocks is not making an error, 
but consciously risking. Finally, failure is some negative consequence, which is not 
necessarily caused by errors (e.g., it is possible to have a failure due to inefficiencies, 
violations, chance agency, risks, or errors, as well as any combination of those; Zhao & 
Olivera, 2006). The Chernobyl disaster can be considered a failure. An observation of the 
events that led to the accident reveals that an unfortunate co-occurrence of violations, 
inefficiencies, risks, and errors was responsible for the ultimate disastrous consequences 
(Reason, 1990). The Enron scandal, in contrast, was primarily caused by violations and risks 
(e.g., concealing debts and various questionable accounting practices), but because of its 
negative consequences is considered a failure. 
 An important distinction that should be made is between an error and the error's 
consequences. Frese and Zapf (1994), in their application of action theory to errors, 
differentiate between errors, error signals, and error consequences. Error signals usually 
involve some form of internal or external feedback showing that a present state is different 
from a planned state (e.g., a feeling that something is not right; an error message). For 
example, in the browser example used earlier, if the computer user makes the error of pressing 
the close button (erroneous action), most browsers will send a message asking whether 
closing the document is indeed intended (error signal) allowing the person to catch the error 
and not to close the browser. In this example the error occurred, but it was trapped and not 
allowed to manifest into an error consequence (e.g., unintentionally closing the browser). 
According to Frese and Zapf (1994) although an action can be erroneous, it does not 
necessarily need to result in a negative consequence, for example, when the error is 
discovered and neutralized. Put differently, the error is not equated with its consequence. In 
fact, errors can have neutral, negative, or even positive consequences. Imagine a nurse who 
makes the error of giving a higher dosage of a medication to a patient. The consequence of 
this error, depending on the drug and the condition of the patient, can be neutral (the patient is 
not affected), negative (the patient experiences a negative reaction to the drug), or positive 
(the patient recovers even faster). In this example, the error is the same, yet the potential 
consequences are different. 
 After defining errors and differentiating them from other related constructs the 
question remains: Why is researching errors necessary and valuable? Errors when not 
properly handled can be costly, dangerous, and even deadly, especially when they co-occur 
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with violations, risks and inefficiencies (e.g., Chernobyl, the Challenger disaster, the Three 
Mile Island meltdown). But when dealt with appropriately, errors can present opportunities 
for learning and improvement. Accordingly, it is in the best interest of scientists and 
practitioners alike to understand what is proper and improper error-handling, how it can be 
stimulated or deterred, how to minimize the negative and maximize the positive consequences 
of errors, and how error-handling affects oneself and others. The purpose of this dissertation 
is to add to the existing knowledge by investigating how one's framing of errors, either from 
an error prevention lens or from an error management lens (i.e., error-handling strategy), 
influences various outcomes by affecting the way others think about a person, and the way the 
person thinks during a task.  
Error Prevention and Error Management 
The literature distinguishes between two error-handling strategies: error prevention 
and error management (e.g., Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese, Brodbeck, Heinbokel, Mooser, 
Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 1991; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Van Dyck, 
Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005). The goal of both strategies is similar - minimizing the 
negative consequences of errors - but the way in which the two strategies go about achieving 
this goal differs. Error prevention postulates that negative consequences of errors can be 
avoided by preventing the occurrence of errors. A problem of this strategy is that it assumes 
that all errors can be prevented, which is an unrealistic and overall impossible assumption, 
because existing knowledge shows that errors are ubiquitous and unpredictable (Reason, 
1990; 1997). Error management, in contrast, is more realistic toward the occurrence of errors 
and focuses on containment rather than on complete removal of errors. It is a strategy that 
distinguishes the error itself from its consequences and attempts to detect potentially costly 
errors before their negative consequences materialize, while simultaneously advancing the 
positive consequences of errors in terms of learning. 
Prior theorizing and research (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Heimbeck et al., 2003; 
Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998; Van Dyck, Van Hooft, De Gilder, & Liesveld, 
2010) connect error prevention and error management to constructs from two prominent 
motivation theories: goal orientation (e.g., Dweck, 1986) and regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins, 1997; 2000). It should be noted, however, that although there are theoretical reasons 
to connect error-handling to learning and performance goals or promotion and prevention 
focus, error management and error prevention form separate constructs that are related to, but 
conceptually different from the abovementioned self-regulation constructs. Error management 
focuses on approaching gains such as learning, but also on avoiding losses such as negative 
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consequences. Similarly, error prevention tries to avoid errors, but also to approach optimal 
performance. Prior research (Van Dyck et al., 2010) investigating the link between goal 
orientation and error-handling strategy found evidence that trait learning goal orientation (i.e., 
an orientation focusing on learning and increasing one’s competence), was positively, but 
only mildly, related to error management (r = .24, p < .10), whereas trait avoid performance 
goal orientation (i.e., an orientation focusing on avoiding negative evaluation by others) was 
mildly positively related to error prevention (r = .24, p < .10). Regarding regulatory focus, 
recently collected data (Dimitrova, 2012) suggest that trait error competence (a component of 
error management; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999) positively correlates with trait 
learning approach orientation (r = .38, p < .001) and trait promotion focus (r = .38, p < .001). 
These moderate correlations, thus, suggest that even though error-handling strategies may be 
empirically related to goal orientation and regulatory focus, error management and error 
prevention are not only theoretically but also empirically distinguishable from these 
constructs. 
Previous Research on Error-Handling 
Error-handling strategy research originated in the literature on software design and 
computer skills training (Frese, 1991; Frese et al., 1991). The main assumption of the early 
error-handling literature was that errors can be useful for training because they help trainees 
develop better and more detailed cognitive models of tasks than error-free training. In order to 
counteract the frustration associated with making errors and increase problem solving, early 
training included simple heuristics (e.g., "There is a way to leave the error situation").  
The next vital step in error-handling research was made by Frese and Zapf (1994) who 
applied action theory to errors, and developed a detailed error taxonomy, as well as a 
conceptualization of error prevention and error management strategies. Frese and Zapf’s 
(1994) work spurred a surge in research interest in the questions of (1) whether error 
management is better for performance than error prevention, (2) when (moderation effects), 
and (3) why (mediation effects). In searching for answers to these questions researchers 
investigated error-handling on three different levels. Most existing research has focused on 
the individual level, followed by the group level, and the organizational level. 
 At the individual level, as compared to error prevention, error management is 
associated with better performance (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Dormann & Frese, 1994; Frese 
et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, Griffin, 
2013; Nordstrom et al., 1998), lower frustration (Frese et al., 1991; Nordstrom et al., 1998), 
higher emotion control (Keith & Frese, 2005), higher meta-cognitive activity (Bell & 
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Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), increased motivation (Nordstrom et al., 1998), and 
increased self-efficacy (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski, Wood, & Bandura, 2001). There 
is evidence that the effects of error-handling strategy on performance are moderated by 
various individual-level factors such as cognitive ability, motivation, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, openness to experience, trait goal orientation, and trait anxiety (e.g., Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008; Carter & Beier, 2010; Gully, Payne, Colles, & Whiteman, 2002; Heimbeck 
et al., 2003). In addition, elements outside of the individual such as within-training 
performance versus post-training performance, analogical versus adaptive transfer 
performance, and type of training (proceduralized versus exploratory) were also found to 
moderate the effect of error-handling strategy on performance (for a meta-analysis see Keith 
& Frese, 2008). Regarding mediation, existing research has investigated three main 
mechanisms at the individual level through which error-handling can influence performance: 
affect (e.g., frustration, Debowski et al., 2001; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000; 
emotional control, Keith & Frese, 2005; anxiety, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008), motivation 
(intrinsic motivation, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski et al., 2001; Wood et al., 2000; self-
efficacy, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski et al., 2001), and cognition (e.g., metacognition; 
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005).  
The currently existing research on error-handling at the group level has been 
conducted in medical settings. More specifically this research has compared the learning, 
psychological safety, and performance of medical teams characterized as having either an 
error prevention type of climate or an error management type of climate (Edmondson, 1996; 
1999; 2004a). The findings show that medical teams with an error management type of 
climate when compared to teams with an error prevention type of climate exhibit greater 
psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999; 2004a), higher reporting rate, less covering up of 
occurring errors, and better learning performance (Edmondson, 1996; 1999, 2004a). 
Additionally, error management climate in medical teams has been positively associated with 
greater patient and employee satisfaction (Hofmann & Mark, 2006).  
Finally, research at the organizational level investigating error culture shows that error 
management culture in organizations is positively related to organizational performance and 
survivability (Van Dyck et al., 2005). These findings indicate that error management is not 
only an individual or a group level phenomenon, but that error-handling can be observed at 
even higher levels in the form of organizational error culture. 
Although as evidenced by the brief summary outlined above a lot is already known 
about error-handling strategies, many questions remain unanswered. In the following section I 
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address some of those questions and explain in what ways the current dissertation contributes 
to the literature. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 The most fundamental feature of error-handling strategies is their different framing of 
errors either as negative occurrences to be prevented (error prevention strategy) or as 
detectable and manageable, potentially beneficial learning opportunities (error management 
strategy). This framing has the capacity to influence the way people see the world around 
them and the way that they think about themselves, others, and the tasks they are working on. 
But is it really the case that error-handling strategies affects people's thoughts, and if they do, 
what implications does that have for other outcomes such as attitudes and performance? The 
overarching research question investigated in this dissertation is “Does error-handling strategy 
affect people’s thoughts and subsequent outcomes?” This main question can be divided into 
two sub-questions: (1) does error-handling strategy affect others’ thoughts (Chapters 2 and 3) 
and (2) does error-handling strategy affect one’s own thoughts (Chapters 4 and 5).  
 I investigate the first sub-question in the leader-follower context by examining 
whether and how followers are influenced by the error-handling strategy of leaders. The main 
interest is then how others (i.e., followers) think about someone else (i.e., a leader) based on 
that person's error-handling strategy. Existing work has established the importance of 
researching error-handling in the leadership context (e.g., Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; 
Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003; Hunter, Tate, Dzieweczynski, & Bedell-Avers, 2011; 
Rodriguez & Griffin, 2009; Thoroughgood, Sawyer, & Hunter, 2012; Zhao, 2011; Zhao & 
Olivera, 2006). Nonetheless, previous research related to errors and leadership has mostly 
focused on creating error typologies and examining their effects on leader performance 
(Eubanks & Mumford, 2010), establishing the reasons for leader errors (Hunter et al., 2011), 
and identifying how different types of errors (e.g, relational vs., task) made by leaders affect 
followers' perception of leader competence, effectiveness, and desire to work for the leader 
(Thoroughgood et al., 2012). Much less is currently known about how a leader's error-
handling strategy affects followers. The few existing studies have examined how leaders 
exhibiting characteristics similar to error management and error prevention influence 
followers' error-related attitudes (e.g., speaking up, proactive coordination, psychological 
safety, learning from errors; Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003) and how perceived managerial 
intolerance of errors (a construct similar to error prevention strategy) influences followers' 
negative emotionality, willingness to learn, and actual learning from errors (Zhao, 2011).  
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 Although the evidence in favor of using error management over error prevention 
strategy abounds in the literature (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege, Nordstrom & 
Williams, 2003; Edmondson, 1996; 1999; Frese, 1991; 1995; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & 
Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998; Van Dyck et al., 2005), organizations purposefully 
incorporating error management in their operations are the exception, rather than the rule 
(e.g., Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Paradoxically, error prevention strategy seems 
to be as ubiquitous in most organizations as are errors (Reason, 1990; 1997). A major 
potential barrier for the implementation of error management in organizations are leaders' 
image concerns (e.g., fears of being perceived as incompetent, weak, and untrustworthy) 
about how applying this strategy would influence what followers think of leaders and how 
those thoughts may potentially transfer to various follower level outcomes (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2005; Hunter et al., 2011; Thogoughgood et al., 2012; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). 
Accordingly, establishing whether followers actually perceive leaders using an error 
management strategy more negatively that leaders using an error prevention strategy is a 
necessary step in better understanding how error-handling strategies affect others beyond the 
individual.  
 Chapter 2 includes two experimental studies (Study 1a and 1b) and a survey (Study 2). 
Studies 1a and 1b provide an initial investigation of whether and how leaders' error-handling 
strategy affects followers' perceptions of leaders in terms of warmth and competence. Study 2 
replicates and extends the experimental evidence by going beyond perception into follower 
level outcomes of error-handling strategy and leader perception (i.e., satisfaction with leader, 
motivation, organizational goal fulfillment). 
 Chapter 3 incorporates a field study (Study 1) and an experiment (Study 2). Here, I 
look further into how leaders' error-handling strategy affects followers. More specifically, I 
investigate whether and how error-handling influences followers' trust in a leader. Leaders 
can try to influence the trust of their followers by either being strict and error averse (error 
prevention strategy) or by accepting that errors are ubiquitous and instead focusing on 
minimizing their negative consequences (error management). Although error prevention 
seems to be the preferred strategy in organizations (Reason, 1990; 1997; Van Dyck, 2009), 
initial investigations show that the followers of leaders using an error prevention-type strategy 
exhibit various attitudes and behaviors consistent with low trust (e.g., unwillingness to 
communicate about occurring errors, covering up errors, fear of reporting errors, low team 
psychological safety; Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003; 2004a,b; Rybowiak et al., 1999), while 
the opposite is the case for the followers of leaders using a strategy similar to error 
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management. My research provides the first direct empirical investigation of whether leaders’ 
use of error prevention or of error management strategy is more beneficial for followers’ trust.  
 Additionally, in Chapter 3 I attempt to replicate and extend the findings of Chapter 2 
regarding followers' perceptions of leaders by investigating the effects of leaders' error-
handling strategy on sociability, morality, and competence. Note that in Chapter 2 under the 
label of warmth I measure only sociability. Although existing earlier theorizing and research 
have equated sociability with morality and called them both warmth (for a review see Cuddy, 
Fiske, & Glick, 2008) recent research shows that the two may be related, but separate 
constructs (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). 
Moreover, prior work has identified three constructs (i.e., benevolence, integrity, and ability) 
conceptually overlapping with sociability, morality, and competence as predictors of trust 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), which is why in Chapter 3 I 
incorporated perceptions as potential mediators between leaders' error-handling strategy and 
followers' trust. 
 Overall, the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 add to the growing line of research 
on leadership and errors by investigating the effects of leaders' error prevention and/or error 
management strategy on followers' perceptions of leaders' warmth (sociability and morality) 
and competence, and the relation between perception and various follower level outcomes 
(i.e., satisfaction with leader, motivation, organizational goal-fulfillment, and trust). Previous, 
mostly qualitative, studies have not directly measured leaders' error management and error 
prevention (see Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003) or have only looked at leaders' prevention 
(Zhao, 2011). The studies in this dissertation, however, both experimentally manipulate and 
measure leaders' error prevention and error management. By integrating different research 
designs (experimental and survey), I establish causality and test the external validity of the 
experimental findings. 
Chapters 4 and 5 move the focus from whether the thoughts of others are influenced 
by leaders’ error-handling strategy to whether error-handling instructions influence one’s own 
thoughts and subsequent performance. Most error-handling strategy research originates in the 
training literature and investigates the effects of error management training as compared to 
error prevention training on performance, and the mechanisms mediating these effects (e.g., 
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Frese, 1991; 1995; 
Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; Lazar & Norcio, 2003; Nordstrom et al., 1998; 
Van Dyck et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2000). Overall, results so far have been consistent: error 
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management leads to better post-training performance than error prevention (for a meta-
analysis see Keith & Frese, 2008).  
 Less is understood, however, about the underlying psychological mechanisms through 
which error-handling strategy affects performance. To date, researchers have mostly focused 
on affective/motivational mechanisms (e.g., anxiety, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; frustration, 
Debowski et al., 2001; Wood et al., 2000; emotion control, Keith & Frese, 2005; intrinsic 
motivation, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski et al., 2001; Wood et al., 2000; self-efficacy, 
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski et al., 2001). Cognitive mechanisms, although 
highlighted as important to investigate (e.g, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Joung, Hesket, & Neal; 
2006; Keith & Frese, 2005), have received relatively little attention. Keith and Frese (2005) 
suggested that the allocation of cognitive resources to on-task, off-task thoughts, and self-
regulation (cognitive resource allocation theory, Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) might potentially 
mediate the effects of error-handling strategy on performance and that (re)appraisal of errors 
due to error framing may explain how error-handling influences cognitive resource allocation 
itself. Nonetheless, existing research has so far only tested the mediating role of self-
regulation (metacognition and emotion control; Keith & Frese; metacognition, Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008). There is a lack of studies investigating the role of on-task and off-task 
thoughts as mediators of the effect of error-handling on performance, or the mediating role of 
cognitive appraisal on the effect of error-handling strategies on cognitive resource allocation. 
Such studies are necessary and valuable because existing error-handling theorizing has 
already incorporated cognition in multiple assumptions, taking for granted that it is influenced 
by error-handling (e.g., Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; 
Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998), yet empirical evidence is missing.  
 To broaden existing scientific knowledge, the two experimental studies in Chapter 4 
investigate whether error-handling influences one's own on-task and off-task thoughts (Study 
1), as well as the mediating role of on-task and off-task thoughts on the effect of error-
handling instructions on performance (Study 2). The experimental study in Chapter 5, 
integrates theories on error-handling (action theory, Frese & Zapf, 1994), cognitive appraisals 
(e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), cognitive resource allocation (Kanfer & Ackermann, 1989) 
and learning transfer (e.g, Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000) in order to empirically investigate Keith 
and Frese's (2005) proposition that error-handling strategy affects error appraisals, which in 
turn affect cognitive resource allocation, and subsequent performance.  
 In addition to testing both cognitive appraisal and cognitive resource allocation as 
mediators of the effect of error-handling on performance, Chapter 5 extends the findings of 
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Chapter 4 by focusing on what really drives the effects of error-handling strategy on cognition 
and performance: error prevention, error management, or their combination. Moreover, 
Chapter 5 provides the first empirical test of how combining error prevention and error 
management affects cognition and performance. Due to the methods applied in previous 
work, establishing whether error management is beneficial, error prevention detrimental or 
whether integrating the two strategies maximizes their positives while minimizing their 
negatives is currently not possible. Specifically, existing experimental research has rarely 
included a control group (except for Gully et al., 2002; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Loh et al., 
2013) and even when there was one, the error prevention group differed from the error 
management and control groups in type of practice, in addition to error instructions (this 
confounding of instructions and practice type is discussed in detail in Chapter 4). 
Additionally, although researchers have suggested that both error prevention and error 
management are necessary (e.g., Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck et al., 2005; Van Dyck, 
2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) we do not yet know whether, how, and when the two error-
handling strategies interact because no field study to date has tested for interaction effects and 
no experiment has included a full-factorial design allowing for interaction. Chapter 5 
addresses the abovementioned limitations and extends previous work in order to improve and 
disambiguate existing error-handling theorizing. Namely, the study in Chapter 5 incorporates 
a full-factorial design - 2 (error prevention: yes vs. no) x 2 (error management: yes vs. no) - 
allowing the investigation of the actual drivers of the effects of error-handling strategy. The 
overall conceptual framework of the Dissertation is presented in Figure 1.1. 
 
FIGURE 1.1 
Conceptual framework of the dissertation 
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Abstract 
Leaders can apply two error-handling strategies while dealing with errors: error prevention or 
error management. How these strategies affect the perception of leaders, however, remains 
unclear. In two experimental studies (Study 1a and 1b) and one field study (Study 2) we 
investigate the effects of leader error-handling strategy on warmth and competence 
perceptions of leaders by followers. Our findings show that error management as compared to 
error prevention leads to perceiving leaders as warmer (all studies) and equally (Study 1a and 
1b) or more competent (Study 2). Additionally, in Study 2 warmth perceptions were found to 
mediate the relationship between error management and satisfaction with leaders and between 
error management and follower motivation. Our findings suggest that leaders should not be 
reluctant to applying error management in their practice, as leaders using this strategy benefit 
from perceptual (being perceived as more sociable) as well as attitudinal and motivational 
benefits (followers are more satisfied with and more motivated by the leaders).  
 
 Keywords: error management, error prevention, warmth, competence, satisfaction with 
the leader, follower motivation 
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Introduction 
To make no mistakes is not in the power of man; but from their errors and 
 mistakes the wise and good learn wisdom for the future. 
                 Plutarch 
 
People in general and leaders in particular have negative associations with errors. 
From early on we are socialized to avoid making errors (Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; 
Reason, 1990) and to see them as something bad, as a sign of incompetence that can cost us 
other people's respect, a deterrent to reaching our goals, a problem to be solved, a threat to be 
averted. We live in a multifaceted world and have limited control over all the uncertainties 
and complexities that can lead to error. Yet, for most people it is difficult to accept that 
preventing all errors is an impossible task. Leaders are no exception (Reason, 1990; Sitkin, 
Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994). 
Leaders can apply different strategies to deal with errors (Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese, 
Brodbeck, Heinbokel, Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 1991; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; 
Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck, Baer, Frese, & Sonnentag, 2005). One common strategy - error 
prevention - stresses the importance of working flawless and preventing error. An alternative 
strategy - error management - accepts error occurrence and focuses on correction, prevention 
of negative consequences, and learning from errors.  
Although the evidence in favor of error management has been consistently growing 
during the last 20 years (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege, Nordstrom & Williams, 2003; 
Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Frese, 1991; 1995; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; 
Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998; Van Dyck et al., 2005; Wood, 
Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000) leaders and organizations have been slow in adopting 
this strategy. A potential barrier for the successful implementation of error management in 
organizations is the common concern that applying error management may have negative 
implications for leaders’ perception by followers (e.g., Hunter, Tate, Dzieweczynski, & 
Bedell-Avers, 2011; Thoroughgood, Sawyer, & Hunter, 2012). Positive leader perception is 
extremely important for leader effectiveness (Yukl, 2007), thus addressing leaders’ concerns 
about adopting an error management strategy (e.g., Berry & Parasuraman, 1992) and 
empirically investigating whether those concerns are substantiated or not, is a necessary step 
to further broaden our understanding of error management theorizing and practices. 
The main goal of the current research is to investigate whether leaders' error strategy 
affects followers’ perceptions of leaders and how these perceptions relate to various 
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outcomes. We know from prior research that people spontaneously generate impressions of 
others and that those impressions can be mapped onto two primary dimensions: warmth and 
competence (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; Fiske, Xu, 
Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Wojciszke, 1995; 2005; Wojciszke, 
Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009). Whereas warmth conveys 
information about how friendly and well-intentioned someone is towards us, competence 
informs us how skilled and able to enact intentions that other is (Cuddy et al., 2008). In two 
experimental studies and a survey we investigate whether and how error-handling strategy of 
leaders affects the warmth and competence perceptions followers have of their leader (Study 
1a, 1b, and 2), and what the consequences of these perceptions are for followers’ satisfaction 
with a leader, motivation, and organizational goal-fulfillment (Study 2). Understanding if and 
how leaders' error-handling strategy affects followers is important, because it uncovers part of 
the process by which leaders can influence others' organizational attitudes, motivation, and 
ultimately - behavior. 
 Previous research has indicated the importance of investigating errors and error-
handling in the leader-follower context (e.g., Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 
1996; 1999; 2003; Hunter et al., 2011; Rodriguez & Griffin, 2009; Thoroughgood et al., 2012; 
Zhao, 2011). For example, Edmondson (1996; 1999; 2003) in a series of interviews and 
questionnaire studies looked into the role leaders' error attitudes and behaviors play in 
influencing team attitudes and behaviors such as speaking up, proactive coordination, 
psychological safety, learning, and efficient error handling. Her findings indicate that leaders 
applying an error management strategy encourage more beneficial team attitudes and 
behaviors than leaders applying a strategy similar to error prevention. Nonetheless, there are 
powerful barriers on the individual, group and organizational levels that hamper both leaders' 
and employees' ability to deal with errors constructively (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Zhao 
& Olivera, 2006). These barriers include various image concerns such as fear of being seen as 
incompetent and weak, threats to self-esteem and self-efficacy, as well as reputational costs 
(Canon & Edmondson, 2005; Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Because image concerns are recognized 
as an important barrier hampering the adoption of error management strategies, investigating 
the actual perception followers have of leaders using either an error management or an error 
prevention strategy is paramount for the successful implementation of error management in 
practice. 
 Additionally, we aim to extend the literature on universal dimensions of social 
cognition by examining whether error-handling strategy is a predictor of perceived warmth 
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and competence. As indicated by Cuddy and colleagues (2011), until now very little research 
has investigated how to project warmth and competence at work. Cuddy and colleagues 
(2011) suggested that non-verbal behaviors may offer some insight, but such behaviors are 
mostly automatic and thus difficult to control. Leader error-handling strategy, in contrast, can 
be consciously controlled and improved by training (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & 
Frese, 2005). Therefore, if error-handling strategy affects warmth and competence perceptions 
it would be a predictor through which leaders can actively improve their self-presentation and 
follower perception, potentially leading to beneficial outcomes for organizations. 
The Distinction Between Errors and Consequences 
 Errors are “all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and where these failures cannot be attributed 
to the intervention of some chance agency” (Reason, 1990, p. 9). Put differently, errors are 
inadvertent deviations (i.e., the person making the error does not intend to do something 
wrong), occurring during goal directed action (i.e., the person needs to have some goal s/he is 
trying to achieve), and are potentially avoidable (i.e., were not caused by chance alone; 
Reason, 1990; Gelfand, Frese, & Salmon, 2011). Deliberate deviations from goals, rules, and 
standards are not labeled as errors, but as violations, because they lack the element of being 
unintentional (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Similarly, suboptimal results are not considered 
errors because they ultimately may reach the intended goal, but in an inefficient way (Zhao & 
Olivera, 2006). Finally, failure can be seen as negative outcomes, which however, are not 
necessarily caused by errors (Zhao & Olivera, 2006). Errors may sometimes co-occur with 
failure, but that does not mean only errors cause failure. In some situations, errors may occur 
but be caught before they result in failure (e.g., an accountant notices and corrects an error in a 
spreadsheet that, if not caught, could cost the company millions and result in bankruptcy). In 
other situations, the willful violation of rules (e.g., sabotage) or some chance event (e.g., 
natural disaster) could lead to failure without errors preceding it.  
One of the main reasons why people try to prevent errors is the expectation that errors 
lead to adverse outcomes (Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, 1990). The same error may, 
however, have different consequences: negative, neutral or positive. Consider, for example, a 
scenario where an employee working at a supermarket by mistake puts a discount tag on a 
product that should originally not have been discounted. This error could in turn have either a 
negative consequence (e.g., the product is sold but at a loss for the supermarket), a neutral 
consequence (e.g., the product sells neither at a loss nor at a profit), or a positive consequence 
(e.g., the product sells extremely well, in spite of the lower profit margin, and the high 
  
26 
quantities sold result in an overall profit for the supermarket). Because depending on 
additional factors the same error could lead to completely different consequences it is 
important not to automatically equate errors with negative consequences.  
Error Management and Error Prevention 
The literature on error handling distinguishes between two primary strategies: error 
prevention and error management (e.g., Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 
2003, Van Dyck et al., 2005). Error prevention focuses primarily on averting the negative 
consequences of errors by completely avoiding the error in the first place. The main limitation 
of the error prevention strategy, however, is that it focuses only on preventing errors, but not 
on containing them after they already have occurred. As pointed out by Reason (1990), errors 
are ubiquitous, thus, predicting and eradicating all of them is impossible. Nonetheless, a lot of 
organizations remain proud of their unrealistic zero-error policies (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). 
In organizations, error prevention is linked to negative responses such as punishment of 
errors, blaming the parties responsible, and fear of losing one’s face (e.g., Van Dyck et al., 
2005). When applied to the leadership context, a leader exhibiting an error prevention strategy 
would be someone who stresses the importance of working faultlessly and preventing all 
error. Such a leader is likely to (un)intentionally make followers afraid of reporting any 
problems or errors that occur, which consequently may lead to escalation of the errors into 
large scale failures.  
 Error management, in contrast, explicitly distinguishes the error from its consequences 
and attempts to minimize the error’s negative consequences (e.g., loss of money, delays, etc.), 
while maximizing the positive ones (e.g., learning, system improvement) rather than 
eliminating error occurrence per se. Error management creates an environment in which 
people are likely to be more open about errors, which makes it possible for errors to be caught 
in time before they turn into serious problems (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Applying an error 
management strategy does not, however, involve blind tolerance toward willful violations, 
incompetence, or laziness. Rather, error management accepts errors as “honest mistakes” - an 
inevitable part of life. When applied to the leadership context, a leader with an error-
management strategy would be someone who accepts that errors cannot be completely 
eradicated and encourages followers not to hide errors, but to learn from them as not to repeat 
them in the future. 
Previous research has largely used an individualistic lens, primarily directed at the 
intrapersonal effects of error-handling strategy on various individual-level outcomes. For 
example, error-handling strategy has been found to have important affective, attitudinal, 
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cognitive, and behavioral consequences, such that when compared to individuals with an error 
prevention strategy, individuals with an error management strategy generally display higher 
motivation (Wood et al., 2000), lower frustration and negative affect (Chillarege et al., 2003), 
more explorative behaviors (Dorman & Frese, 1994), stronger emotion control and increased 
metacognition (Keith & Frese, 2005), stronger task-focus (Chapter 4; Van Dyck, Van Hooft, 
De Gilder, & Liesveld, 2010), and better performance (Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese, 1991; 
1995; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 
2005; 2008; Nordstrom et al., 1998). Although understanding the intrapersonal effects of 
errors and error-handling strategy is extremely relevant for theory generation and for practice, 
focusing solely on what happens within an individual does not provide us with the whole 
picture. Errors and the error-handling strategy applied by a person have effects not only on the 
self, but also on others and it is important to understand what those effects are (Goodman, 
Wood, & Chen, 2011; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, 1990). With the current research we 
aim to go beyond the intrapersonal effects of error-handling strategy and investigate error-
handling as an interpersonal phenomenon that can affect followers’ perception of a leader. 
Warmth and Competence 
 Independent streams of research in psychology, anthropology, management, and 
organization science have consistently identified two fundamental dimensions of social 
perception, which although called differently among separate research traditions, in their core 
have focused on two primary aspects of person perception: warmth and competence (Asch, 
1946; Cuddy et al., 2008; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Wojciszke, 
2005; Wojciszke et al., 1998; Wojsziske et al., 2009). Warmth and competence account for 
more than 80% of the variance in our impressions of others (Wojciszke, 2005; Wojciszke et 
al., 1998). Thus, those two primary dimensions are extremely instrumental in outlining how 
we perceive others (Cuddy et al., 2008; Wojciszke, 2005). Warmth includes judgments about 
how friendly, good-natured, and tolerant someone is, whereas competence focuses on whether 
someone is capable, skillful, and intelligent. While warmth informs us about the other’s intent 
towards us (is the person a friend or a foe), competence tells us to what degree the other is 
capable of enacting their intent (Cuddy et al., 2008). 
 Under most circumstances, perceived intent towards us (warmth) is more informative 
and more consequential to our well-being than whether others are able to act on their goals 
(competence), which may be why warmth judgments are primary to competence judgments, 
in the sense that people perceive warmth faster than competence and that warmth is more 
important to them (Cuddy et al., 2008). Various studies support the primacy of warmth. For 
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example, people were shown to identify warmth-related trait words faster than competence-
related trait words (Ybarra, Chan, & Park, 2001). Similarly, warmth-related traits were more 
chronically accessible than competence-related traits; when asked to list the most important 
personality traits, people consistently mentioned more warmth-related than competence- 
related traits; warmth judgments were more stable and less ambiguous than competence 
judgments; competence judgments were dependent on the co-occurring warmth information 
provided about the target of the evaluation (Wojciszke et al., 1998). The latter does not go to 
say that perceived competence is not important for one’s well-being. Under circumstances 
when one’s outcomes depend on the competence of another, the relevance of competence 
increases (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). For example, if a follower’s outcomes depend on the 
competence of the leader (e.g., the employee has a higher chance of getting a bonus with a 
competent leader guiding them), the impact of competence judgments relative to warmth 
judgments likely increases.  
Although there is some debate about which fundamental dimension is primary under 
what circumstances, researchers are equivocal that being perceived as both warm and 
competent is more beneficial than any other combination of the two dimensions (see Cuddy et 
al., 2008). Being perceived as both warm and competent elicits uniformly positive affect and 
behavior (admiration, pride, active and passive help), whereas being perceived as cold and 
incompetent elicits uniformly negative affect and behavior (contempt, dislike, active and 
passive harm; Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2002). Being perceived as cold but competent, 
or as warm and incompetent results in ambivalent affect and behavior (pity, sympathy, active 
help but passive harm for warm but incompetent; envy, dislike, passive cooperation but active 
harm for cold and competent). Additionally, both warmth and competence have been 
theorized as important predictors of leader influence (Hollander, 1958; Hollander & Julian, 
1969) and as vital prerequisites of leader credibility and effectiveness (Chemers, 2001). 
Similarly, in the leadership literature two clusters of leader behavior have been distinguished - 
consideration (akin to warmth) and initiating structure (akin to competence) – both of which 
have been found to relate positively to follower motivation, follower satisfaction with the 
leader, follower and leader job performance, and leader effectiveness (meta-analysis of 130 
studies, Judge, Piccolo, & Illies, 2004). Thus, the evidence from different research streams 
from social cognition, leadership, and organizational behavior, converges in one common 
conclusion: being perceived as warm and competent is beneficial for individuals in general, 
and for leaders in particular. 
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Current Research 
To investigate whether leaders’ error-handling strategy affects follower perception of 
leaders’ warmth and competence, we conduct three studies. Studies 1a and 1b are experiments 
in which participants receive instructions from a fictitious leader, consistent with either an 
error-management or with an error prevention strategy, after which participants’ perceptions 
of the leader were measured. Study 2 is a correlational field study that tests the ecological 
validity of our experimental findings and examines their replicability by measuring error-
handling strategy, warmth and competence perceptions of actual managers as judged by their 
employees. In addition, Study 2 aims to extend the findings of Study 1a and 1b by (1) 
examining the relationship between leaders' error-handling strategy and follower satisfaction 
with the leader, motivation, and organizational goal-fulfillment, as well as (2) the potential 
mediation of these relationships by follower perception of the leader (warmth and 
competence). An overview of our research model is presented in Figure 2.1.  
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Overview of research model 
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Error Strategy and Warmth Perception 
We expect that a leader applying an error management strategy will be perceived as 
warmer, because such a leader would appear more tolerant, understanding, and friendly than 
the error avoidant, apprehensive, and requiring faultless work, error prevention leader. As 
previously mentioned in order to decide whether someone is warm or cold people make 
judgments about how likely that person is to be friendly or not. A leader applying an error-
management strategy who focuses on learning from errors instead of on completely removing 
them is likely to be seen as someone who cares for the well-being of their followers to a larger 
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extent than the uncompromising, zero-error policy, error prevention strategy leader. 
Accordingly, a leader who accepts errors as natural and inevitable is expected to appear 
warmer than a leader who views them as negative occurrences to be prevented at any cost. 
The concept of error prevention is linked to errors being blameworthy (Van Dyck, 2009; Van 
Dyck et al., 2005), making the prospect of committing an error stressful, and threatening to 
followers. Consequently, a leader applying an error prevention strategy is less likely to be 
seen as a friend and more as a potential foe. Supporting this line of reasoning prior work 
suggests that leaders applying an error management strategy create a climate of openness, 
sharing and trust, whereas leaders applying an error prevention strategy create an intolerant 
climate defined by covering-up, guilt, shame, and fear (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; 
Edmondson, 1996; Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999; Van Dyck et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1. Leaders applying an error management strategy are perceived as 
warmer than leaders applying an error prevention strategy. 
Error Strategy and Competence Perception 
Based on existing research, two different opposing rationales regarding the effects of 
error-handling strategy on competence exist. The first rationale aligns with leaders' concerns 
about applying error management, stemming from the view that leaders using this strategy 
would be judged as weak and incompetent due to their apparent leniency (Berry & 
Parasuraman, 1992). In this view, by not being punitive towards followers who commit an 
error, a leader applying error management shows incompetence and encourages lower quality, 
because followers start thinking that anything goes and commit even more errors. In line with 
this perspective, leaders using error management strategies can be seen as indecisive, because 
they do not immediately punish whoever made the error, but instead try to understand why the 
error has occurred, how it can be corrected, and what can be learned from it. 
According to the second rationale, leaders applying error management would be 
perceived as more competent than leaders applying error prevention. Error management has 
previously been linked to improved learning (Edmondson, 1996; 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 
2006) and performance (Van Dyck et al., 2005), both of which can be seen as measures of 
competence. Additionally, findings suggest that the type of climate leaders create with their 
error-handling strategy can either help or harm the efficiency and long-term performance of 
their teams (Edmondson, 1996; 2004a). Teams whose leaders apply an error management 
strategy are more likely to report problems, to analyze them thoroughly and not to repeat the 
same errors, whereas teams whose leaders apply an error prevention strategy hide mistakes, 
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do not communicate when problems arise, and suffer from recurring errors due to lack of 
learning. Although error prevention may be a strategy that works well in predictable 
circumstances, when the situation changes and becomes less stable, error prevention does not 
help a leader handle the unexpected in a constructive way (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Thus, 
one may expect that leaders with an error prevention strategy are less prepared and less skilled 
to handle the unexpected than leaders using an error management strategy. Moreover, 
followers’ perceptions of a leader’s competence are also likely to be affected by how realistic 
the goals set by the leader are (Ridgeway, 2007). As mentioned earlier, error prevention 
strategy tries to do away with all errors, but often people are aware that such a goal is 
impossible to achieve. Such a realization on behalf of followers may have a negative effect on 
the perception of their leader’s competence. In the present study we aim to investigate which 
theoretical rationale is empirically supported by testing whether leaders applying an error 
management strategy are perceived as either less or more competent than leaders applying an 
error prevention strategy. 
Study 1a 
 Study 1a was designed as an initial test of whether and how leaders' error strategy 
affects followers’ warmth and competence perceptions of leaders. Because we were primarily 
interested in the way error-handling strategy influences the individual perceptions of a 
follower regarding a leader, we opted for an experimental study at the dyadic leader-follower 
level. This allowed us to keep external factors controlled, while being able to causally 
establish whether leaders' error-handling strategy influences followers' warmth and 
competence perceptions. 
Method 
 Participants and design. Participants were 45 individuals (23 women and 22 men; 
Mage = 22.70 years, SD = 3.44) recruited on the campus of the university of the first author. 
One participant was excluded from our sample because he did not complete the task. All 
participants were randomly assigned to a two-group (leader instructions: error management 
vs. error prevention) between-participants design. Participants received € 5 for their 
participation. As an extra incentive for participation in the research, participants were told that 
a single prize of € 50 would be distributed through a performance-based lottery. 
Procedure. Participants were seated individually in separate cubicles. They were 
informed that they were taking part in a study on online leadership and that they would 
receive instructions from a leader on the screen. In reality, all messages were preprogrammed 
and no real leader existed. The fictitious leader introduced themselves (no gender information 
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was provided) as having a Master’s in management and computer science and as being 
experienced with the task participants would work on. Our manipulations were developed 
based on earlier theorizing and error-handling instructions used in previous research (Keith & 
Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998) consistent with either error management or with error 
prevention strategy. Namely, in the error management condition the leader told participants 
that it is not always possible to prevent errors, which is why the leader's motto was "To err is 
human". The leader then explained that handling errors constructively and learning from them 
is better for performance. In the error prevention condition, the leader told participants that 
errors can often be prevented, which is why the leader's motto was "Better safe than sorry". 
The leader then mentioned that working meticulously and preventing potential errors is better 
for performance. 
The fictitious leader next instructed participants to open the envelope they received at 
the beginning of the study which included an outline of the task to be completed, namely, 
designing slides in Authorware 7.0. The task was selected because we expected none of the 
participants to be familiar with the software, yet it was possible to develop basic 
understanding of how to work with it within a short timeframe. The instructions provided a 
step-by-step guide. Participants were given 15 minutes to complete a simple designing task. 
After participants completed the task they filled in the measures of warmth and 
competence. In line with the methods used in previous research (e.g., Cuddly et al., 2008; 
Fiske et al., 2002, Judd et al., 2005), we asked participants to what degree they considered the 
leader to exhibit the traits “warm”, “friendly” and “good-natured” (warmth α = .88; M = 2.97, 
SD = 0.99), “skilled”, “efficient” and “efficacious” (competence α = .70; M = 3.24, SD = 
0.87). Responses were given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very 
much). 
To account for alternative explanations of our findings we asked participants how 
experienced they were in programming (1 = not at all experienced, 5 = very experienced), 
how difficult and how enjoyable they found the task (1 = not at all, 5 = very much), how good 
they found the instructions (1 = not at all good, 5 = very good), how well they thought they 
had followed the instructions (1 = not at all, 5 = very well), and how well they thought they 
had performed on the task (1 = very poorly, 5 = very well). 
Results 
 All means, standard deviations, and correlations between the study variables can be 
found in Table 2.1. 
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 Controls. No differences between groups were found for programming experience, 
task difficulty, task enjoyment, clarity of instructions, following instructions, or perceived 
task performance (all Fs < 1.63, all ps > .208). We can thus exclude those variables as 
potentially influencing our results. 
 Main findings. Consistent with our predictions, an analysis of variance revealed that 
leaders who provided error management strategy instructions (M = 3.32, SD = 0.81) were 
perceived as warmer by participants than leaders who provided error prevention strategy 
instructions, (M = 2.53, SD = 1.03), F (1, 43) = 8.22, p = .006, η2p = .16 (see Figure 2). 
Regarding competence, no significant differences between groups were found, F (1, 43) = 
0.61, p = 0.44. Leaders providing error management instructions (M = 3.15, SD = 0.83) were 
not perceived as either more, or less competent than leaders providing error prevention 
instructions (M = 3.35, SD = 0.91). The current findings support Hypothesis 1, but do not 
support either rationale for the relation between error-handling strategy and competence. 
Discussion 
 Study 1a provided the first evidence that leaders’ error-handling strategy positively 
affects leaders' warmth perception. Our findings indicate that, as predicted, leaders exhibiting 
an error management strategy are seen as more friendly and sociable by their followers than 
leaders exhibiting an error prevention strategy. Both types of leaders were not perceived as 
differently competent. It is possible that our instructions have unintentionally influenced both 
groups of participants in seeing the leader as competent. Specifically, in Study 1a all 
participants were told that the leader had a Master’s degree in management and computer 
science and was experienced with the task participants worked on. It is possible that this 
information biased our respondents to perceive both leaders as competent, independently of 
the leader’s error-handling strategy. Moreover, in Study 1a followers had very limited 
“contact” with the leader, which only included the general leader information, general task 
information, and manipulation. The task instructions were handed on a preprinted page, and 
thus were not provided by the fictitious leader.  
 We address the abovementioned limitations in Study 1b by: (a) removing any 
information about the previous experience or prior education of the leader and by (b) having 
the leader directly send all information related to the task, including the general leader 
information, general task information, manipulation, and task instructions. Finally, another
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TABLE 2.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Variables in Study 1a 
 
Variables 
Error 
management
 a 
Error    
prevention
 b            
 M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6     7        8    9    10   11 
1. Condition - - - - -          
2. Perceived Warmth 3.32 0.81 2.53 1.03 .40** -         
3. Perceived Competence 3.15 0.83 3.35 0.91 -.12 .07 -        
 Controls                 
4. Prior experience with programming 2.12 1.39 1.90 1.17 .09 -.01 .04 -        
5. Perceived task difficulty 3.12 1.27 3.60 1.23 -.19 -.25 -.29* -.47*** -       
6. Perceived task enjoyment 2.40 1.00 2.35 1.14 .02 .12 .20 .26† -.44** -      
7. Perceived quality of instructions 2.76 0.83 2.45 1.19 .16 .39** .49** .20 -.54*** .40 -     
8. Following instructions 3.52 0.92 3.35 1.04 .09 .15 .51*** .25 -.29† .06 .39** -    
9. Perceived task performance 2.64 1.44 2.35 1.14 .11 .05 .45** .51*** -.74*** .50*** .53*** .37* -   
10. Sex 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.51 -.07 .20 .15 -.23 .19 -.03 .17 -.06 -.20 -  
11. Age 22.64 2.71 22.75 4.27 -.02 -.32* -.20 -.16 .05 -.16 -.29† -.22 -.22 -.27† - 
 
Note. Condition: Error prevention = 0 and Error management = 1. 
Sex: Man = 0 and Woman = 1.  
a
 n = 25 
b 
n = 20 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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way in which Study 1b differs from Study 1a is the difficulty of the task participants worked 
on. In Study 1a participants received step-by-step instructions, which explained in detail how 
to do the task. Accordingly, making errors was unlikely, thus, the error management strategy 
was less useful than it could be during more complex tasks (e.g., Frese et al., 1991; Keith & 
Frese, 2008). From previous research we know that the benefits of error management over 
error prevention are mainly found for complex, rather than simple tasks (Heimbeck et al., 
2003). Simple tasks do not lead to many errors and require limited skills. Additionally, for 
simple tasks it is easier to work without making errors, thus working faultlessly is a relatively 
realistic goal. It is therefore possible that the lack of difference between groups on perceived 
leader competence was due to participants accepting both the goals of management and of 
prevention as feasible for the simple task. To address this possible alternative explanation of 
our findings in Study 1b we used a more complex task that involved exploratory learning, 
which allowed participants in both groups to make errors during the task. 
Study 1b 
Method 
 Participants and design. Participants were recruited on the campus of the same 
university as in Study 1a. Five participants who had previous experience with the simulation 
task and had participated in a previous related study, as well as one participant who did not 
complete working on the task were removed from all analyses, leaving 48 participants in total 
(34 women; 14 men; Mage = 22.52 years, SD = 3.60). After entering the laboratory participants 
were randomly assigned to a two-group (leader instructions: error management vs. error 
prevention) between-participants design. As an encouragement to participate participants 
were included in a performance-based lottery for € 50. 
Procedure  
The procedure in Study 1b was identical to the procedure in Study 1a with the 
following exceptions. First, no information regarding the competency of the leader (degree 
and prior knowledge of the experimental task) was included. Second, we used a different and 
more complex task than in Study 1a. The task (Train Dispatcher 2.0; Signal Computer 
Consultants, 1997) is a train simulation the goal of which is to guide trains to their end 
destination. Third, participants did not receive payment for participation, but were told that 
based on their performance and on how well they followed the instructions of the leader, 10 
participants would be selected by the leader and entered in a lottery for € 50. Our purpose was 
to make the distinction between the leader and the followers more visible by making 
followers’ outcomes dependent on the leader to a greater extent than in Study 1a. 
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As a cover story we informed participants that they would be randomly assigned to 
communicate with an online leader who would guide them through the task either through an 
interactive chat with video, interactive chat without video, or one-way chat instructions. In 
reality, all participants received one-way chat instructions from the leader.  
Next, all participants saw a chatbox that indicated that the leader was available online. 
The instructions received next were identical between conditions. Specifically, all participants 
read that the leader was participating in this research as a part of a leadership training aimed at 
learning how to lead people online, and that the leader would not be physically present, but 
instruct via the chatbox. Next, all participants received instructions explaining the general 
rules of the task they were going to work on – TrainDispatcher 2.0. The instructions were 
followed by a five-minute practice trial during which participants could guide their first train. 
If participants did not manage to complete this task successfully, the experimenter would 
show them the correct solution step-by-step. 
Participants then received the error-handling strategy manipulation, which was 
identical to that in Study 1a. The instructions in both conditions concluded by stating that 
participants’ goal was to lead as many trains as possible to the exit location. 
After the manipulation, participants worked on the simulation task for 10 minutes. 
Because error management improves task performance over time (see Keith & Frese, 2005; 
2008), we specifically selected a short task duration (10 minutes) to minimize the possibility 
that participants would judge the leader giving error management instructions more favorably 
than the leader giving error prevention instructions due to performing better on the task. 
Next, participants were informed that they would receive some questions related to 
their perception of the leader. Leader’s perceived warmth was measured with the traits 
“warm”, “friendly”, “good-natured”, “nice”, and “likeable” (α = .93; M = 2.99, SD = 1.09). 
Perceived competence was measured with “skilled”, “efficient”, “efficacious”, “confident”, 
and “effective” (α = .85; M = 3.26, SD = 0.83). The measures were adapted from previous 
social cognition research (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002; Judd et al., 2005). Responses were given on 
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).  
 The control variables in Study 1b were similar to those in Study 1a. Specifically, we 
asked participants whether they had previously done the train task (yes, no), how experienced 
they were with similar tasks (1 = not at all experienced, 5 = very experienced), how difficult 
and how enjoyable they found the task (1 = not at all, 5 = very much), how good they found
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Table 2.2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Variables in Study 1b 
 
Variables 
Error 
management
 a
 
Error 
prevention
 b
            
  M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Condition - - - - -           
2. Perceived Warmth 3.81 0.85 2.23 0.64 .68*** -          
3. Perceived Competence 3.12 0.71 3.39 0.92 -.20 .11 -         
 Controls                
4. Prior experience with programming 1.26 0.54 1.48 0.77 -.17 -.09 -.00 -        
5. Perceived task difficulty 3.65 0.94 3.20 1.04 .21 .20 -.15 -.40** -       
6. Perceived task enjoyment 2.96 1.22 3.28 1.17 -.16 .00 .05 .31* -.55*** -      
7. Perceived quality of instructions 2.48 0.99 2.40 1.04 .02 .35** .58*** .11 -.06 .21 -     
8. Following instructions 3.04 1.22 2.92 0.86 .04 .34* .20 .34* -.18 .22 .46** -    
9. Perceived task performance 1.65 0.65 2.36 1.25 -.35** -.17 .13 .47*** -.55*** .42** .01 .14 -   
10. Sex 0.70 0.47 0.72 0.46 -.00 -.10 -.20 -.22 .42** -.11 -.17 -.19 -.43** -  
11. Age 23.35 2.85 22.52 3.60 .13 .07 -.33* -.10 .04 -.17 -.22 -.15 -.23† -.06 - 
 
Note. Condition: Error prevention = 0 and Error management = 1. 
Sex: Man = 0 and Woman = 1. 
a
 n = 27. 
b 
n = 27. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed.
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the instructions (1 = not at all good, 5 = very good), how well they thought they had followed 
the instructions (1 = not at all, 5 = very well) and how well they thought they had performed 
on the task (1 = not at all well, 5 = very well). 
Results 
 The means, standard deviations and correlations among variables in Study 1b are 
presented in Table 2.2. 
Controls. Participants who had prior experience with the task were excluded from the 
analyses. The reasons for this decision was that a study including the same task and similar 
manipulation had been conducted less than a month before the current study, thus the 
previously debriefed participants knew the purpose of the manipulation and the task. No 
differences between groups were found for programming experience, task difficulty, task 
enjoyment, clarity of instructions, and following instructions (all Fs < 2.49, ps > .121). There 
was a difference between groups on how well participants thought they did on the task. 
Specifically, participants who received error management instructions (M = 1.65, SD = 0.65) 
thought they did worse than participants who received error prevention instructions (M = 
2.36, SD = 1.25), F (1, 46) = 5.88, p = .019, η2p = .11. Objectively, however, there were no 
actual differences on performance scores found between conditions, F (1, 46) = 0.27 p = .603, 
η2p = .01.  
Main findings. Consistent with our predictions and the findings of Study 1a, ANOVA 
showed that the leader who provided error management instructions (M = 3.81, SD = 0.85) 
was perceived as warmer by participants than the leader who provided error prevention 
instructions, (M = 2.23, SD = 0.64), F (1, 46) = 53.48, p < .001, η2p = .54 (see Figure 2.2). The 
findings support Hypothesis 1. As in Study 1a, no significant differences between groups 
were found for perceived leader competence, F (1, 46) = 1.28, p = .263. Leaders providing 
error management instructions (M = 3.12, SD = 0.71) were not perceived as either more, or 
less competent than leaders providing error prevention instructions (M = 3.39, SD = 0.92).  
Discussion 
 Study 1b replicated the findings of Study 1a. Specifically, leaders applying an error-
management strategy were perceived as warmer than leaders applying an error prevention 
strategy. Similarly to Study 1a, no difference between groups was found on how competent 
followers perceived a leader. The current results for competence suggest that leaders are 
perceived as equally competent independently of their error-handling strategy. A potential 
explanation of this finding may be that leaders activate certain stereotypes and status beliefs 
due to their higher status (Ridgeway, 2007). In particular, according to the dominant 
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FIGURE 2.2 
Study 1a and 1b mean perceived warmth and competence of the leader per condition. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
 
 
sociocognitive schemas, status is often associated with possessing certain skills and abilities, 
in other words, with being competent. The implicit link between status and competence is 
consistent with the expectation that people usually gain their status by demonstrating high 
competence and task-relevant skills (Hollander, 1964). Previous research has shown that 
competence perceptions are strongly influenced by the status of the person or group 
evaluated, so that high-status others are perceived as competent and low-status others as 
incompetent (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 1999; 2002). It is therefore likely to assume that 
if a person is a leader, they must possess the necessary skills and abilities. Consequently, the 
mere description of someone as a “leader”, especially if there is minimal information 
available, may result in followers judging a leader as competent. If, however, followers have 
had multiple interactions with a leader, they are less likely to base their judgments solely on 
their stereotype of leaders as competent, but on actual examples of the leader’s competence or 
lack thereof. In cases where followers have better knowledge of the leader, error strategy of 
the leader may affect leaders' competence perceptions to a larger extent than in cases where 
followers base their competence perceptions mainly on heuristics about leaders in general.  
 It is also theoretically plausible that participants dismissed competence as less relevant 
than warmth. Although we tried to make followers' outcomes dependent on the leader in 
Study 1b (participants received no formal remuneration for their participation but were told 
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that the leader selected the 10 participants who followed his suggestions and did best on the 
second part of the task for the € 50 lottery), we cannot exclude that followers did not feel 
dependent on the leader (they could have realized the chance of winning the prize was too 
small), rendering the competence information secondary to the warmth information. The 
context may have therefore been notably different from normal leader-follower contexts, 
where follower outcomes are often dependent on the leader. Another way in which our 
context is different from real life is that participants were aware that they would never have to 
work with the leader again. In real organizations one knows that one will have to work with 
the same leader over an extended period of time and if one’s outcomes are dependent on that 
leader, the leader’s competence is of great importance to the self (see Wojciszke, 2005). 
Consequently, to address these limitations, as well to provide a real-life replication of Studies 
1a and 1b, we conducted a questionnaire study with actual employees. 
Study 2 
 Our goal in Study 2 is to replicate and extend the findings of our experimental 
studies in a field setting. Unlike the simulated leaders in Study 1a and 1b who either had 
a pure error management strategy or a pure error prevention strategy, in Study 2 we 
measure attitudes and behaviors consistent with both error management and error 
prevention strategies of actual leaders (managers) as rated by their followers 
(employees). In line with the experimental studies, we expect that error management 
strategy is associated with perceiving leaders as warmer, whereas error prevention 
strategy is associated with perceiving leaders as less warm. Because in Study 2 we 
measure both error-handling strategies rather than manipulate a single strategy our 
Hypothesis 1 was adapted accordingly: 
Hypothesis 1'. Leaders are perceived as warmer when they exhibit (a) high 
rather than low error management and (b) low rather than high error prevention. 
Additionally, in Study 2 we wanted to go beyond the mere perceptions of leaders by 
investigating whether perceived warmth and competence are associated with other variables 
previously identified as beneficial for employees and organizations (e.g., Judge et al., 2004). 
Specifically, we look at satisfaction with the leader, experienced motivation, and 
organizational goal-fulfilment. The interest in the positive effects of leaders’ warmth and 
competence perceptions on various follower and organizational outcomes has been increasing. 
Recently, Cuddy and colleagues (2011) called for more research investigating the dynamics of 
warmth and competence judgments in organizations. Earlier work has discussed the 
conceptual similarities between warmth and competence and concepts used in leadership 
  
 
 
41 
research. For example, Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2007) theoretically connected warmth to the 
concept of relationship development (i.e., coaching, guiding, and supporting followers in a 
way that satisfies their personal needs and goals and allows them to contribute to group goal 
attainment; Chemers, 2000, p. 40) and competence to the concept of resource deployment 
(i.e., leaders using their own skills and abilities and those of their followers to achieve group 
goals; Chemers, 2000, p. 40). Similarly, Cuddy et al. (2008) theoretically linked warmth to 
the concept of consideration (i.e., leaders showing concern, respect, support, and appreciation 
for followers; Judge et al., 2004, p. 36) and competence to initiating structure (i.e., leaders 
properly structuring and organizing themselves and others to achieve a common goal; Judge 
et al., 2004, p. 89).  
Based on existing theorizing and empirical evidence (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008; 2011; 
Fiske et al., 2006) which suggest that both warmth and competence are associated with 
positive attitudes, affect, and behavior on behalf of perceivers, we expect that warmth and 
competence are positively linked to various indicators of effective leadership (e.g., 
satisfaction with leader, motivation, organizational goal-fulfillment). Specifically, followers 
are more likely to be satisfied with leaders who are perceived as more friendly, kind, and 
sociable (i.e., warm) and as more effective, efficient, and skilled (i.e., competent), because 
warmth indicates that the leader is likely to show consideration of the follower’s needs, while 
competence indicates that the leader has the abilities to successfully guide the follower. 
Moreover, followers are more likely to be motivated by a leader if that leader is seen as warm 
and competent (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2011). Such a leader is not only perceived as someone who 
has the ability to guide followers in the right direction (by being competent), but also as 
someone who does so in a way that followers agree with (by being warm). Finally, according 
to existing leadership theories (e.g., integrative leadership, Chemers, 1997; transformational 
leadership, Judge & Piccolo, 2004) in order to perform well and reach organizational goals, 
followers need leaders who are not only focused on the task and skilled to get things done 
(i.e., competent), but also leaders who are considerate of other people’s needs (i.e., warm). 
Previous findings support our theorizing by showing that both leaders’ consideration (akin to 
warmth) and initiating structure (akin to competence) are positively related to a variety of 
leadership outcomes, among which follower’s satisfaction with leaders, follower motivation, 
and follower performance (meta-analysis by Judge et al., 2004). Accordingly, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 2. Leaders’ (a) warmth and (b) competence perceptions are positively 
related to followers’ satisfaction with leaders. 
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Hypothesis 3. Leaders’ (a) warmth and (b) competence perceptions are positively 
related to followers’ motivation. 
Hypothesis 4. Leaders’ (a) warmth and (b) competence perceptions are positively 
related to followers’ organizational goal-fulfillment. 
We expect that followers are more satisfied with, more motivated by, and more likely 
to achieve company goals with leaders exhibiting more error management and with leaders 
exhibiting less error prevention. Error management facilitates learning, self-actualization, 
successful coping, and free communication (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999; Hofmann & Frese, 
2011). With a leader applying error management strategy followers can feel a greater sense of 
security and safety as such a leader will be less likely to punish first and try to establish what 
had actually happened later. Error prevention, in contrast, involves fear of being punished and 
unwillingness to communicate openly, both of which are likely to create tension between 
leaders and followers leading to lower experienced satisfaction by followers. Additionally, 
based on the earlier theorized relations between error-handling and leader perception and 
leader perception and follower satisfaction with the leader, we expect that the relation 
between leaders' error-handling strategy and followers’ satisfaction with the leader is 
mediated by followers’ perception of leaders (warmth and competence). Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5. Error management is (a) positively related to followers’ 
satisfaction and (b) this relationship is mediated by leaders’ perceived warmth 
and competence. 
Hypothesis 6. Error prevention is (a) negatively related to followers’ satisfaction 
and (b) this relationship is mediated by leaders’ perceived warmth and 
competence. 
In grounding our predictions about the link between error strategy and motivation we 
draw on self-determination theory (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000), which posits that people are 
more likely to feel motivated if their basic needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness 
are met. Accordingly, we expect error management to be positively linked to motivation 
because it (1) strengthens followers’ sense of competence by helping them learn and improve 
(Keith & Frese, 2005), (2) promotes autonomy by providing more opportunities for self-
direction (e.g., an employee who is not afraid of making errors is more likely to explore; 
Hofmann & Frese, 2011), and (3) encourages experienced relatedness by increasing 
cooperation, sharing, and feelings of psychological safety (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999). In 
contrast, the followers of leaders who use more of an error prevention strategy may 
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experience reduced motivation. When errors are framed as something to be prevented, 
followers consider them as a sign of incompetence (harming the need for competence). 
Additionally, followers of leaders using error prevention may feel more extrinsically 
constrained and grow concerned about being punished for making errors, which may 
discourage taking responsibility and encourage shifting it and blaming others (harming the 
need for autonomy). Finally, error prevention strategy is linked to secrecy, hiding errors, fear 
for one’s image, all of which are likely to restrain people’s ability to openly and non-
defensively relate to others (harming the need for relatedness). Based on the already outlined 
theoretical and empirical links between leaders' error-handling strategy and perception 
(warmth and competence), as well as between perception and motivation, we predict that 
warmth and competence mediate the effect of leaders' error-handling strategy on followers' 
motivation.  
Hypothesis 7. Error management is (a) positively related to followers’ 
motivation and (b) this relationship is mediated by leaders’ perceived warmth 
and competence. 
Hypothesis 8. Error prevention is (a) negatively related to followers’ motivation 
and (b) this relationship is mediated by leaders’ perceived warmth and 
competence. 
Prior work has shown that error management is linked to improved performance (e.g., 
Keith & Frese, 2005; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Error management makes it easier for people to 
focus on the task at hand (Chapter 4) and to self-regulate (Keith & Frese, 2005), which in turn 
increases the likelihood that people perform well. Accordingly, we expect that leaders who 
use an error management strategy should be able to positively influence their followers’ 
performance as measured by organizational goal-fulfillment. Error prevention, in contrast, 
should lead to less efficient functioning, as evidenced by more frustration and negative affect 
(Chillarege et al., 2003), fewer task-directed thoughts (Chapter 4), and lowered metacognition 
(Keith & Frese, 2005), which ultimately lead to worse performance than error management. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 9. Error management is (a) positively related to followers’ 
organizational goal-fulfilment and (b) this relationship is mediated by leaders’ 
perceived warmth and competence. 
Hypothesis 10. Error prevention is (a) negatively related to followers’ 
organizational goal-fulfilment and (b) this effect is mediated by leaders’ 
perceived warmth and competence. 
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Method 
Participants. Participants were 95 employees (50 women and 41 men, 4 respondents 
did not indicate their sex) working at two large supermarkets located in The Netherlands. Out 
of the 148 employees approached, 95 returned a completed questionnaire, resulting in a 64% 
response rate. For reasons of confidentiality we did not ask for exact age and tenure, but 
provided participants with age and tenure categories instead. The age distribution of 
employees was as follows: 5.3% were younger than 16 years old, 77.9% were between 16 and 
25 years old, 3.2% were between 26 and 35 years old, 2.1% were between 36 and 45 years 
old, 84% were between 46 and 55 years old, 2.2% were older than 56 years old. One 
participant did not report an age category. Out of the 95 employees, 39 (41.1%) had worked at 
their current position 1 year or less, 41 (44.2%) had worked between 1 and 5 years, and 10 
(10.7%) had worked longer than 5 years. Four participants (4.2%) did not indicate how long 
they had worked at the supermarket.  
Measures. Unless otherwise stated all responses were given on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Leaders’ error-handling strategy, as perceived by followers, was measured with 10 
items from the Error Orientation Questionnaire (Rybowiak et al., 1999). The questionnaire 
measures attitudes and behaviors related to error-handling strategy in the work context. We 
adapted the 10 selected items so that the referent was not the self, but the leader. Five items 
measured leaders’ perceived error management: “After an error, my manager thinks through 
how to correct it”, “After an error has occurred, my manager analyzes it thoroughly”, “If 
something went wrong, my manager takes the time to think it through”, “Errors point my 
manager at what he/she can improve”, and “Although mistakes are made, my manager does 
not let go of the final goal” (α = .78; M = 3.71, SD = 0.59). Five items measured leaders’ 
perceived error prevention: “My manager feels stressed when people make a mistake”, “My 
manager is often afraid of people making errors”, “My manager gets upset and irritated if 
people make an error”,” During work, my manager is often worried that errors might occur”, 
and “My manager believes it can be harmful to make errors known to others” (α = .77; M = 
2.40, SD = 0.69). 
Leader warmth (α = .91) and competence (α = .88) perceptions were measured with 
the same 10 items as in Study 1b.  
Satisfaction with the leader was measured with a single item asking “How satisfied are 
you with your leader” (1 = not at all satisfied; 5 = very satisfied). Because single-item 
measures of satisfaction are equally robust as scale measures of satisfaction (Wanous, 
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Reichers, & Hudy, 1997) we opted for the current measure in order to minimize the time 
respondents spent filling in the questionnaire.  
Motivation of the followers was measured with Hackman and Lawler’s (1971) 7-item 
scale. Items were adapted to refer to the motivation experienced by followers with the current 
leader, and not to motivation in general. Sample item is “With this leader I feel personally 
responsible for what I do” (α = .81; M = 3.37, SD = 0.65).  
Organizational goal-fulfillment was measured with four self-developed items. The 
items were, as follows: “I perform my tasks according to the organizations’ standards”, “I 
complete my tasks in time”, “I always meet my deadlines”, and “I am capable of achieving 
the company goals” (α = .76; M = 3.99, SD = 0.52).  
Results 
Table 2.3 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations among variables. 
Several employees shared the same leader, thus the data had a nested structure (employees 
nested within leaders). Because the observations were therefore not completely independent 
we used multilevel modeling (see Hox, 2010) to analyze the data. We conducted all multilevel 
analyses in SPSS with the maximum likelihood method, controlling for age, sex, store, and 
time worked at store, with leader as the assigned nesting variable.  
Multilevel analysis including simultaneously error management, error prevention, and 
the control variables showed that perceived error management of the leader significantly and 
positively related to perceived warmth of the leader, B = 0.36, t(83.81) = 3.87, p < .001, 95% 
CI [0.17, 0.54], supporting Hypothesis 1'a, whereas perceived error prevention was not 
significantly related to perceived warmth of the leader, B = -0.12, t(83.81) = -1.27, p = .208, 
95% CI [-0.32, 0.07], not supporting Hypothesis 1'b. A second multilevel analysis including 
simultaneously error management, error prevention, and the control variables showed that 
perceived error management of the leader significantly and positively related to perceived 
competence of the leader, B = 0.59, t(86) = 6.26, p < .001, 95% CI [0.40, 0.77], whereas 
perceived error prevention was not significantly related to perceived competence of the 
leader, B = -0.09, t(86) = -0.90, p = .370, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.11]. These findings provide 
support for the rationale that error management is associated with perceived competence. 
Next, we tested whether perceived warmth and competence entered simultaneously 
related to leader satisfaction, experienced motivation, and organizational goal-fulfilment. For 
followers’ satisfaction with the leader, the multilevel analyses revealed significant 
relationships with perceived warmth, B = 0.44, t(86) = 4.24, p < .001, 95% CI [0.23, 0.64] and 
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TABLE 2.3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Variables in Study 2 
                
 Variable M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6       7       8        9    10         11 
1 Error management 3.71 0.59 93 -           
2 Error prevention 2.40 0.69 94 -.51
***
 -          
3 Perceived warmth 3.64 0.78 93 .56
***
 -.49
***
 -         
4 Perceived competence 3.88 0.63 93 .62
***
 -.37
***
 .61
***
 -        
5 Satisfaction with leader 3.83 0.95 92 .63
***
 -.48
***
 .67
***
 .62
***
     -       
6 Follower motivation 3.37 0.64 90 .60
***
 -.16 .44
***
 .51
***
 .51
***
 -      
7 Organizational goal-fulfillment 3.99 0.52 92 .27
**
 -.28
**
 .20† .11 -.00 .14 -     
8 Sex 0.62 0.84 90 .13 -.12 .26
*
 .12 .17 -.10 .13 -    
9 Age 2.43 1.25 93 .11 -.09 .14 .05 .15 .02 .18 .51
***
 -   
10 Store - - 95 .00 .16 -.13 .23
*
 -.07 .14 .13 .24
*
 .19† -  
11 Time worked at store 1.75 0.88 91 .08 -.06 .13 .03 .10 .40
***
 .16 .42
***
 -.08 -.01 - 
 
Note. Sex: Man = 0 and Woman = 1. Time worked at store: Less than a year  = 1, Between 1 and 5 years = 2, Between 5 and 10 years = 3, Between 10 and 15 years 
= 4, Between 15 and 20 years = 5, Longer than 20 years = 6.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. All tests are two-tailed. 
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with perceived competence, B = 0.38, t(86) = 3.82, p < .001, 95% CI [0.18, 0.58]. These 
findings indicate that, as expected, being seen as a more warm and a more competent leader is 
linked to higher satisfaction with the leader by followers, supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
For followers’ motivation, the multilevel analysis revealed significant relationships with 
perceived warmth, B = 0.32, t(84) = 2.61, p = .011, 95% CI [0.08, 0.56] and with perceived 
competence, B = 0.33, t(86) = 2.87, p = .005, 95% CI [0.10, 0.56], supporting our predictions 
that both perceived warmth and competence of the leader are positively related to follower 
motivation and providing support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. For organizational goal-
fulfillment, the multilevel analysis shows no significant relationship with perceived warmth, B 
= 0.23, t(86) = 1.57, p = .121, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.52] or perceived competence, B = -0.06, t(86) 
= -0.41, p = .682, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.21], thus Hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported. The 
latter findings go against our predictions that leaders’ perceived warmth and competence are 
related to followers’ organizational goal-fulfillment and suggest that no mediation should be 
expected through warmth and competence for the effect of leader error-handling strategy on 
organizational goal fulfillment (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Thus, 
we can conclude that Hypotheses 9b and 10b are not supported by default, as the mediator 
variables should be related to the dependent variable for mediation to occur.  
Mediation analyses. Separate multilevel analyses including both perceived error 
management and error prevention and the control variables revealed a positive relationship 
between leaders’ perceived error management and followers’ satisfaction with the leader, B = 
0.53, t(85) = 5.47, p < .001, 95% CI [0.34, 0.73] and motivation, B = 0.64, t(83) = 6.94, p < 
.001, 95% CI [0.46, 0.83], but not with organizational goal-fulfillment, B = 0.12, t(85) = 1.09, 
p = .278, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.34]. Accordingly, the data provided support for Hypotheses 5a and 
7a, but not for Hypothesis 9a. Error prevention was not significantly related to any of the 
dependent variables (all B's < -0.23, all p's > .052), thus no support was found for Hypotheses 
6a, 8a, and 10a. 
 As can be seen in Table 2.4, the relationship between error management and 
satisfaction with the leader was reduced from B = 0.53 to B = 0.22 after including perceived 
warmth and competence in the equation, B = 0.22, t(85) = 2.12, p = .026, 95% CI [0.03, 0.44]. 
Bootstrap analysis (5000 iterations; see Preacher and Hayes, 2008) including warmth and 
competence as mediators, all control variables and error prevention (also controlled for) 
revealed a significant total indirect effect of error management on satisfaction with the leader 
of 0.27, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [0.10, 0.50]. Observing the individual indirect effects of the 
mediators showed that only warmth independently mediated the effect on satisfaction with the 
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leader, B = 0.15, SE = 0.08, 95% CI [0.04, 0.35], while competence did not, B = 0.12, SE = 
0.08, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.31]. Our findings partially support Hypothesis 5b. 
The relationship between error management and follower motivation was reduced 
from B = 0.64 to B = 0.43 after including perceived warmth and competence in the equation 
but remained significant, B = 0.43, t(83) = 4.14, p < .001, 95% CI [0.22, 0.64]. The bootstrap 
analysis revealed a significant total indirect effect of error management on follower 
motivation with the leader of 0.13, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.04, 0.28]. Tests of the separate 
indirect effects revealed that only warmth independently mediated the effect on motivation, B 
= .07, SE = 0.05, CI (0.02, 0.19), while competence did not, B = .06, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [-
0.02, 0.22]. Our results provide partial support for Hypothesis 7b. 
 
TABLE 2.4 
Results of Multilevel Analyses Predicting Satisfaction with the Leader from Perceived 
Error Management and Perceived Error Prevention With and Without Hypothesized 
Mediators 
Variables 
 Satisfaction with the Leader  
 Model 1            Model 2  
B (SE) 95% CI B (SE) 95% CI 
Control variables     
Sex 0.09 (0.10) (-0.10, 0.28) 0.15 (0.08) (-0.02, 0.32) 
Age 0.09 (0.09) (-0.08, 0.26) 0.07 (0.08) (-0.08, 0.22) 
Store -0.10 (0.18) (-0.45, 0.25) -0.17 (0.17) (-0.50, 0.17) 
Time worked at store -0.08 (0.10) (-0.29, 0.12) -0.09 (0.09) (-0.26, 0.09) 
Independent variables     
Perceived error management 0.53*** (0.10) (0.34, 0.73) 0.22*(0.10) (0.02, 0.42) 
Perceived error prevention -0.19† (0.10) (-0.39, 0.01) 0.11 (0.09) (-0.29, 0.06) 
Mediators     
Perceived warmth   0.35**(0.10) (0.14, 0.55) 
Perceived competence   0.25* (0.11) (0.04, 0.46) 
Other     
Intercept .00 (0.29) (-0.58, 0.58) 0.11 (0.26) (-0.40, 0.63) 
Manager-level variance 0.00  0.00  
-2 residual log-likelihood 194.34  167.22  
∆ -2 residual log-likelihood   27.12***  
 
Note. Standardized coefficients with standard error in parentheses are reported.  
df = 85.  
Sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 2.5 
Results of Multilevel Analyses Predicting Motivation from Perceived Error Management 
and Perceived Error Prevention With and Without Hypothesized  
Mediators 
Variables 
 Motivation  
 Model 1            Model 2  
B (SE) 95% CI B (SE) 95% CI 
Control variables     
Sex 0.32† (0.18) (-0.03, 0.68) 0.49** (0.18) (0.14, 0.84) 
Age -0.04 (0.09) (-0.22, 0.13) -0.05 (0.08) (-0.21, 0.11) 
Store -0.24 (0.18) (-0.13, 0.61) 0.25 (0.20) (-0.14, 0.63) 
Time worked at store -0.07 (0.11) (-0.14, 0.29) 0.10 (0.10) (-0.10, 0.29) 
Independent variables     
Perceived error management 0.64*** (0.09) (0.46, 0.83) 0.43***(0.10) (0.22, 0.64) 
Perceived error prevention 0.11 (0.10) (-0.09, 0.31) 0.17† (0.10) (-0.02, 0.35) 
Mediators     
Perceived warmth   0.24*(0.11) (0.02, 0.47) 
Perceived competence   0.18 (0.11) (-0.05, 0.41) 
Other     
Intercept -0.45 (0.38) (-1.21, 0.31) -0.55 (0.38) (-1.30, 0.21) 
Manager-level variance 0.00  0.00  
-2 residual log-likelihood 185.57  172.36  
∆ -2 residual log-likelihood   13.21***  
 
Note. Standardized coefficients with standard error in parentheses are reported.  
df = 83.  
Sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 2.6 
Results of Multilevel Analyses Predicting Organizational Goal-Fulfillment from Perceived 
Error Management and Perceived Error Prevention With and Without Hypothesized 
Mediators 
Variables 
Organizational Goal-Fulfillment 
 Model 1            Model 2  
B (SE) 95% CI B (SE) 95% CI 
Control variables     
Sex 0.05 (0.21) (-0.37, 0.47) 0.11 (0.23) (-0.34, 0.56) 
Age -0.06 (0.10) (-0.26, 0.14) -0.07 (0.10) (-0.27, 0.13) 
Store 0.44* (0.22) (0.01, 0.86) 0.60* (0.25) (0.11, 1.09) 
Time worked at store 0.44** (0.13) (0.18, 0.69) 0.43** (0.13) (0.17, 0.68) 
Independent variables     
Perceived error management 0.12 (0.11) (-0.10, 0.34) 0.19 (0.13) (-0.07, 0.45) 
Perceived error prevention -0.23† (0.12) (-0.46, 0.00) -0.23† (0.12) (-0.46, 0.01) 
Mediators     
Perceived warmth   0.12(0.14) (-0.17, 0.41) 
Perceived competence   -0.21 (0.15) (-0.50, 0.08) 
Other     
Intercept -1.21** (0.45) (-2.10, -0.32) -1.44** (0.48) (-2.39, -0.48) 
Manager-level variance 0.00  0.00  
-2 residual log-likelihood 219.90  217.90  
∆ -2 residual log-likelihood   2.00  
 
Note. Standardized coefficients with standard error in parentheses are reported. 
df = 85. 
Sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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Discussion 
 The current findings extend our understanding by looking at whether observed error-
handling strategy of actual leaders relates to followers' perception of leaders' warmth and 
competence. Our results show that leaders with an error management strategy were perceived 
as both warmer and more competent than leaders exhibiting less of an error management 
strategy. Additionally, our results provide evidence that higher warmth perceptions are related 
to greater satisfaction with leaders by followers, and to higher follower motivation, but not to 
higher levels of organizational goal-fulfillment. Finally, we found support for the predicted 
mediation by warmth of the relationship between error management and satisfaction with the 
leader and of the relationship between error management and follower motivation. 
Competence was not a mediator. These results indicate that by showing more error 
management characteristics, leaders can influence whether followers perceive them as warm, 
and that those perceptions can in turn affect how satisfied with and motivated by the leader 
followers are. No effects were found for error prevention. Additionally, against our 
expectations, neither error management, nor error prevention were related to organizational 
goal-fulfillment. We believe that this lack of correlation may be linked to the context in which 
the study was conducted. Specifically, the organizational goals set for employees at a 
supermarket may not be particularly high nor particularly stimulating, causing a ceiling effect. 
The possibility that organizational context plays an important role in the types of goals set by 
employees is logical and should be further investigated in relation to error-handling strategy 
and leader perception in a context with higher expectations of employees. 
General Discussion 
 In the current research we were interested in whether the error-handling strategy of a 
leader would influence followers’ warmth and competence perceptions of that leader. 
Conflicting perspectives on the effects of error-handling on leader perception by followers 
exist both in theory and in practice. Accordingly, empirically investigating whether and how 
leaders’ error-handling strategy affects followers’ perceptions of leaders was necessary. Our 
findings consistently show that leaders applying an error management strategy are perceived 
as warmer, friendlier and more sociable by their followers than leaders applying an error 
prevention strategy (Study 1a and 1b) and that being seen as a leader with a more of an error 
management strategy is linked to being perceived as warmer than leaders with a less of an 
error management strategy (Study 2). Regarding competence, our experimental studies 
suggested that leaders applying an error management strategy were seen as equally competent 
as leaders applying an error prevention strategy. Our questionnaire study, however, found that 
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actual followers who see their leaders as applying more of an error management strategy, 
perceived the leaders as more competent than did followers who thought their leaders used 
less of an error management strategy. Nonetheless, we found that only warmth but not 
competence mediated the relationship between error management and satisfaction with the 
leader and between error management and follower motivation (Study 2). Overall, our results 
suggest that being seen as a leader with an error management strategy leads to perceptual (i.e., 
being perceived as warmer), attitudinal (i.e., higher satisfaction with leader), and motivational 
benefits (i.e., higher follower motivation) and is not associated with perceptions of 
incompetence that managers in practice often fear for.  
Theoretical and Practical Relevance  
 The present studies add to the existing literature on leader error-handling (e.g., Cannon 
& Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003; 2004a; Hunter et al., 2011; Rodriguez 
& Griffin, 2009; Thoroughgood et al., 2012; Zhao, 2011) by investigating the perceptual 
effects of leader error-handling strategy. From previous research we know that leaders 
applying an error management strategy create an error tolerant climate within their teams that 
stimulates open communication about errors, psychological safety, learning from prior errors 
and enhanced long-term performance (e.g., Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Edmondson, 1996; 
Van Dyck et al., 2005). These earlier studies raised the question whether having an error 
management strategy as a leader would be associated with being perceived more favorably by 
followers. Whether this was indeed the case, however, could not be established based on the 
available literature. Our research provides novel and important evidence showing that error-
handling strategy affects how a leader is perceived. 
 Second, the current studies broaden our understanding of the relationship between 
error-handling strategy on follower work attitudes and motivation, and as such help us to 
develop new theorizing that takes perceptions into account. The interest in the benefits of 
applying error management in organizations has been increasing (Hofmann & Frese, 2011; 
Van Dyck et al., 2005), but more empirical evidence is necessary to support the extant 
theorizing. Our studies indicate that applying an error management strategy can positively 
influence not only leader perception by followers, but also how satisfied followers are with 
the leader and how motivating they consider the leader to be. 
 Third, our research adds to knowledge about the emergence of warmth and 
competence perceptions. There is rich literature (e.g., Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 
2005; Todorov, Said, & Verosky, 2011) examining facial characteristics and their effect on 
warmth (a.k.a. trustworthiness) and competence (a.k.a. dominance). Additionally, there is rich 
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literature on social cognition and group stereotyping identifying factors affecting warmth and 
competence perceptions (for a review see Cuddy et al., 2008). Prior research has focused 
mostly on indirect interactions (reading a description of a stereotyped group or of a person) or 
on facial perception from pictures. However, less research has looked at warmth and 
competence inferred from task relevant behavior. Our experimental studies differ from 
previous research in that participants made inferences about a leader based on more direct 
information (the words came from the source – the leader – and were not framed as second 
hand information describing the leader). Although the leader in our experiments did not 
interact with participants (the chat was one-sided), our questionnaire study involved making 
judgments based on actual interactions between leaders and followers. We thus add to the 
literature on warmth and competence by looking at more direct (Study 1a and 1b) and realistic 
interaction-based (Study 2) formation of judgments. 
 Fourth, our results suggest that leaders should not be afraid of being perceived as 
having an error management strategy by followers, because error management is linked to 
improved leader perception. Moreover, error management has the additional benefit of 
making followers more motivated and satisfied with their leader, which in turn could 
potentially exert a positive influence on other work-related attitudes and behaviors. Unlike 
some earlier factors suggested to affect warmth and competence perceptions (e.g., non-verbal 
behavior), error-handling strategy is relatively easy to adopt and more under the conscious 
control of leaders. It is therefore possible to train leaders in effective error management skills 
in order to reap the benefits of improved leader perception.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Although the reported findings extend the literature in multiple ways, several 
limitations must be acknowledged. First, in order to limit the effect of other factors that can 
potentially affect our findings, we used an artificial leader-follower set-up in Studies 1a and 
1b. Specifically, we did not want to include a direct video or audio chat between leader and 
follower because this would add multiple factors besides the manipulation that could affect 
the findings, such as leader appearance, mood, gender, eloquence, tone of voice, and so on. 
Future research could apply a more realistic experimental setting by using actors trained to 
behave consistent either with error management or with error prevention and casted as 
leaders. Alternatively, future research could focus on field experiments including an error 
management training intervention. 
Second, leader-follower interactions usually involve both parties communicating and 
cooperating with each other, but in our experimental studies participants only got to read texts 
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sent by the leader, thus no real interactions took place. In the questionnaire study, we only 
focused on perceptions of error-handling strategy, warmth, and competence at a specific point 
in time, but not on their development over time. It will be worth investigating how multiple 
interactions between leaders and followers shape the perceptions of warmth and competence 
and the role error-handling strategy plays during this process of impression (re)formation. 
Future research could address this issue by using a longitudinal design in the field or by 
conducting multi-interaction leader-follower experiments. 
 Third, another potential limitation is that in Study 2 we focused not on how leaders 
behave regarding errors, but on how they are perceived to behave. One could expect that 
leaders have a preferred way to deal with errors that could be called their error-handling 
strategy (Rybowiak et al., 1999). According to contingency theories (e.g., Fiedler, 1967), 
however, leaders adapt their behavior to their followers, which is why the same leader can be 
seen differently by different followers. We believe that both approaches offer a grain of truth: 
leaders are more likely to stick to their preferred error-handling strategy most of the time, but 
there are variations to the strategy that leaders apply depending on who the follower is or 
what the context is. Future research can investigate existing leader-follower dyads to test 
whether leaders not only are perceived as having variations in their error-handling strategy by 
different followers, but actually behave differently towards different followers. Additionally, 
future research could investigate the relationship between error handling, perception and 
attitudes with a sample of leaders and followers in a different, more goal-driven context to test 
the generalizability of the current findings over contexts. 
 Fourth, the results of Study 2 indicate that error management, rather than error 
prevention drives the effects of error-handling strategy on perception and follower attitudes. 
Such a finding is interesting and should be investigated further in an experimental setting 
including a control group so that it can be established if and when error management or error 
prevention influence certain outcomes.  
Finally, it should be noted that the results between the two experimental studies and 
the questionnaire study did differ in one aspect. Specifically, the questionnaire study showed a 
positive relationship between error management and perceived leader competence whereas 
the experimental studies did not. A likely explanation for this inconsistency may be found in 
existing theorizing. Namely, based on previous literature it appears that during impression 
formation, people are primarily interested in warmth and less in competence information 
(Wojciszke et al., 1998). Accordingly, it may well be that people pay less attention to 
competence information during initial image creation because at that stage whether the other 
  
 
 
55 
has good or bad intent is what matters most (Fiske et al., 2002). When people have had prior 
experience with someone, however, they more or less know what the other’s intent is, thus, 
people’s interest in competence information increases, because competence reveals whether 
the other can act upon their intent. The participants in our experimental studies knew that they 
would never again interact with the leader, whereas the followers who filled in the 
questionnaire in Study 2 interacted with their leader on a daily basis. Future research should 
investigate whether the expectation of multiple interactions moderates the perceptions people 
focus on. It is likely that people primarily focus on warmth information in one time 
encounters, and that both warmth and competence are deemed important in multiple 
encounters. 
Conclusion 
 Our main goal in the current research was to investigate whether leaders' error-
handling strategy affects followers’ perceptions of leaders and how these perceptions in turn 
are related to follower attitudinal and motivational outcomes. Our findings show that leaders 
using an error management strategy can reap perceptual, as well as attitudinal and 
motivational benefits when compared to leaders using error prevention as a primary strategy 
(Study 1a and 1b) or to leaders using less of an error management strategy (Study 2). 
Accordingly, our results suggest that image concerns should not pose a real barrier for the 
application of error management by leaders in organizations. Instead, leaders having an error 
management strategy may be closer to efficient leadership because they have the advantage of 
being seen more favorably than leaders having an error prevention strategy.  
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Abstract 
Leaders can try to earn their followers' trust either by being strict and uncompromising (error 
prevention strategy) or by being realistic towards human fallibility (error management 
strategy). Which one of the strategies is more effective in inducing trust, however, remains 
unknown. In two studies we empirically investigate whether leaders' error-handling strategy 
affects followers’ trust and whether this relationship is mediated by followers' evaluative 
impressions of leaders' sociability, morality, and competence. In Study 1, a questionnaire 
measuring leaders' (coaches') perceived error management, error prevention, sociability, 
morality, competence, and trust, was filled in by 182 players from 27 non-professional Dutch 
football teams. Study 2 was an experiment (N = 73) in which we manipulated leaders' error-
handling strategy (error management vs. control vs. error prevention) and measured its causal 
effects on followers' evaluative impressions (sociability, morality, and competence) and on 
trust. Overall, our findings indicate that error management is positively associated with trust 
in leaders than low levels of error management (Study 1) or than error prevention (Study 2) 
and that the relationship between leaders' error-handling strategy and followers' trust is 
mediated by perceived morality (both studies) and competence (Study 1 only).  
 
 Keywords: leader perception, trust, error management, error prevention, sociability, 
morality, competence 
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Introduction  
 Leaders, be they CEOs, managers, sport coaches or small-business owners, aspire to 
be trusted and for a good reason - without trust between leaders and followers effective 
leadership is difficult, if not impossible. An important aspect of creating trust involves how 
leaders’ handle various difficulties, problems, and errors occurring at the workplace. One 
way in which leaders can try to influence their followers’ trust is by focusing on vigilance 
and prevention of potential errors in order to show high reliability and trustworthiness. 
Nonetheless, no matter how vigilant and striving for zero-errors leaders are, they will make 
errors, and so will their followers, because the occurrence of errors is inevitable (e.g., 
Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, 1990; 1997; Zhao, 2011). An alternative strategy leaders 
can apply is accepting that things can and will go wrong at some point and instead focusing 
on minimizing the damage of errors. Based on the available literature it is unclear whether 
attempting to prevent errors really pays off in terms of increased follower trust or whether 
followers instead put their trust in leaders who are more realistic about errors. 
 The literature distinguishes between two error-handling strategies leaders can use: 
error prevention and error management (e.g., Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese, Brodbeck, Heinbokel, 
Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 1991; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; 
Van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005). Error prevention is the standard strategy most 
people apply, because from early on we are taught that errors are bad, indicate poor ability, 
and have negative consequences (Reason, 1990; 1997). Accordingly, we try to prevent those 
negative consequences by preventing the occurrence of the error itself. Error management, in 
contrast, is a strategy that accepts errors as unavoidable and instead focuses not on 
completely removing all error, but on detecting and minimizing the negative consequences of 
errors, while maximizing the potential positive consequences, such as learning and secondary 
error prevention (Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2008, Van Dyck et al., 2005). 
While most of the existing error-handling literature has focused on investigating the effects of 
error prevention and error management on individual (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Frese, 1991; 
1995; Frese et al., 1991; Keith & Frese, 2005, Zhao, 2011), group (Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 
Hofmann & Mark, 2006), and organizational performance (Van Dyck et al., 2005), the 
broader picture of how error-handling strategies affect individuals’ cognitions in general, and 
specifically how leaders’ error–handling affects followers’ sociability, morality, and 
competence perceptions of the leaders, remain largely underinvestigated.  
In two studies (a correlational field study and an experimental lab study) we 
investigate (1) which leader error-handling strategy is more beneficial for followers' trust in 
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leaders and (2) explain how leaders' error-handling strategy is linked to followers' trust by 
looking into the mediating mechanisms that explain the relationship between leaders’ error-
handling strategy and trust. Specifically, for the mediational part of our research we integrate 
the trust literature (e.g., Burke, Sims, Lazzara, & Salas, 2007; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 
2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998) and the literature on social cognition and impression formation (e.g., Cuddy, 
Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Wojciszke, 
1995; 2005; Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), 
and examine leaders' perceived sociability (a.k.a. ‘benevolence’ in the trust literature), 
morality (a.k.a. ‘integrity’ in the trust literature), and competence (a.k.a., ‘ability’ in the trust 
literature) as potential mediators.  
The current research contributes to scientific knowledge in at least three ways. First, it 
clarifies the relationship between leaders’ error-handling strategy and trust. This is important 
because error prevention strategy underlies various accepted business frameworks advocating 
error-free performance and zero defects (e.g., Six Sigma, Pande & Holpp, 2002) and 
accordingly leaders are often encouraged to be intolerant of errors (Zhao, 2011). Nonetheless, 
initial investigations challenge the conventional wisdom that leaders’ use of a prevention 
strategy promotes trust and reveal a darker side to error prevention, while showing the 
benefits of error management (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999). Our research provides the first 
direct empirical investigation of whether leaders’ use of error prevention or of error 
management strategy is more beneficial for followers’ trust. 
The second contribution of the current research is in going beyond the intrapersonal 
effects of error-handling strategy by investigating error-handling as an interpersonal 
phenomenon. The majority of the existing error-handling work to date has used an 
individualistic lens, primarily directed at the intrapersonal effects of error-handling strategy 
on various individual-level outcomes: motivation (Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 
2000), affect (negative affect and frustration, Chillarege, Nordstrom, & Williams, 2003), 
cognition (task-focus; Van Dyck, Van Hooft, De Gilder, & Liesveld, 2010), self-regulation 
(emotional control and metacognition, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), and 
performance (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese et al., 1991; Keith & Frese, 
2005). While this research has provided valuable insights in how error-handling operates at 
the individual level, we still lack understanding of how an individual’s error-handling 
strategy affects others. Interindividual effects of leaders’ error-handling strategies are 
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important because they can influence the functioning of employees (e.g., can potentially 
affect various outcomes related to employee productivity, such as trust in the leader, 
satisfaction with the leader, motivation, organizational commitment, and job satisfaction). By 
investigating the interindividual effects of leaders’ error-handling we add to the growing line 
of research investigating the benefits and drawbacks of error-handling strategies in the 
workplace (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Frese, 1991; 1995; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Van 
Dyck et al., 2005), as well as to the scientific understanding of the factors facilitating and 
hindering trust formation.  
The third contribution of our research lies in linking the leadership literature to the 
literature on social cognition and impression formation (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 
1999; 2002; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). There is a very rich existing literature 
showing that sociability, morality, and competence determine people’s attitudes and 
behaviors in an interpersonal context (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; 
Wojciszke, 1995; 2005; Wojciszke et al., 1998; 2009). Nonetheless, we know very little 
about what factors in a leader affect the impressions followers form in terms of sociability, 
morality, and competence. Previous research has mostly focused on leaders’ appearance (e.g., 
Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005; Todorov, Said, & Verosky, 2011; Willis & 
Todorov, 2006) and how it affects impressions, however, the effects of leaders’ behaviors on 
followers’ impressions remain underinvestigated. The present research extend previous work 
by looking beyond leaders’ appearance into error-handling strategy as a potential antecedent 
of followers’ sociability, morality, and competence judgments of leaders.  
Hypotheses Development 
Error-Handling Strategy and Trust 
Trust is defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or the behavior of another” 
(Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). The practical benefits of trust, especially in the leadership 
context, have received strong support. Specifically, trust in leadership has been linked to 
various positive consequences for organizations, such as greater follower satisfaction with a 
leader, organizational citizenship behaviors, improved follower performance, higher job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment (for a meta-analysis see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). It 
is because of those benefits for leaders and organizations that both researchers and 
practitioners are interested in establishing what characteristics or behaviors in a leader make 
followers trust the leader more. 
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An important leader characteristic that may affect trust is a leader’s error-handling 
strategy. One error-handling strategy is error prevention, which focuses on doing things right 
the first time and on actively avoiding making errors. If a leader or an organization 
consistently work error-free they are seen as reliable and deserving others’ trust (Hunter, 
Tate, Dzieweczynski, Bedell-Avers, 2011), which is why the idea of error prevention is 
intuitively appealing. The practice of error prevention, however, has the negative implication 
that no errors are allowed, which creates an unobtainable goal because errors are an 
inevitable part of most activities (e.g., people rarely have perfect knowledge of the situation 
they are in, or the necessary unwavering attention to notice every potential error before it 
manifests as a negative consequence; Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Accordingly, if errors are 
made by a follower whose leader uses error prevention as a strategy, the follower is likely to 
feel vulnerable and have negative expectations about the intentions of the leader.  
Although error prevention has the positive goal of removing errors, if errors do appear 
they are perceived as threats that are likely to lead to some form of punishment and are 
consequently associated with distrust, covering up, fear of losing face, unwillingness to 
communicate about problems (e.g., Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck, 2009), and other 
self-protective activities that indicate lack of willingness to be vulnerable. In line with this 
logic, qualitative studies suggested that the teams of leaders who focused on preventing errors 
were less likely to communicate openly due to fear of being punished and more prone to 
cover up and under-report occurring errors (Edmondson 1996; 1999; 2004a). The opposite 
was true for the teams whose leaders framed errors as learning opportunities and created a 
more constructive error-handling climate. Consequently, we predict that contrary to popular 
belief leaders' use of an error prevention strategy is harmful to followers' trust. 
Hypothesis 1a. Leaders’ error prevention is negatively related to trust.  
To be willing to trust another party, people should feel that their vulnerabilities and 
limitations will not be exploited (Rousseau et al., 1998). Error management can create an 
environment in which people are not afraid of showing their vulnerability (e.g., psychological 
safety as a specific case of trust, Edmondson, 1999; 2004a,b). A leader who accepts that 
errors will occur and conveys the importance of learning from them makes it possible for 
followers to be vulnerable because errors are seen less as something associated with being 
punished and more as an opportunity to improve oneself and one's work (e.g., Van Dyck et 
al., 2005; Zhao & Olivera, 2006).  
Earlier theorizing, in line with our predictions, suggests that error management is 
positively linked to trust (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 2004b, Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 
  
63 
2005), yet, empirically based knowledge is currently lacking. Nonetheless, in line with our 
reasoning, related prior work on psychological safety provides evidence that leaders using 
principles similar to error management inspire greater psychological safety in their teams 
(e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 2004b)
1
. We hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1b. Leaders’ error management is positively related to trust.  
Antecedents of Trust 
 Prior research has identified three main antecedents of trust: benevolence, integrity, 
and ability (Mayer et al., 1995), all three of which have a unique relationship with trust 
(Colquitt et al., 2007). First, benevolence is defined as “the extent to which a trustee is 
believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (Mayer et 
al., 1995, p. 718). Characteristics such as caring, supportive, friendly and nice are inherent to 
benevolence. Because it creates emotional attachment between trustor and trustee, 
benevolence is considered as an affective base of trust (Colquitt et al., 2007). Second, 
integrity is defined as “the perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the 
trustor feels acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). A person seen as having high integrity 
would be characterized as fair, just, and honest. Both benevolence and integrity convey 
information about what kind of intentions a trustee perceives a trustor to have (Colquitt et al., 
2007). The more the trustee thinks the trustor has good intentions, the more the trustee will 
perceive a trustor as having high benevolence and high integrity. Finally, ability is defined as 
“skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some 
specific domain” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 717). Ability provides information on whether 
trustees have the skills and competence needed to act upon their intentions (Colquitt et al., 
2007).  
 The three antecedents of trust can be seen as conceptual triplets to three concepts 
originating in the social cognition literature on person and group perception and impression 
formation. Those concepts are sociability, morality, and competence. Sociability, similar to 
benevolence, includes judgments of how friendly, good-natured and sociable someone is and 
informs us about the others’ intent towards us (Cuddy et al., 2008; Ellemers et al., 2008; 
Leach et al., 2007). Morality, like integrity, gives us information about how fair, honest and 
moral we perceive someone to be (Leach et al., 2007; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, in press). 
                                                 
1
 Psychological safety, like trust, involves a willingness to be vulnerable to others’ actions (Edmondson, 2004b). 
Trust, however, is a broader construct than psychological safety. Namely, psychological safety is a group level 
construct, whereas trust can be an individual, group, or an organizational level construct (Edmondson, 2004b). 
Moreover, psychological safety defines vulnerability narrower than the type of vulnerability covered by the trust 
construct (Edmondson, 2004b). In our research we chose trust rather than psychological safety, because we were 
interested in how leaders' behavior affects individual trust, rather than in trust within a group. 
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Finally, competence, similar to ability, conveys information about whether someone can act 
upon their intentions (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2008). In the person and group perception literature 
sociability and morality often are combined under the label warmth (see Cuddy et al., 2008; 
Ellemers et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; Wojciszke et al.,1998), however, recent work 
suggests that sociability and morality are separate concepts that load on different dimensions 
and should be treated as such (see Leach et al., 2007). In line with the trust literature, which 
identifies benevolence, integrity, and ability as predictors of trust (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2007; 
Mayer & Davies, 1995), we predict that sociability, morality, and competence would be 
positive predictors of trust.  
Hypothesis 2. Leaders' perceived (i) sociability, (ii) morality, and (iii) 
competence are positively related to followers' trust in the leader. 
Sociability, Morality, and Competence as Mediators 
 Sociability judgments are made based on what intentions we perceive someone to 
have towards us. We consider people who we perceive as having good intentions to be 
potential friends and those we perceive as having bad intentions to be potential foes (for a 
review see Cuddy et al., 2008). Leaders using an error prevention strategy show themselves 
as strict and uncompromising. A leader who tells followers they should work flawlessly and 
avoid errors is thus less likely to be seen as someone having good intentions towards 
followers, because if anything goes wrong such a leader is more likely to look for someone to 
blame and punish (Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003; Van Dyck et al., 2005). A leader applying 
an error management strategy, in contrast, will likely be judged as more sociable, because of 
appearing tolerant, understanding, and friendly towards followers, all of which signal good 
intentions on behalf of the leader. Error management involves acceptance of human fallibility 
and it is this acceptance that we expect will inspire followers to form a more favorable 
sociability impression of a leader. Consequently, we predict that leaders showing more of an 
error prevention strategy will be seen as less sociable and leaders using more of an error 
management strategy will be seen as more sociable. 
 When it comes to morality, acceptability of a leader’s principles is vital to judging 
them as moral. Fairness, justice, honesty and clear principles define morality (Leach et al., in 
press). If a follower thinks the principles of a leader are not acceptable, unfair, or clearly 
impossible to achieve, the follower is likely to view the leader as lacking morality (Burke et 
al., 2007). A leader expecting perfect error-free performance is likely to come off as 
unrealistic and unfair because making errors is inevitable. A leader exhibiting an error 
management strategy, in contrast, sees errors as normal, which is a more realistic and 
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achievable strategy than trying to prevent all errors from occurring (Reason 1990, 1997). 
Additionally, a leader who accepts that “to err is human” may be perceived as more honest 
and sincere, because of admitting to human fallibility. Accordingly, we predict that leaders' 
error management will be positively associated with followers' morality judgments of leaders, 
whereas the opposite will be true for leaders' error prevention.  
 People are judged as competent when they show observable abilities, skills, and good 
performance (Cuddy et al., 2008; Ellemers et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; Leach et al., 
2007). According to earlier related work, error prevention by leaders harms followers’ 
learning and performance (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; Van Dyck et al., 2005), which over time 
is likely to signal that the leader is not competent enough (e.g., not efficient and efficacious) 
in achieving organizational goals. Error management, in contrast, is positively linked to 
individual, team, and organizational performance (Edmondson, 1996; Frese, 1991; 1995; 
Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Van Dyck et al., 2005), which suggests error management is 
associated with higher ability and higher competence to perform. We expect that followers 
over time become aware of the greater competence of leaders using an error management 
strategy and judge those leaders as more competent. 
 To summarize, we predict that followers infer traits related to sociability, morality, 
and competence depending on leaders' error-handling strategy. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 3a. Leaders who show more error prevention are perceived as (i) 
less sociable, (ii) less moral, and (iii) less competent by their followers than 
are leaders who show less error prevention. 
Hypothesis 3b. Leaders who show more error management are perceived as (i) 
more sociable, (ii) more moral, and (iii) more competent by their followers 
than are leaders who show less error management. 
Finally, we hypothesize that leaders with an error prevention strategy will be 
trusted less due to followers’ negative perceptions of leaders’ sociability, morality, 
and competence. Leaders with an error management strategy, in contrast, will be 
trusted more because their followers perceive them as sociable, moral, and competent. 
Hypothesis 4a. The relationship between leaders' error prevention strategy and 
followers' trust is mediated by (i) sociability, (ii) morality, and (iii) 
competence. 
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Hypothesis 4b. The relationship between leaders' error management strategy 
and followers' trust is mediated by (i) sociability, (ii) morality, and (iii) 
competence. 
Figure 3.1 provides a visualization of our theoretical model. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 
Theoretical model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 
 Our goal in the first study is to conduct an initial test of our predictions. We focused 
on leadership in a sports context by selecting as our sample football players (followers) who 
rated the error-handling strategy of their coach (leader), the perceived sociability, morality, 
and competence of their coach (leader), as well as their trust in the coach (leader).  
Error prevention strategy can be exemplified by a coach who tells players that they 
should make no errors whatsoever during a game and shows negative affect when an error 
occurs. An example of a coach applying an error management strategy, is a coach who 
accepts errors as a normal part of the game and supports players to discuss an error 
previously made with the team so that other players do not repeat the same error. The players 
and coaches in our sample had trained together for at least a few months, giving the players 
ample opportunities to observe the error-handling strategy of the coach and to form 
sociability, morality, competence, and trust impressions. 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 182 players (169 men and 13 women) from 27 Dutch 
amateur (partial) selection football teams (24 male teams and 3 female teams). Three coaches 
coached more than one team, resulting in a total of 24 coaches players could evaluate. The 
Leader error-
handling strategy 
Perceived 
sociability 
Perceived 
morality 
Perceived 
competence 
 
Trust in leader 
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mean player age was 23.96 years (SD = 3.94). The mean number of respondents per team was 
6.74 players (SD = 2.31). 
 Procedure and measures. Participants were approached face to face before or after 
football practice and asked if they would be willing to fill in a short a paper and pencil 
questionnaire. Unless otherwise stated, all responses were measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all applicable) to 5 (very much applicable).  
Error management and error prevention. Coaches’ error-handling strategy, as 
perceived by players, was measured with eight items derived from the Error Orientation 
Questionnaire (Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999). The questionnaire originally 
measures attitudes and behaviors related to one’s own error-handling strategy in the work 
context. We reworded the items so that they referred to the football context and the perceived 
coach error-handling strategy. For example, the item “After an error, I think through how to 
correct it” was adapted to “After an error, my coach thinks through how to correct it”. Four 
items measured leaders’ error management: “After an error, my coach thinks through how to 
correct it”, “After an error has occurred, my coach analyzes it thoroughly”, “Errors point my 
coach at what he/she can improve”, and “When somebody makes an error, my coach tells 
him/her to share it with others so that others do not make the same error” (α = .66; M = 3.36, 
SD = 0.61).  
Four items measured the behavioral and attitudinal aspects of error prevention 
strategy: “My coach is often afraid of players making errors”, “During the game, my coach is 
often worried that errors might occur”, “My coach prefers that players keep errors to 
themselves” and “My coach believes it can be harmful to make errors known to others” (α = 
.71; M = 2.69, SD = 0.73).  
Sociability, morality, and competence. Coach perception by followers was measured 
with 15 items adapted from prior research on sociability, morality, and competence (Cuddy et 
al., 2008; Fiske et al., 1999; 2002; Judd et al., 2005; Wojciszke et al., 1998). Respondents 
were asked how “warm”, “friendly”, “good-natured”, “helpful”, and “likeable” (sociability; α 
= .81; M = 3.60, SD = 0.56), “trustworthy”, “honest”, “sincere”, “fair” and “just” (morality; α 
= .89; M = 3.60, SD = 0.68), “competent”, “skilled”, “capable”, “intelligent”, and 
“efficacious” (competence; α = .88; M = 3.59, SD = 0.73) they found their coach. 
Trust. Trust in the coach by players was measured with six items (the trust in 
management items) from Cook and Wall’s (1980) trust scale. The scale was adapted to the 
current context by exchanging the word “supervisor” with “coach”, “worker” with “player” 
and “firm” with “team”. Sample items are, “My coach is sincere in his/her attempts to meet 
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the player’s point of view” and “My coach can be trusted to make sensible decisions for the 
team’s future” (α = .79; M = 3.60, SD = 0.71). 
Control variables. We measured players’ age, sex, position (active or reserve), years 
active in football in general, and years active in current team as control variables. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. Means, standard deviations and correlations of all the study 
variables are included in Table 3.1. We conducted several confirmatory factor analyses in 
EQS in order to test whether the items loaded on their expected constructs. The analyses used 
the maximum likelihood estimation and included all the items measuring leaders' error 
management, leaders' error prevention, sociability, morality, competence, and trust. All items 
were allowed to load only on their intended factor, factors were allowed to correlate among 
each other, and errors were not allowed to correlate.  
 We compared our six-factor model to a five-factor, four-factor, three-factor, two-
factor, and a one-factor model, respectively (see Table 3.2). The five-factor model used a 
combined sociability-morality factor. Competing views about the discernibility of the 
sociability and morality constructs exist in different theoretical frameworks. Whereas the 
group virtue literature differentiates between sociability and morality (e.g., Leach et al., 2007; 
this is also consistent with the distinction between benevolence and integrity by Mayer, et al., 
1995), the universal dimensions of social perception literature often equates sociability and 
morality or at least uses them interchangeably by calling both "warmth" (e.g., Cuddy et al., 
2008). Accordingly, we wanted to test whether a model differentiating between sociability 
and morality (the six-factor model) performs better statistically than a model combining them 
(the five-factor model). Additionally, Cuddy and colleagues (2008) suggest that trust is a part 
of warmth, which is why we tested a four-factor model including a combined sociability, 
morality, and trust factor (the four-factor model). The three-factor model combines 
sociability, morality, competence, and trust as a single factor, while still differentiating 
between error management and error prevention. The purpose of testing this model was to 
ensure that sociability, morality, and competence would behave similar to the predictors of 
trust (i.e., benevolence, integrity, and ability) in not being identical to trust (Colquitt et al., 
2007; Mayer & Davis, 1995). The two-factor model included a combined error management 
and error prevention factor and a combined sociability, morality, competence, and trust 
factor, testing whether our constructs can be generally divided into two factors: one focusing 
on error-strategy and the other on perceptions/trust. Finally, the one-factor model combined 
all measured variables into a single factor.  
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TABLE 3.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Individual-Level Correlations in Study 1 
  Variables M SD 1      2      3        4       5    6           7      8       9      10  11 
1 Age 23.96 3.94 -           
2 Sex
 
 0.07 0.26 .03 -          
3 Position
 
 0.12 0.32 -.21** -.03   -         
4 
Years active in 
football 
3.65 1.01 .56*** -.38*** -.13† -        
5 Years active in team 2.37 1.43 .10 -.18* .08 .31*** -       
6 
Perceived error 
management 
3.36 0.61 .06 -.25** .04 .07 -.02         -      
7 
Perceived error 
prevention 
2.69 0.73 .05 .02 .07 -.03 -.10 -.01       -     
8 Perceived sociability 3.60 0.56 -.04 -.01 .05 -.08 -.02 .25** -.15* -    
9 Perceived morality 3.60 0.68 .01 -.15* .01 .05 -.01 .32*** -.13† .66*** -   
10 Perceived competence 3.59 0.73 -.11 -.22** .09 .00 .06 .36*** -.09 .47*** .60***     -  
11 Trust in coach 3.60 0.71 -.01 -.19* .02 .05 .03 .42*** -.26*** .50*** .68*** .58*** - 
 
Note. N = 182. All measures measured on a 1 (not at all applicable) to 5 (very much applicable) scale except for sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman, and Position: 
0 = Active player, 1 = Reserve 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed.
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The six-factor model, which differentiated between the six variables of interest, 
yielded a significantly better fit to the data than any of the alternative models (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). The data, thus, statistically supported the distinctiveness of our constructs (see Table 
3.2). 
 
TABLE 3.2 
Study 1 Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 Model χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df RMSEA SRMR CFI IFI NNFI 
1 6-factor model a 678.74*** 362   0.07 0.08 0.88 0.88 0.86 
2 5-factor model b 749.54*** 367 70.80*** 5 0.08 0.08 0.85 0.85 0.83 
3 4-factor model c 850.39*** 371 171.65*** 9 0.08 0.09 0.81 0.81 0.79 
4 3-factor model d 1048.62*** 374 369.88*** 12 0.10 0.10 0.73 0.74 0.71 
5 2-factor model e 1202.68*** 376 523.94*** 14 0.11 0.10 0.67 0.68 0.65 
5 1-factor model f 1285.34*** 377 606.60*** 15 0.12 0.10 0.64 0.64 0.61 
 
Note. 
a 
Includes leaders' error management, error prevention, perceived sociability, morality, competence, and 
trust. 
b 
Includes leaders' error management, error prevention, competence, trust, and a factor combining 
sociability and morality. 
c 
Includes leaders' error management, error prevention, competence, and a factor 
combining sociability, morality, and trust. 
d 
Includes leaders' error management, error prevention, and a factor 
combining sociability, morality, competence, and trust. 
e 
Includes a factor combining error management and 
error prevention and a factor combining sociability, morality, competence, and trust. 
f 
Includes one factor 
combining all six constructs. The ∆χ2
 
compared separately the six-factor model to each alternative model.  
*** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Hypotheses testing. Because in our sample players were nested within teams and 
made judgments about their coaches, we conducted multilevel regression analyses, where 
coach was the second level (nesting) variable. Note that three coaches coached more than one 
team, thus it made more sense to have “coach” as a second level variable than “team”. We 
conducted all multilevel analyses in SPSS mixed models with the maximum likelihood 
method, controlling for age, sex, position, years active in football, and years active in team, 
with coach as the assigned nesting variable.  
Multilevel regression analysis simultaneously including error management and error 
prevention strategy as predictors (see Table 3.3) showed that perceived error prevention of 
the coach was significantly and negatively related to trust in the coach, B = -0.23, t(174.04) = 
-3.48, p < .001 (Hypothesis 1a was supported). The same analysis also showed that perceived 
error management of the coach significantly and positively related to trust in the coach, B = 
0.40, t(173.72) = 6.04, p < .001 (Hypothesis 1b was supported). 
Next, we conducted a multilevel analysis testing whether perceived sociability, 
morality, and competence of the coach related to players’ trust in the coach. The analyses 
showed that, as hypothesized, morality, B = 0.43, t(173.04) = 5.48, p < .001, and competence, 
  
71 
B = 0.29, t(158.38) = 4.03, p < .001, were positive predictors of trust (Hypotheses 2ii and 2iii 
were supported). Sociability, however, predicted no unique variance in trust, B = 0.08, 
t(171.39) = 1.09, p = .279 (Hypotheses 2i was not supported).  
Separate multilevel analyses simultaneously including error management and error 
prevention strategy as predictors showed that error prevention contrary to our predictions was 
not related to perceived sociability of the coach, B = -0.13, t(167.11) = -1.82, p = .070, 
perceived morality of the coach, B = -0.11, t(175) = -1.62, p = .108, or perceived competence 
of the coach, B = -0.02, t(174.71) = -0.27, p = .788. Hypotheses 3ai, 3aii, and 3aiii were not 
supported. The same analyses also showed that error management strategy by the coach was  
 
TABLE 3.3 
Results of Multilevel Regression Analyses Predicting Trust From Perceived Error 
Management and Perceived Error Prevention With and Without Hypothesized Mediators 
Study 1 
Variables 
Trust  
Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.32 (0.63) -0.09(0.47)  
Control variables    
Age 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)  
Sex -0.49 (0.31) -0.21 (0.23)  
Position -0.02 (0.21) -0.01 (0.16)  
Years active in football -0.07 (0.09) -0.05 (0.07)  
Years active in team 0.00 (0.05) -0.01 (0.04)  
Independent variables    
Perceived error prevention -0.23*** (0.07) -0.17** (0.05)  
Perceived error 
management 
0.40*** (0.07) 0.18** (0.06) 
 
Perceived sociability  0.05 (0.07)  
Perceived morality  0.40*** (0.08)  
Perceived competence  0.24**(0.07)  
Coach-level variance 0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02)  
-2 residual log-likelihood 439.44 344.89  
∆ -2 residual log-likelihood  94.55***  
 
Note. N = 182. Standardized coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses are reported. Sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman; Position: 0 = 
Active player, 1 = Reserve. Coach-level variance: Estimate of the 
random variance between coaches.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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positively associated with perceived sociability of the coach, B = 0.27, t(165.90) = 3.63, p < 
.001, perceived morality of the coach, B = 0.32, t(175) = 4.39, p < .001, and perceived 
competence of the coach, B = 0.31, t(174.17) = 4.59, p < .001, supporting Hypotheses 3bi, 
3bii, and 3biii. 
Next we tested for mediation by sociability, morality, and competence. A multilevel 
analysis (see Table 3.3) including error management and error prevention, as well as the 
control variables as predictors showed that the relationship between perceived error 
prevention of the coach and trust also decreased after including the mediators, B = -0.17, t 
(172.20) = -3.45, p = .001. The same analysis also showed that the relationship between 
perceived error management of the coach and trust, although remaining significant, was 
reduced by 0.21 after including the three predicted mediators, B = 0.18, t (174.88) = 3.35, p = 
.001. 
 In order to test multiple mediators simultaneously we could not use the Baron and 
Kenny (1986) approach, which is applicable only to single mediator models and instead 
applied the Preacher and Hayes (2008) approach, which estimates the significance of the total 
indirect effect by calculating the effect of the independent variable on the outcome variable 
while simultaneously including all mediators. As suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008) we 
used a bootstrapping procedure to calculate the confidence intervals for the total indirect 
effect and the individual mediation effects (while controlling for the other mediators). If the 
confidence intervals do not include zero, we can state with 95% confidence that the indirect 
effect is significant (Hayes, 2009). Because the coach-level explained variance in the 
multilevel analyses was close to zero, we only focused on the individual follower level data 
in the meditational analyses (for similar procedure see Burris, 2012). In all subsequent 
analyses we included all control variables.  
The lack of significant association between error prevention and the proposed 
mediators (see above) violates one of the main requirements for the presence of mediation – 
that there should be relation between the predictor variable and the mediating variables 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes, 2009). Accordingly, by default we can reject Hypotheses 4ai, 
4aii, and 4aiii, stating that sociability, morality, and competence mediate the relationship 
between error prevention strategy and trust. 
Bootstrap analyses with 5000 resamples revealed a significant total indirect effect of 
coaches’ perceived error management on trust in the coach of 0.15, S.E. = 0.05, 95% CI 
[0.07, 0.26], thus, we can conclude that mediation was present. Further analysis of the 
mediators showed that sociability, B = 0.01, S.E. = 0.02, did not have a significant mediation 
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effect, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.05] (Hypothesis 4bi was not supported). Morality, B = .109, S.E. = 
.03, and competence, B = .05, S.E. = 0.03, however, were significant mediators, 95% CI 0.04 
to 0.16 for morality, and 95% CI [0.02, 0.13] for competence, respectively (Hypotheses 4bii 
and 4biii were supported). 
Discussion 
Our findings show that error prevention relates negatively to trust, while error 
management relates positively to trust. Moreover, the positive relationship between error 
management and trust is explained by morality and competence. No mediation due to 
perception was found for the relationship between error prevention and trust, suggesting that 
a different mechanism explains this relationship. Error management was positively related to 
followers’ sociability, morality, and competence perception of leaders. No relationships were 
found between error prevention and leader perception. The present findings imply that the 
extent of applying an error management strategy is more important for followers' leader 
perception than the extent of applying an error prevention strategy.  
The current research provides an initial investigation of our theorizing in a field 
setting. A strength of field studies is their high ecological validity as compared to 
experimental research. Nonetheless, a problem common to cross-sectional designs is that no 
causation can be established. In other words, based solely on Study 1 it is unclear what the 
exact direction of the effects is – for example, is leaders' error-handling strategy affecting 
trust, or do followers who trust their leader more also think that their leaders handle errors 
more constructively. Additionally, other factors besides leaders’ error-handling strategy could 
affect followers’ evaluations of leaders’ sociability, morality, competence, and followers’ 
trust. In order to address these limitations, we conducted a second study in which we 
experimentally manipulated leaders' error-handling strategy and measured followers' 
perception (sociability, morality, competence) and trust in the leader. 
Study 2 
 The goal of Study 2 is to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a controlled experimental 
setting, which allowed us to test the causal links between variables. To this end, we created a 
scenario with a fictitious “virtual” leader who was supposedly giving participants instructions 
on how to work on a task via a chat box. In reality, the leader instructions covered three 
different conditions: a leader using an error prevention strategy, a leader using an error-
management strategy, and a leader providing error-neutral information (control). The actual 
task-related instructions were identical among groups. The only difference among groups was 
in what strategy leaders said they subscribed to, with the exception of the control group 
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where the leader provided general information. We opted for this paradigm rather than using 
confederates because having “virtual” leaders allowed us to control the information presented 
to followers so that no factors outside of our manipulations could affect the results (e.g., 
confederate’s appearance, tone of voice, gender, leadership style), thus eliminating alternative 
explanations. 
A notable difference between Study 1 and Study 2 is that in Study 1 we measured 
degrees of error management and degrees of error prevention of the same leader. Actual 
leaders are likely to exhibit both prevention and management in their interactions with others. 
In Study 2, however, we focus on “pure” error management and “pure” error prevention, that 
is, the leaders only exhibited characteristics consistent with one of the strategies. 
Accordingly, our hypotheses had to be tailored to the experimental context by focusing on 
comparisons among groups, instead of on comparisons between degrees of exhibiting a 
certain error-handling strategy. To make the findings comparable to those of Study 1, in 
Study 2 we compare the control group to the two experimental groups and the two 
experimental groups to each other. A comparison between the error management group and 
the control group is similar to a comparison between leaders’ exhibiting high and low levels 
of error management, with the error management group being similar to high error 
management and the control group being similar to low error management. Similarly, a 
comparison between the error prevention group with the control group mimics a comparison 
between high levels of error prevention and low-levels of error prevention. Accordingly, our 
hypotheses were adapted in the following manner (Hypothesis 2 is identical to that in Study 
1): 
Hypothesis 1a’. Leaders who provide error prevention instructions are trusted 
less by their followers than are leaders providing error neutral instructions. 
Hypothesis 1b’. Leaders who provide error management instructions are 
trusted more by their followers than are leaders providing error neutral 
instructions. 
Hypothesis 1c’. Leaders who provide error management instructions are 
trusted more by their followers than are leaders providing error prevention 
instructions.  
Hypothesis 3a’. Leaders who provide error prevention instructions are 
perceived as (i) less sociable, (ii) less moral, and (iii) less competent by their 
followers than are leaders who provide error-neutral instructions. 
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Hypothesis 3b’. Leaders who provide error management instructions are 
perceived as (i) more sociable, (ii) more moral, and (iii) more competent by 
their followers than are leaders who provide error-neutral instructions. 
Hypothesis 3c’. Leaders who provide error management instructions are 
perceived as (i) more sociable, (ii) more moral, and (iii) more competent by 
their followers than are leaders who provide error prevention instructions. 
Hypothesis 4’. The effect of leaders’ error-handling strategy on trust is 
mediated by (i) sociability, (ii) morality, and competence (iii). 
Method 
 Participants and design. The final sample, excluding two participants, consisted of 
73 participants (32 men and 41 women; Mage = 26.98, SD = 8.62). Two participants (one man 
and one woman, both in the error prevention group) were removed, one for not reading the 
leader instructions and one for not finishing the 15 minute practice task. Participants were 
primarily recruited at the university of the first author by distributing flyers in the canteen and 
by asking both students and non-students whether they wanted to participate in the study. In 
total 41 students and 32 non-students joined the study. As remuneration participants had a 
one in five chance to win money prizes varying from €10 (approximately $13) to €50 
(approximately $65) bogusly linked to performance. The experiment had a three-group 
between-participants design (error strategy of the leader: error management vs. error 
prevention vs. control). The between-group distribution was as follows: error management 
(11 men; 14 women), error prevention (9 men, 14 women), and control (12 men and 13 
women). 
 Procedure and measures. The experimenter led participants to an individual cubicle 
with a computer and informed them that all instructions would be presented on the computer 
screen. The instructions stated that the study dealt with online leadership and that participants 
would be working on a task for which they would receive help from a leader in a chat 
window (for similar procedure see Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012). The task was a 
simulation called TrainDispatcher 2.0 (Signal Computer Consultants, 1997). Participants 
were linked to the preprogrammed chat where they received instructions, identical in each 
condition, introducing them to the basics of the task. After reading the introductory task 
instructions participants saw a screen recording of the fictitious leader showing how to 
successfully guide a train from its entry point to its final destination. The total duration of the 
video was a little over a minute. After seeing the video, participants returned to the chat box 
where they received instructions by the fictitious leader according to the group they were 
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randomly assigned to: error management, error prevention, or control. The error management 
and error prevention manipulations were based on theory and manipulations used in previous 
studies (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 
1998). In line with the definition of error management, participants in the error management 
group read that the leader followed the motto "To err is human" and considered important 
learning from errors. The leader encouraged participants to think about how to minimize the 
negative impact of occurring errors and learn from them in order not to repeat them in the 
future. Participants in the error prevention group, in contrast, read instructions consistent with 
the principles of error prevention stating that the leader followed the motto "Better safe than 
sorry", and considered important preventing errors. The leader encouraged participants to 
think about how they could minimize the occurrence of errors, detect situations that lead to 
errors, and use their knowledge to prevent the occurrence of similar situations in the future. 
In line with earlier manipulations (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005; 
Nordstrom et al., 1998), errors were framed positively in the error management text ( e.g., 
“errors can be something positive”) and negatively in the error prevention text (e.g., “error 
can be damaging”). Both error management and error prevention were framed positively as a 
good strategy that improves follower performance when used. In the control group 
participants received a neutral text discussing the Dutch train system (e.g., how it is among 
the busiest train networks in the world, what percentage of people travel by train daily for 
work) of similar length to the experimental groups. After the manipulation, participants had 
15 minutes to practice a filler train task. Next, participants received the measures of interest. 
Sociability, morality, and competence. To measure leaders’ perceived sociability, 
morality, and competence we used nine items derived from those used in Study 1. Leader’s 
perceived sociability was measured by asking participants how “warm”, good-natured” and 
“likeable” they found the leader (α = .87). Perceived morality was measured by asking how 
“honest”, “fair”, and “just” the leader was perceived to be (α = .80). Perceived competence 
was measured with how “competent”, “skilled” and “efficacious” the leader was (α = .79).  
Trust. Trust was measured with the five-item initial trust scale by Koufaris and 
Hampton-Sosa (2004). The scale was adapted to the leadership context by exchanging the 
words "company" and "vendor" with "leader". For example, the item "I trust this company 
has my best interests in mind" became "I trust this leader has my best interests in mind" (α = 
.84). 
Manipulation checks and controls. As a manipulation check we used the learning 
from errors and error strain subscales from the Error Orientation Questionnaire by Rybowiak 
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et al. (1999). These scales correspond with error management and error prevention strategies, 
respectively, and have been used successfully as manipulation checks in previous research on 
error-handling strategy (Keith & Frese, 2005). The learning from errors scale consists of four 
items and in the current study it was made context specific by changing the general wording 
by adding “during the task” (e.g., “The errors I made during the task helped me improve my 
work” instead of “My errors help me improve my work”). The error strain scale, which 
included 5 items, was adapted to our context in a similar way as the learning from errors 
scale. Sample item is “I felt stressed when I made an error during the task”. The Cronbach 
alphas for the scales were .90 and .73, respectively. 
We assessed participants’ gaming experience (“How often do you play computer 
games?”), experience with simulations similar to the one used in the current study (“I 
consider myself experienced in similar tasks”, task difficulty (“I found the task difficult”), 
following the instructions by the leader (“I have followed well the instructions by the 
leader”), and perceived performance on the task (“I think I have performed well on the task”) 
as control variables. Leader credibility was measured with four self-developed items: "During 
the study I did not doubt whether there was really a leader", "The chat was believable", "I 
believed that someone was chatting with me during the study", and "I believed that during the 
study there was a leader" (α = .76). The answer scale varied from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely) and was adapted according to the item (e.g., not at all experienced/difficult). We 
also assessed participants' age, sex, and study status (student or non-student). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the study 
variables are included in Table 3.4. We conducted four separate confirmatory factor analyses 
in EQS in order to test whether sociability, morality, competence, and trust were distinct 
constructs. The analyses used the maximum likelihood estimation and included all the items 
measuring leaders' perceived sociability, morality, competence, and trust. All items were 
allowed to load only on their intended factor, factors were allowed to correlate among each 
other, and errors were not allowed to correlate. We compared our four-factor model to a 
three-factor, two-factor, and a one-factor model, respectively (see Table 3.5). The four-factor 
model yielded a significantly better fit to the data than any of the alternative models, χ2 = 
118.58; RMSEA = 0.10; SRMR = 0.07; CFI = 0.91; IFI = 0.91; NNFI = 0.88. As in Study 1, 
the data statistically supported the distinctiveness of our constructs (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
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TABLE 3.4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations in Study 2 
  
Error 
management Control 
Error 
prevention              
  Variables M SD M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Age 27.52 9.07 26.56 9.19 26.83 7.81 -             
2 Sex 0.56 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.61 0.50 -.21† -            
3 Student status 0.48 0.51 0.40 0.50 0.43 0.51 .59*** -.28* -           
4 Gaming experience 2.08 0.95 2.24 1.01 2.22 1.04 -.25* .02 -.22* -          
5 
Experience with 
similar simulations 
1.92 1.15 2.36 1.29 2.00 0.90 -.06 .03 -.20† .45 -         
6 
Experienced task 
difficulty 
3.88 1.27 3.48 1.23 4.22 1.28 .02 -.10 .04 -.31** -.49*** -        
7 
Following leader 
instructions 
3.56 1.19 3.40 1.00 3.26 1.18 .03 .00 .15 .02 .23* -.14 -       
8 
Perceived practice 
performance 
2.56 1.33 2.84 1.37 2.13 1.36 .04 -.03 .15 .27** .49*** -.66*** .48*** -      
9 Leader credibility 3.26 1.05 3.34 0.80 3.02 1.31 -.16 .06 -.19 .07 -.08 .31** -.11 -.24* -     
10 Perceived sociability 3.71 0.82 3.09 0.64 1.99 1.09 .05 .01 -.04 .04 .13 -.13 .29* .26* .05 -    
11 Perceived morality 3.65 0.60 3.35 0.50 2.68 1.17 -.02 -.07 -.03 .13 .18 -.16 .31 .20† .11 .67*** -   
12 
Perceived 
competence 
3.63 0.93 3.16 0.76 3.57 0.98 -.09 -.10 .12 .09 .17 .02 .27* .16 .03 .16 .38*** -  
13 Trust 3.94 0.64 3.53 0.65 3.22 0.92 -.17 .04 -.11 .16 .08 -.01 .26* .11 -.12 .55*** .67*** .45*** - 
 
Note. N = 73. Sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman. Student status: 0 = Student, 1 = Non-student.     
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed.
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TABLE 3.5 
Study 2 Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 Model χ2 df ∆χ2 
∆d
f 
RMSEA SRMR CFI IFI NNFI 
1 4-factor model
 a 118.58*** 71   0.10 0.07 0.91 0.91 0.88 
2 3-factor model
 b 144.45*** 74 25.87*** 3 0.12 0.09 0.86 0.87 0.83 
3 2-factor model c 178.99*** 76 60.41*** 5 0.14 0.09 0.80 0.81 0.76 
4 1-factor model d 229.71*** 77 251.30*** 6 0.17 0.15 0.71 0.71 0.65 
 
Note. 
a 
Includes leaders' perceived sociability, morality, competence, and trust. 
b 
Includes leaders' perceived 
competence, trust, and a factor combining sociability and morality. 
c 
Includes leaders' perceived competence, 
and a factor combining sociability, morality, and trust. 
d 
Includes one factor combining all four constructs. 
 
*** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 Manipulation checks and controls. ANOVA with condition as the independent 
variable and the learning from error subscale from the EOQ by Rybowiak et al. (1998) as the 
dependent variable revealed a significant effect, F (2, 70) = 5.91, p = .004, η2p = 0.15. 
Subsequent contrasts indicated that the manipulation was successful as error management 
instructions resulted in greater perceived importance of learning from error that error 
prevention instructions (Error management = 1, Control = 0, Error Prevention = -1), F (1, 70) 
= 11.49, p = .001, η2p = 0.14, and control instructions (Error management = 1, Control = -1, 
Error prevention = 0) F (1, 70) = 4.69, p = .034, η2p = 0.06, whereas error prevention and 
control instructions did not differ on learning from error (Error management = 0, Control = 1, 
Error Prevention = -1), F (1, 70) = 1.61, p = .209, η2p = 0.02. 
 ANOVA with condition as the independent variable and the error strain subscale from 
the EOQ by Rybowiak et al. (1998) as the dependent variable indicated that condition had a 
significant effect on error strain, F (2, 70) = 8.92, p < .001, η2p = 0.20. Subsequent contrasts 
indicated that the manipulation was successful as error prevention instructions resulted in 
greater perceived error strain than error management instructions (Error management =1, 
Control = 0, Error prevention = -1), F (1, 70) = 17.52, p < .001, η2p = 0.20, and control 
instructions (Error management = 0, Control = 1, Error prevention = -1), F (1, 70) = 7.04, p = 
.010, η2p = 0.09, whereas error management and control instructions did not differ on error 
strain (Error management = 1, Control = -1, Error Prevention = 0), F (1, 70) = 2.45, p = .122, 
η2p = 0.03.  
 Separate ANOVAs revealed no significant differences among conditions on gaming 
experience, experience with similar simulations, task difficulty, following leader instructions, 
perceived performance, and perceived leader credibility (all Fs < 2.07, p > .134). The results 
suggest that the effects we find on our dependent variables are unlikely to be explained by 
differences among our groups on the control variables.  
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 Hypotheses testing. All analyses of variance were initially conducted with following 
the leader’s instructions as a covariate (we only included covariates that were correlated with 
the dependent variables, as suggested by Field, 2009) and then without. Results were 
identical which is why we only report the analyses without covariates to maximize degrees of 
freedom. 
 Error-handling strategy and trust in the leader. ANOVA with error-handling 
strategy as the independent variable and trust as the dependent variable showed a significant 
effect, F (2, 70) = 5.66, p = .005, η2p = 0.14. A contrast analysis (Error management = 0, 
Control = 1, Error prevention = -1) revealed no difference in followers' trust towards leaders 
using error prevention or error-neutral instructions, F (1, 70) = 2.09, p = .153, η2p = 0.03 
(Hypothesis 1a’ was not supported). A second contrast analysis (Error management = 1, 
Control = -1, Error prevention = 0) showed that leaders using error management instructions 
are trusted to the same extent as leaders using error-neutral instructions, F (1, 70) = 3.77, p = 
.056, η2p = 0.05 (Hypothesis 1b’ was not supported). There was, however, a trend in the 
expected direction suggesting that error management instructions were more beneficial to 
followers' trust than error-neutral information. A third contrast analysis (Error management = 
1, Control = 0, Error prevention = -1) indicated that leaders using error management 
instructions are trusted more than leaders using error prevention instructions, F (1, 70) = 
11.20, p = .001, η2p = 0.14 (Hypothesis 1c’ was supported). 
Sociability, morality, competence, and trust. A regression analysis including all 
control variables (gaming experience, experience with similar simulations, task difficulty, 
following the instructions by the leader, perceived performance on the task, leader credibility, 
sex, age, and student status) and sociability, morality, and competence as predictors of trust 
revealed that morality, B = 0.51, p < .001, η2p = 0.49 (Hypothesis 2ii was supported), and 
competence, B = 0.24, p = .012, η2p = 0.32 (Hypothesis 2iii was supported), were predictors 
of trust. Sociability, however, was not a significant predictor, but showed a trend in the 
hypothesized direction, B = 0.21, p = .058, η2p = .24 (Hypothesis 2i was not supported). The 
results were identical independently of whether the control variables were included in the 
regression or not and replicated the findings of Study 1. 
 Error-handling strategy and leader sociability. ANOVA with error-handling strategy 
as the independent variable and sociability as the dependent variable showed a significant 
effect, F(2, 70) = 24.14, p < .001, η2p = 0.41. A contrast analysis (Error management = 0, 
Control = 1, Error prevention = -1) showed that leaders using error prevention instructions 
were seen as less sociable than leaders using error-neutral instructions F(1, 70) = 19.60, p < 
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.001, η2p = 0.22 (Hypothesis 3a’i was supported). A second contrast analysis (Error 
management = 1, Control = -1, Error prevention = 0) showed that leaders using error 
management instructions are perceived as more sociable by followers than leaders using 
error-neutral instructions, F (1, 70) = 6.27, p = .015, η2p = 0.08 (Hypothesis 3b’i was 
supported). A third contrast analysis (Error management = 1, Control = 0, Error prevention = 
-1) indicated that leaders using error management instructions are perceived as more sociable 
than leaders using error prevention instructions, F(1, 70) = 47.30, p < .001, η2p = .40 
(Hypothesis 3c’i was supported). 
 Error-handling strategy and leader morality. ANOVA with error-handling strategy 
as the independent variable and morality as the dependent variable was significant, F(2, 70) = 
9.18, p < .001, η2 p = 0.21. A contrast analysis (Error management = 0, Control = 1, Error 
prevention = -1) revealed that leaders using error prevention instructions were seen as less 
moral than leaders using error-neutral instructions, F(1, 70) = 8.30, p = .005, η2p = 0.11 
(Hypotheses 3a’ii was supported). A contrast analysis (Error management = 1, Control = -1, 
Error prevention = 0) indicated that leaders using error management instructions and error-
neutral instructions are perceived as equally moral, F(1, 70) = 1.84, p = .180, η2p = 0.03 
(Hypotheses 3b’ii was not supported). A second contrast analysis (Error management = 1, 
Control = 0, Error prevention = -1) showed that leaders using error management instructions 
are perceived as more moral than leaders using error prevention instructions, F(1, 70) = 
17.71, p < .001, η2p = 0.20 (Hypotheses 3c’ii was supported). The conducted analyses imply 
that error prevention has negative impact on the perception of leaders' morality when 
compared to both error-neutral and error management instructions. 
 Error-handling strategy and leader competence. ANOVA with error-handling 
strategy as the independent variable and competence as the dependent variable was not 
significant, F(2, 70) = 2.00, p = .143, η2p = 0.05, suggesting no differences between groups. 
The only contrast approaching significance compared the error management to the control 
group (Error management = 1, Control = -1, Error prevention = 0) showing a trend that 
leaders using error management instructions were perceived as slightly more competent than 
leaders using error-neutral instructions, F(1, 70) = 3.42, p = .069, η2p = 0.05. Hypotheses 
3a’iii, 3b’iii, and 3c’iii were not supported. 
 Mediation analyses. A multiple mediator analysis using a 5000 bootstrap resample 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with the error prevention and the error-neutral conditions (Error 
prevention = 1, Control = 0; N= 48) showed a non-significant total indirect effect, B = -0.35, 
S.E. = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.81, 0.03]. The individual indirect effect of morality, however, was 
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significant, B = -0.25, S.E. = 0.14, 95% CI [-0.64, -0.05]. The individual indirect effects of 
sociability, B = -0.16, S.E. = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.62, 0.08] and competence, B = 0.07, S.E. = 
0.07, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.27], were not significant. 
A second multiple mediator analysis with the error management and the error-neutral 
conditions (Error management = 1, Control = 0; N = 50) showed a significant total indirect 
effect when all mediators were included simultaneously, B = 0.32, S.E. = 0.13, 95% CI [0.06, 
0.57]. Analysis of the individual indirect effects, however, showed that neither morality, B = 
0.13, S.E. = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.004, 0.35], nor sociability, B = 0.11, S.E. = 0.10, 95% CI [-
0.01, 0.39], nor competence, B = 0.08, S.E. = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.27], individually were 
significant mediators.  
The third multiple mediator analysis including the error management and error 
prevention conditions (Error management = 1, Error prevention = 0; N = 48) revealed a 
significant total indirect effect on trust when all mediators were included simultaneously, B = 
0.56, S.E. = 0.24, 95% CI [0.13, 1.11]. Observing the individual mediators indicated that 
only morality is a significant mediator, B = 0.37, S.E. = 0.17, 95% CI [0.09, 0.81]. 
Hypothesis 4’ii was partially supported. The indirect effects of sociability, B = 0.17, S.E. = 
0.20, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.68] and competence, B = 0.02, S.E. = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.21], were 
not significant. Hypothesis 4’ii was partially supported for morality, while hypotheses 4’i and 
4ìii were not, indicating that only morality is a significant mediator of the effect of leaders’ 
error–handling strategy on trust. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 provides the first experimental evidence supporting the causal effect of 
leaders' error-handling strategy on followers' trust in the leader. Our findings show that, as 
hypothesized, leaders using error management strategy instructions are trusted more by 
followers than are leaders using error prevention strategy instructions. In addition, this effect 
was mediated by leaders’ morality perception, showing that leaders using error management 
strategy instructions are more trusted, because they are perceived as more moral than leaders 
using error prevention strategy instructions or error-neutral instructions. Sociability was again 
not a mediator as in Study 1. In contrast to Study 1, in Study 2 no effect of leaders' error-
handling strategy was found on perceived leader competence and competence did not mediate 
the relationship between error-handling and trust as it did in Study 1. We discuss 
explanations for the observed differences in greater detail below. An overview of the 
supported (or not) hypotheses can be found in Table 3.6. 
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TABLE 3.6 
Results Overview with Supported and Not Supported Hypotheses 
Study 1 Supported 
Not 
supported 
Study 2 Supported 
Not 
supported 
Hypothesis 1a. Leaders’ error prevention is 
negatively related to trust. 
1a  Hypothesis 1a’. Leaders who provide error prevention 
instructions are trusted less by their followers than leaders 
providing error neutral instructions. 
 1a’ 
Hypothesis 1b. Leaders’ error management is 
positively related to trust. 
1b  Hypothesis 1b’. Leaders who provide error management 
instructions are trusted more by their followers than are 
leaders providing error neutral instructions.  
 1b’ 
   Hypothesis 1c’. Leaders who provide error management 
instructions are trusted more by their followers than are 
leaders providing error prevention instructions.  
1c’  
Hypothesis 2. Leaders’ perceived (i) sociability, (ii) 
morality, and (iii) competence are positively related 
to followers’ trust in the leader. 
2ii,2iii 2i Hypothesis 2. Leaders’ perceived (i) sociability, (ii) 
morality, and (iii) competence are positively related to 
followers’ trust in the leader. 
2ii,2iii 2i 
Hypothesis 3a. Leaders who show more error 
prevention are perceived as (i) less sociable, (ii) less 
moral, and (iii) less competent by their followers 
than are leaders who show less error prevention. 
 3ai, 3aii, 
3aiii 
Hypothesis 3a’. Leaders who provide error prevention 
instructions are perceived as (i) less sociable, (ii) less 
moral, and (iii) less competent by their followers than are 
leaders who provide error-neutral instructions. 
3a’i, 3a’ii 3a’iii 
Hypothesis 3b. Leaders who show more error 
management are perceived as (i) more sociable, (ii) 
more moral, and (iii) more competent by their 
followers than are leaders who show less error 
management. 
3bi,3bii, 
3biii 
 Hypothesis 3b’. Leaders who provide error management 
instructions are perceived as (i) more sociable, (ii) more 
moral, and (iii) more competent by their followers than are 
leaders who provide error-neutral instructions. 
3b’i 3b’ii, 3b’iii 
   Hypothesis 3c’. Leaders who provide error management 
instructions are perceived as (i) more sociable, (ii) more 
moral, and (iii) more competent by their followers than are 
leaders who provide error prevention instructions. 
3c’i, 3c’ii 3c’iii 
Hypothesis 4a. The relationship between leaders’ 
error prevention strategy and followers’ trust is 
mediated by (i) sociability, (ii) morality, and (iii) 
competence. 
 4ai, 4aii, 
4aiii 
Hypothesis 4’. The effect of leaders’ error-handling 
strategy on trust is mediated by (i) sociability, (ii) 
morality, and competence (iii). 
4’ii 4’i, 4’iii 
Hypothesis 4b. The relationship between leaders’ 
error management strategy and followers’ trust is 
mediated by (i) sociability, (ii) morality, and (iii) 
competence. 
4bii, 4biii 4bi    
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General Discussion 
 Whom would followers trust more and why: a leader telling them to prevent things 
from going wrong or a leader telling them that it is impossible to foresee every error? Our 
findings provide evidence that leaders' error-handling strategy can and does affect the trust of 
followers. Specifically, Study 1 showed that (1) the more coaches were perceived as having 
an error management strategy and (2) the less they were perceived as having an error 
prevention strategy, the more they were trusted by their players. Study 2 showed that leaders 
using error management strategy instructions were trusted more than leaders using error 
prevention strategy instructions. The current results support our theorizing that leaders’ 
perceived error-handling strategy predicts followers’ trust. Regarding mediators of the effects 
of leaders' error-handling strategy on trust, Study 1 showed that both morality and 
competence were mediators, whereas Study 2 only identified morality as a mediator. 
Interestingly, sociability was not a mediator in either study. 
 Our findings show that although error prevention may be intuitively appealing as a 
way for leaders to positively influence followers' trust, in reality leaders' error prevention 
harms trust, whereas leaders' use of error management reinforces it. These results suggest that 
the strive for error-free business performance in organizations may have the unintended 
consequence of undermining one of the most powerful instruments leaders have to influence 
their followers - trust. Error management, in contrast, was not only associated with more 
trust, but was also good for leaders' image in terms of sociability, morality, and competence.  
Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
The current research adds to the error-handling literature by investigating the effects 
of leaders’ error-handling strategy on trust. Previous theorizing and qualitative data suggest 
that leaders' error-handling strategy may be linked to trust (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 
2003; 2004a,b; Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005), but this relationship has never been 
empirically tested. For example, Edmondson's research discussed a form of leader error 
management and error prevention, but never directly looked at trust by followers in a leader 
and focused instead on psychological safety between team members (see Edmondson, 
2004b). Our research extends the existing error-handling literature by first showing that 
leaders’ error-handling strategy is indeed related to trust (Study 1) and then by showing that 
leaders’ error-handling strategy causally affects followers' trust (Study 2). 
Recent research shows that leaders' errors affect the way leaders are perceived by 
others (i.e., task-competence, relationship-competence, willingness to work for leader; 
Thoroughgood, Sawyer, & Hunter, 2012). We contribute to this nascent but necessary 
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research line by showing that leaders' error-handling strategy also affects followers' 
perceptions and trust. This is important because it indicates that the way leaders handle errors 
can have (un)intentended consequences for the leaders in terms of the impressions followers 
form and of followers' trust. Importantly, the current research is unique in its focus on the 
interindividual effects of error-handling in the leader-follower context.  
We contribute to the leadership literature in multiple ways. First, we advance research 
on leader impression formation by showing that not only appearance (e.g., Todorov et al., 
2005; Todorov et al., 2011) affects the impressions followers form of a leader, but also 
behaviors and attitudes (in this case regarding errors) can influence how a leader is perceived. 
A recent theoretical paper by Cuddy and colleagues (2011) outlined the how, when and why 
of impression judgments in the work context, including interactions between leaders and 
followers. In our research, we go a step further by empirically investigating leaders' error-
handling strategy as an antecedent of impression judgments and followers' trust as their 
outcome. Second, we contribute to integrative leadership (e.g., Chemers, 1997, 2000), 
transformational leadership (see Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Judge, Picolo, & Illies, 2004), 
ethical leadership (for a meta-analysis see Brown & Treviño, 2006), and authentic leadership 
(e.g., Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Walumbwa, Avolio, Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008) 
theories by showing that both morality and competence determine how influential a leader is 
(in this case by affecting trust). Overall, previous theorizing and the present findings 
highlight impression formation in the leader-follower context as a fruitful research venue that 
warrants further investigation. 
Our findings have implications for the social perception literature, specifically, this 
literature sometimes equated warmth (sociability and morality) and trust (e.g., Cuddy et al., 
2008), our findings, however, indicate that these concepts are not completely overlapping 
with trust. Rather, in line with the trust literature, morality (a.k.a. integrity) and competence 
(a.k.a. ability) were found to predict trust. The finding that sociability is not linked to trust 
(when controlling for morality and competence) is novel, in the sense that both the trust and 
the perception literatures theorize this link. It is possible that, as suggested by the perception 
literature, the overlap between sociability and morality is so substantial that when trust is 
regressed on both their high intercorrelation cancels the weaker of the two effects. The latter 
finding provides an important implication to take into account in future research. Namely, 
most existing research looked at the individual effects of sociability, morality, and 
competence separately (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995), however, it is possible 
that some predictors are stronger than others under different circumstances and only a 
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simultaneous analysis can show that (note that sociability, morality, and competence were all 
positively correlated with trust, as expected).  
Finally, in the current research we measured the concepts of sociability, morality, and 
competence, instead of benevolence, integrity, and ability (Mayer et al., 1995; Mayer & 
Davis, 1999) because the constructs from the person perception literature are broader, easier 
to judge, and applicable in more contexts. Prior research has shown that people can make 
snap judgments about how sociable (a.k.a., likeable), moral (a.k.a. as trustworthy), and 
competent another person is after as little as 100 milliseconds of exposure to a picture (Willis 
& Todorov, 2006). Although in our research participants had much longer time to make their 
judgments about leaders, we expect that the measures of sociability, morality, and 
competence are nonetheless more sensitive and easier to apply to various contexts than the 
measures of benevolence, integrity, and ability by Mayer and Davis (1999). Additionally, the 
measures of sociability, morality, and competence, unlike their trust triplets have been used 
with different types of information: pictures, person descriptions, and behavioral 
observations, to name a few (e.g., Mayer & Davis, 1999 measures require for participants to 
have an interaction over a longer period of time).  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
There was a dissimilarity between the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 regarding 
competence. Namely, in Study 1 leaders’ error management strategy was positively linked to 
competence, whereas in Study 2, leader’s error management instructions did not result in 
higher perceived competence when compared to both error-neutral instructions and error 
prevention instructions. It is possible that the differences in results are attributable to how 
important the context made leaders’ competence for followers. According to Wojciszke 
(2005), “…when the target’s competence contributes to the perceivers’ well-being as much as 
their own abilities do, as in the case of competence of “my lawyer” or “my boss”(p. 65) the 
impact of competence judgments increases. The followers in the experimental study, 
however, were not particularly dependent on the leader, nor did they expect to have any 
future interactions, thus the leader’s competence did not matter that much to them. 
Consequently, the variability in findings may indicate the presence of potential moderators, a 
possibility that should be addressed further in future research (e.g., knowing the leader well 
versus just getting to know the leader; interacting with the leader once versus multiple times; 
high versus low importance of trusting the leader). 
A strength of our research was the combination of experimental and field study 
design. Our experimental study allowed us to make causal assumptions while controlling for 
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various alternative explanations, whereas the questionnaire distributed among actual 
followers made it possible to test those assumptions in a realistic setting. A potential 
limitation of the field study is that our sample consisted of amateur football players, who 
although sharing various characteristics with employees at an organization, are also markedly 
different. For example, employees are paid for their work (extrinsic motivation), whereas 
amateur football players participate for pleasure (intrinsic motivation). Moreover, football 
games involve a concentrated performance in a short amount of time, whereas employees are 
expected to perform well throughout longer periods of time. On an abstract level, however, 
leaders and teams in the organizational and in the sports context are similar. In both contexts 
the leader/coach is “an individual influencing a group of individuals to achieve a common 
goal” (Northouse, 2010, p. 3). Additionally, both contexts involve a complex interplay 
between leaders and followers, with the behaviors of the leader influencing followers and 
vice versa. 
Regarding our experimental study, by not showing a picture or a movie of a leader we 
ensured that leader appearance, tone of voice or non-verbal behaviors could not affect our 
findings. Moreover, by having the leader only sending messages we controlled for the 
potential effects of differences in interactions between leaders and followers. In real life, 
perceptions and trust are more malleable in the sense that people adjust them depending on 
their interactions with others. It may well be that the same leader can act differently towards 
different followers, whose perceptions and trust in turn predict the followers’ behaviors 
towards the leader and vice versa. Even so, the results regarding the effect of leaders' error-
handling strategy on trust were consistent between the two studies. Nonetheless, Study 2, has 
the limitation that the "communication" between the leader and followers was one-directional 
and did not provide a real interaction (the leader sent messages to the followers, but they 
could not send messages back). Additionally, the dynamics between leaders and followers are 
much more complex and involve long-term interactions and constant updates of perceptions 
and trust. That being said, in general lines the findings in the experimental and the 
questionnaire study were similar, indicating support for our predictions and replicability of 
the results. 
Finally, in the current studies, trust was treated as an emergent state (Burke et al., 
2007), namely, as a dynamic state that depends on contextual factors, such as leaders’ error-
handling strategy and perceived sociability, morality, and competence. Future research may 
want to measure participants’ trust propensity as a personality trait, as it can be a potential 
moderator that influences the effects on contextual trust. 
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Practical Implications 
Our findings indicate that applying an error prevention strategy, which is consistent 
with the zero-error policies many organizations advocate, was damaging to followers' 
perception of and trust in leaders. If leaders want to be trusted more and be perceived more 
favorably, applying an error management strategy may be particularly instrumental. Thus, if 
leaders want to engage in image management leading to them being perceived as more 
sociable, moral and competent, they should consider using an error management rather than 
an error prevention strategy.  
Trust is linked to a lot of potential positive outcomes for organizations (e.g., improved 
performance, OCBs; see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002) and the current findings provide organizations 
and the leaders within those with a strategy (error management) that can be trained (Hofmann 
& Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2008) to reap the benefits of trust. A word of warning, 
however, if leaders use error management inconsistently in their words and actions (e.g., 
saying that people should report and learn from errors but punishing those who report) 
followers would be unlikely to trust them (e.g., behavioral integrity; Simons, 2002). Finally, 
we do not know if leaders' use of error management strategy would still show similar effects 
on followers in organizations characterized by strong error prevention culture but we hope 
that future work would investigate the boundary conditions of the current effects. 
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Abstract 
People working on a task can make errors along the way. How people deal with an error, 
however, depends on the type of error-handling strategy they apply. One strategy, error 
management, focuses on increasing the positive and decreasing the negative 
consequences of errors. A second strategy, error prevention, focuses on working 
faultlessly. In two experiments, we manipulated error-handling strategy through task 
instructions and measured on-task thoughts and off-task thoughts. In Study 1 (N = 78), 
error management resulted in more on-task thoughts than error prevention, but no 
differences were found for off-task thoughts. Study 2 (N = 76) replicated the findings of 
Study 1, and further demonstrated that error management resulted in better analogical 
and adaptive transfer performance than error prevention, and that these effects were 
mediated by on-task thoughts. Our findings point toward the benefits of error 
management instructions for people and organizations.  
  
 Keywords: error management, on-task thoughts, off-task thoughts, analogical 
transfer performance, adaptive transfer performance 
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Introduction 
 Like them or not, errors are a part of life. Errors are defined as “all those 
occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve 
its intended outcome, and where these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of 
some chance agency” (Reason, 1990, p. 9). Errors are characterized by three main 
aspects: (1) they are unintentional, (2) occur only in goal directed action, and (3) are 
potentially avoidable (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Reason, 1990). 
People try to prevent errors because of the negative consequences they may 
involve, such as stress, frustration, financial loss, and loss of lives (Reason, 1990). Yet, 
we live in a complex and dynamic world, which makes the occurrence of errors all the 
more likely. No matter how hard we try to prevent them, errors inevitably occur 
(Reason, 1997), which is why it is highly relevant that methods are developed to help 
people continue pursuing a goal after they commit an error. In this way, errors can be 
effectively corrected, lowering the likelihood of severe negative consequences, and 
leading to learning from error, which can eventually affect future task pursuit and result 
in higher quality outcomes and better performance (Van Dyck, 2009). In the current 
paper, we investigate how active/exploratory practice of a novel complex task combined 
with instructions that either advise people to prevent errors (error prevention) or to make 
and learn from errors (error management) affect people’s cognitions and subsequent 
performance. Specifically, we are interested in whether providing people with an 
appropriate error handling strategy during task practice may be beneficial to post-
practice performance by positively affecting people’s ability to stay on-task and 
minimize task-undirected (off-task) thoughts.  
Two error-handling strategies have been previously outlined: error prevention 
and error management and both of them have the common goal of reducing 
(minimizing) the negative consequences of errors (e.g., Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese, 
Brodbeck, Heinbokel, Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 1991; Frese & Zapf, 
1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck, Baer, Frese, & Sonnentag, 2005). The way 
that the two strategies achieve this goal, however, differs. Error prevention entails a 
relatively negative view of errors and aims to prevent their negative consequences by 
avoiding errors altogether. Although prevention can be extremely important for reducing 
errors, it cannot completely eliminate them (Reason, 1997) and it does not prepare 
people for proper error handling once an error has occurred. What is more, focusing only 
on error prevention may make an individual or an organization blind to the learning 
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potential present in some errors (Sitkin, 1992). Error management, in contrast, is based 
on the assumption that the occurrence of errors cannot be completely eradicated and that 
errors can have both negative and positive consequences. Based on these assumptions, 
error management proposes that one should try to use errors in a constructive manner by 
learning from them and by attempting to reduce their negative consequences. Put 
differently, error management tries to minimize the negative and maximize the positive 
consequences of errors. Note that unlike error prevention, error management 
distinguishes the error from the consequences (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). For example, 
the same error, turning a valve in the wrong direction, can have different consequences 
if it occurs while regulating your heater at home as compared to when adjusting your 
oxygen tank while climbing or diving (Van Dyck, 2009). In the first case, your house 
may get a bit warmer or a bit colder than you intended it, but in the second case, you 
may not get enough oxygen and die. The errors by themselves in these cases are similar, 
the erroneous turning of a valve, but the consequences are markedly different. In the 
above example, error management attempts to increase the chance that the error will be 
successfully caught so that its negative consequences do not manifest or are at least 
minimized. 
Research has shown that error management leads to better performance than 
error prevention for both individuals and organizations (Chillarege, Nordstrom, & 
Williams, 2003; Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & 
Keith, 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Nordstrom, 
Wendland, & Williams, 1998; Van Dyck et al., 2005). Less is understood, however, 
about the underlying psychological mechanisms through which error-handling strategy 
affects performance, in other words, we are still unclear about why error management is 
effective. Uncovering these mechanisms is important not only because it can help us 
understand the theoretical underpinnings of the previously observed effects of error 
management on performance, but also because knowing which mechanisms work can 
help with the implementation of error management in practice.  
Researchers have proposed three main mechanisms through which error-
handling strategy can affect performance: cognitive (e.g., metacognition; Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), emotional (e.g., frustration, Debowski, Wood, 
& Bandura, 2001; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000; emotion control, Keith 
& Frese, 2005; anxiety, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008), and motivational (intrinsic 
motivation, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski et al, 2001; Wood et al., 2000; self-
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efficacy, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski et al., 2001). In the current studies we 
extend prior research by shedding more light on the cognitive mechanism. According to 
Joung, Hesketh, and Neal (2006) cognitive processing while learning complex tasks 
should receive greater attention so that more effective training programs can be 
developed, yet “relatively little research has examined the way that different approaches 
to training design can spark active cognitive processing in the training context” (p. 285). 
We aim to fill this gap by extending the work of Keith and Frese (2005), who implied 
that the allocation of cognitive resources to on-task, off-task thoughts, and self-
regulation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) might potentially mediate the effect of error-
handling strategy on performance. Although Keith and Frese (2005) established self-
regulation (metacognition and emotion control) as a mediator, no study so far has 
empirically tested the mediating role of on-task and off-task thoughts. Such a lack of 
prior research is surprising as multiple authors have consistently suggested that the 
presence of off-task thoughts and the lack of on-task thoughts could negatively affect 
performance (e.g., Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; 
Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998). Accordingly, our first contribution to the 
literature is investigating whether the allocation of cognitive resources to on-task and 
off-task thoughts mediates the effect of error-handling strategy on performance. 
Our second contribution to the error-handling literature is disentangling the role 
of type of practice and type of instructions. Very few studies have compared 
active/exploratory practice with error management instructions to active/exploratory 
practice with error prevention instructions (see Keith & Frese, 2008). According to the 
error management training and the active learning literatures (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; 
Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese et al., 1991; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2005; 
2008) errors during training, as a form of task exploration, are helpful in themselves 
because they make it possible for participants to learn the rules of the task better as 
compared to participants who receive guided training that allows for no errors to occur. 
We, however, argue that it is not erring itself that helps people during practicing a new 
task, rather how errors are framed that makes a difference, because it allows people to 
stay either more, or less focused on the task. Accordingly, in our experiments all 
participants have the possibility to make errors during the practice phase. By allowing 
all participants to make errors, we address a limitation of prior work: the confounding of 
(a) exploratory task practice (practice during which people can make errors) with error 
management instructions and (b) step-by-step practice (practice during which people 
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cannot make errors) with error prevention instructions (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith 
& Frese, 2008; Keith, Richter & Naumann, 2010). 
Our third contribution to the error-handling literature lies in investigating to what 
extent even short task practice with minimal error-handling instructions can affect 
performance. Put differently, we were interested in whether the performance findings 
reported for extended training sessions in previous research (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 
2008; Frese, 1991; Frese et al., 1991; Keith & Frese, 2005) would also generalize to 
short task instructions. Systems and tasks people face every day increase in complexity, 
while the time needed for learning how to deal with them diminishes. This creates a 
paradox: people are expected to learn more than before in much less time. Additionally, 
it necessitates the development of methods that are more efficient time wise, while 
remaining equally effective performance wise. Because it is not always possible for 
people or organizations to spend multiple hours on a single training, optimizing by 
decreasing the amount of time spent on practicing and learning, while maintaining the 
positive performance effects is both important and practically relevant. Most prior 
research on error management has used training sessions varying from 45 minutes to 
longer than 4 hours (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; Dormann & 
Frese, 1994; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Joung et al., 2006; Nordstrom et 
al., 1998) during which people were continuously receiving either error management or 
error prevention information. In contrast, our research aims to examine the effect of brief 
error management and error prevention instructions during practicing a novel task. Note 
that we do not define our context as training or error management training per se, rather 
our experiments combine brief error-framed (management or prevention) instructions 
and short task practice
1
.  
                                                 
1
 Training differs from the practice phase we used in multiple ways. First, in duration, training is 
longer and can vary from a few hours to days, months, and even years. Second, in level of skill 
acquisition, training involves developing procedural knowledge (automatization of the skills being 
learned), whereas during our practice phase participants can at best achieve knowledge compilation 
(“integrating the sequences of cognitive and motor processes required to perform the task” and moving 
them to “long-term memory”; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989, p. 660). Third, skill complexity, training usually 
involves learning skills that are more complex, for example, driving skills. Fourth, structure, when 
compared to task practice, training is more structured and learners are provided with clearer, more specific 
goals to be achieved. Fifth, feedback, training usually provides learners with specific direct feedback 
about the progress of the learning process. Finally, outcome, for training the nature of the outcome, for 
example acquiring a specific skill set is more observable (e.g., getting a driver’s license).  
Additionally, our practice phase exhibits some similarities with and differences from error 
management training (for a detailed overview of different types of error management related training see 
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008). Similarly to error management training our practice phase is characterized by: 
(a) providing minimal or no guidance, (b) promotion of inductive learning, (c) error framing, and (d) 
promotion of personal control (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008, p. 298). Regarding differences, first, unlike error 
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On- and Off-Task Thoughts 
 Making errors is disruptive for goal-directed action and as such is likely to affect 
people’s cognitive processing by prompting an individual to stop and think why an error 
has occurred or what its consequences may be (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996). People 
have limited cognitive resources that can be allocated to different activities (Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1989). In their cognitive resource allocation model, Kanfer and Ackerman 
(1989) distinguish three types of activities during task engagement among which people 
distribute their cognitive resources: on-task thoughts, off-task thoughts, and self-
regulation. On-task thoughts involve allocating attention to task-directed thoughts (e.g., 
thinking about the rules of the task). If attention is instead allocated to off-task thoughts 
then the person is having task-undirected thoughts (e.g., thinking about an appointment 
later this week). Finally, self-regulation involves (re)directing cognitive resources back 
to the task, for example when one is experiencing off-task thoughts (“When difficulties 
arose, I calmly considered how I could continue the task”, Keith & Frese, 2005, p. 683). 
While prior research has looked into self-regulation as a potential mediator of the effect 
of error-handling strategy on performance (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 
2005), we focus on the two elements of cognitive resource allocation – on-task thoughts 
and off-task thoughts – that have not been previously addressed. 
Off-task thoughts. Human information processing theories preceding Kanfer and 
Ackerman’s (1989) cognitive resource allocation theory, have postulated that people have 
a finite mental processing capacity, or put differently, the attentional/cognitive resources a 
person has at any given time are limited (Baddeley, 1986; Kahneman, 1973). 
Subsequently, off-task thoughts compete with on-task thoughts for limited 
attentional/cognitive resources (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986). In 
their core, on-task and off-task thoughts entail attention toward or away from the task at 
hand (e.g., Giambra, 1995; Sarason et al., 1986). Off-task thoughts can be defined as 
temporary attentional lapses during which “an individual’s attention becomes temporarily 
                                                                                                                                                
management training our practice phase does not attempt to reduce anxiety and frustration by positive 
statements during learning itself as was done by Keith and Frese (2005), or Bell and Kozlowski (2008). 
Second, we do not provide a specific encouragement of exploration and experimentation during the 
practice phase. Third, the duration of our practice phase (25 minutes excluding the reading of task 
instructions) is shorter than that of a typical error management training (at least 45 minutes excluding the 
reading of task instructions; e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005). 
Fifth, sometimes error management training (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Debowski, et al., 2001) includes 
clear training objectives, whereas the only objectives we provide in our research are highly general (i.e., 
guide as many trains in as short amount of time as possible to their end destinations). Finally, sometimes 
error management training (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008) includes feedback to participants, whereas no 
feedback is provided during our practice phase. 
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disengaged from the task and is instead directed internally within participants” 
(Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davis, 2006, p. 220). Similarly to Sarason and colleagues 
(1986), under the concept off-task thoughts, we incorporate both (a) task-unrelated 
interference (e.g., “I wonder what I will have in the canteen after finishing the task”), 
defined as directing attention away from the task (the description of this concept varies in 
terminology, but the most common terms used are task unrelated thoughts or TUT, 
stimulus independent thoughts or SI, zone-outs, and mind-wandering; see., Smallwood et 
al., 2006), and (b) task-related interference, defined as intrusive thoughts, which although 
related to the task, “either hinder or at least usually do not advance progress towards the 
specific goals of the task” (Sarason et al., 1986, p. 217). Task-related interference 
although task-related is not task-directed. In turn, task-related interference is 
differentiated into self-evaluative thoughts, defined as recurring negative self-related 
thoughts, for example, “I am not good at this task”, and non self-related thoughts, defined 
as thoughts not related to the self, but somehow related to the task without being task-
directed, for example, “I wonder how much time I have to finish the task” (Yee, Hsieh-
Yee, Pierce, Grome, & Schantz, 2004). To summarize, off-task thoughts can be 
disentangled into self-evaluative, non self-related, and task-unrelated thoughts.  
On-task thoughts. On-task thoughts, in contrast, can be defined as attention 
directed towards the task and task completion or as a form of task-concentration and 
focused task-engagement (e.g., Smallwood, Obonsawin, & Heim, 2003). On-task 
thoughts are theoretically and conceptually similar to mental/cognitive focus (e.g., Lee, 
Sheldon, & Turban, 2003), which indicates capacity to stay focused on the activity one is 
currently engaged in. Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) cognitive resource allocation theory 
implies that on-task thoughts are negatively related to off-task thoughts, consequently, the 
more off-task thoughts a person has, the less mental capacity that person would have for 
on-task thoughts and vice versa. In other words, off-task thoughts compete with on-task 
thoughts for limited cognitive capacity resources (Yee et al., 2004). 
Error-handling strategy, on-task thoughts, and off-task thoughts. During 
skill acquisition people have a high demand for attentional resources (e.g., Fitts & 
Posner, 1967; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). At the early stages of learning, knowledge is 
unintegrated and dependent on working memory. After a person acquires certain skills, 
the need for attentional resources decreases and the person does not need to focus 
completely on the task anymore. Thus, having enough attentional resources to focus on 
the task especially in the first stages of learning may be of vital importance for acquiring 
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new information and skills, which in turn may affect performance on new tasks.  
Making an error during skill acquisition can guide one’s thoughts away from the 
task and in this way jeopardize learning (Joung et al., 2006; Van der Linden, Sonnentag, 
Frese, & Van Dyck, 2001). Prior research indicates that suppressing negative thoughts 
or emotions is more draining than reappraising a negative event (Richards & Gross, 
2000). Put differently, suppressing one’s thoughts after making an error (e.g., trying not 
to think that one is performing poorly) is more cognitively costly than reappraising 
potential error situations beforehand by reframing errors as learning opportunities. We 
expect that if people apply an error management approach they will be less prone to 
direct attention to various possibly disruptive off-task thoughts than if people apply an 
error prevention approach. Subsequently, error-handling strategy is expected to 
influence the amount of cognitive resources one can spend on task-directed (on-task) 
thoughts, making people with an error management approach less likely to waste effort 
on off-task thoughts than people with an error prevention approach. In other words, if 
people worry less about making errors, because errors are framed positively, they have 
more cognitive resources available for actively mastering the task. If one cannot 
reappraise errors as positive learning opportunities every new error indicates that one is 
getting farther away from the goal of working faultlessly. As error prevention 
instructions frame diligence and working faultlessly as beneficial, making an error is 
expected to result in more negative off-task thoughts and fewer on-task thoughts than 
error management. This in turn may activate various potentially detrimental task-
undirected (off-task) thoughts (e.g., Sarason & Stroops, 1978; Van der Linden et al., 
2001). Note that we do not expect that error management instructions can completely 
eliminate off-task thoughts, rather mitigate them, making it easier for people to muster 
up the necessary cognitive resources to stay task focused. 
Hypothesis 1: Error management leads to more on-task thoughts than error 
prevention.  
Hypothesis 2: Error management leads to fewer off-task thoughts than 
error prevention. 
Performance 
Prior findings indicate that error management leads to better transfer 
performance than error prevention (for an overview see Keith & Frese, 2008). 
According to Keith and Frese (2005), error management increases positive 
transfer - transferring previously learned knowledge or skills from one task to 
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another (Hesketh, 1997; Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000) - which in turn results in 
improved performance. In the current research we examine two types of transfer 
related performance: analogical and adaptive.  
 Analogical transfer performance. Analogical transfer “involves using a 
familiar problem to solving a problem of the same type” (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 
1967; Keith & Frese, 2005). In other words, analogical transfer requires the direct 
application of a rule, skill, or a procedure that was learned during practice. Encountering 
errors is expected to sensitize people to similar errors in the future, which leads to an 
increased capacity to successfully handle those and as such promotes analogical transfer 
(Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000). In addition, we argue that acquiring the necessary skills 
during task practice would strongly depend not only on the making of errors per se but 
also on the framing of errors, which can influence the extent to which people can learn 
from the errors made. Cumulative research on error-handling has found small 
differences in analogical transfer performance (for a review see Keith & Frese, 2008). A 
possible explanation for the small effects may be the coupling of error management 
instructions with error-based training and error prevention instructions with errorless 
training, both of which can independently lead to similar levels of analogical transfer 
(for a discussion see Keith & Frese, 2008). We wanted to test whether error management 
instructions will be more beneficial for analogical transfer than error prevention 
instructions, while allowing all participants to make errors. One can speculate that error 
management due to its reframing of errors as challenges to master and learn from will 
help people acquire more information from errors during task practice. Error prevention, 
on the other hand, frames errors as threats to working faultlessly. Because of this, people 
may want to disengage from the error situation as quickly as possible, and consequently 
learn less from an error than someone who reappraises errors as learning opportunities. 
In turn, learning either more, or less from errors during task practice may influence 
analogical transfer performance
2
.  
Hypothesis 3: Error management leads to better analogical transfer 
performance than error prevention.  
 Adaptive transfer performance. Due to time limitations not every feature of a 
complex task can be taught, accordingly, practice should not only teach people the skills 
necessary for the task, but also help them become more efficient in dealing with new 
                                                 
2
 Note that we do not explicitly test whether people have acquired more or less information from errors in 
the current experiments. 
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challenges. Error management involves learning how to handle various unexpected 
complications and errors, which makes it an especially effective strategy in instigating 
adaptive transfer (Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008). Adaptive transfer, “involves using one’s 
existing knowledge base to change a learned procedure, or to generate a solution to a 
completely new problem” (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 1968). Adaptive transfer 
requires people to adapt to a new problem that can be structurally different from those 
previously solved during practice (Ivancic & Hesketh, 1995/1996; Keith & Frese, 2008). 
According to Ford, Smith, Weissbein, Gully and Salas (1998, p. 220) for training to be 
practically useful it should “prepare individuals to apply what was learned to more 
complex situations than were experienced during training”. In addition, by reframing 
errors as learning opportunities error management stimulates people to pay more 
attention to the important information errors reveal and thus assists them in developing 
better mental models of the task (Frese et al., 1991). Prior research consistently indicates 
that error management has a beneficial effect on adaptive transfer when compared to 
various alternative methods (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Dormann & Frese, 1994; 
Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005), which is why we hypothesize that error 
management results in better adaptive transfer performance than error prevention. It is 
important, however, to investigate the robustness of previous findings under conditions 
of short task practice, to test the expected benefit of error management instructions over 
error prevention instructions. 
Hypothesis 4: Error management leads to better adaptive transfer 
performance than error prevention.  
Note that in our current theorizing we differentiate between practice and transfer 
performance. We only expect error management to lead to improved performance after, 
but not during practice itself. During practice encouraging people to make errors is 
likely to result in similar or inferior performance of the error management group as 
compared to the error prevention group. As indicated by Keith and Frese (2005, p. 678), 
“during training, participants are encouraged to make errors. During the test phase, 
however, participants are aware that their performance is being assessed (e.g., Wood et 
al., 2000). This distinction is crucial, given that manipulations positively affecting 
training performance may negatively affect performance in the long run and vice 
versa…” Accordingly, a meta-analysis by Keith and Frese (2008) provides evidence that 
error management is only beneficial to transfer, but not so much to training (practice) 
performance. 
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Finally, we hypothesize that the effects of error-handling strategy on analogical 
and adaptive transfer performance are mediated by on-task and off-task thoughts. In 
particular, we hypothesize that error management results in better analogical and 
adaptive transfer performance than error prevention because it induces more on-task 
thoughts and fewer off-task thoughts. Although our predictions regarding mediation by 
on- and off-task thoughts are theoretically grounded in prior research (e.g., Keith & 
Frese, 2005; Joung et al., 2006), the current studies are the first to test whether this 
mechanism indeed clarifies the effect of error-handling strategy on performance. Our 
conceptual model is outlined in Figure 4.1. 
Hypothesis 5: On-task thoughts mediate the effect of error-handling 
strategy on (a) analogical and (b) adaptive transfer performance. 
Hypothesis 6: Off-task thoughts mediate the effect of error-handling 
strategy on (a) analogical and (b) adaptive transfer performance. 
 
FIGURE 4.1 
Research model 
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university canteen. All participants were randomly assigned to a two-group between-
participant design with error management and error prevention as conditions. 
Specifically, participants were assigned by being given consecutively the numbers 0 
(error prevention group) or 1 (error managment group), independently of age or sex. All 
participants received € 7 for their participation. 
The error management group consisted of 24 males and 16 females. The error 
prevention group consisted of 18 males and 20 females. Five participants were removed 
from the initial sample: two due to problems with the procedure during the experiment - 
one participant took 40 minutes longer to finish the study (average completion time was 
58.60 minutes, with SD = 7.07, making this participant an extreme outlier, almost six 
standard deviations away from the mean) and one participant responded too fast to the 
questions, as indicated by response times of less than 500 ms on multiple questions, and 
three participants failed the manipulation check at the end of the study.  
Procedure. Participants were seated in separate cubicles and all instructions and 
questions were presented on a computer screen. The experiment took approximately 60 
minutes to complete. We provided a brief description of the purpose of the experiment 
as “an investigation of strategic insight - the type of strategic thinking people use while 
playing games”. We used this abstract description in order to obscure the goal of the 
current study, so that our participants were less likely to adapt their answers to what they 
thought the purpose of the study was. 
Manipulation. First, we administered the experimental manipulation of error-
handling strategy instructions after randomly assigning participants either to the error 
management or the error prevention condition. As a manipulation, participants read a 
short text framed as supported by scientific research that stressed the benefits of error 
management or error prevention. The current manipulations were theoretically grounded 
in the existing work on error-handling (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 
2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998). Specifically, the error management manipulation was 
adapted from Keith and Frese (2005), but shortened in a manner consistent with the 
error management manipulation by Nordstrom and colleagues (1998). The error 
prevention manipulation was self-developed, but partially based on the error avoidant 
instructions used by Nordstrom et al. (1998). The texts for the two conditions were 
comparable in size and wording. Management and prevention were both framed as good 
for both learning and subsequent performance. Participants in the error management 
condition read that “it is not always possible to prevent errors, which is why one should 
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not get overly upset over them”. The text also indicated that “the occurrence of errors 
can be very useful because a lot can be learned from errors since they point you towards 
things you do not know” and that “people who learn how to deal with errors succeed 
more”. In the error prevention condition the text stressed the importance of working 
without making errors and suggested that “people who learn how to prevent errors 
succeed more”. The text stated that “people who work meticulously and without errors 
perform better, which is why one should try to think in advance of how to prevent 
errors”. The text also suggested that one can learn a lot if one strives to work without 
errors.  
The manipulations were reinforced by presenting three short statements on 
screen (procedure was adapted from Keith & Frese, 2005). In the error management 
condition those were: "To err is human", "Errors really are not that bad" and "Try to 
learn as much as you can from your errors!" In the error prevention condition the 
statements were: "Better safe than sorry", "Mistakes can be prevented through diligence" 
and "It is crucial to work faultlessly!" 
Game task. The task used in the current research involved a computer game. 
This game task was selected according to the following criteria: there should be no 
theoretical disadvantages to using either error management or error prevention strategy; 
the rules of the task should be simple to learn in a short amount of time; the task should 
be difficult enough so that participants can make numerous errors; making errors should 
be informative, in the sense that if people attend to what has occurred and why they 
should be able to learn from errors and improve performance; feedback should be 
provided so that participants know whether they have successfully achieved a level goal; 
there should be a particular strategy or a limited number of possible successful strategies 
which need to be employed to find the correct solution to a level; the game-play should 
be easy enough for a non-gaming person and should not require high degree of motor or 
perceptual/motor processing such as hand/eye coordination, for example, because the 
latter would give an unfair advantage to the people experienced in playing games. 
Based on those criteria we selected the game Pingus
© 
(Ruhnke, 2010) which is a 
free-source Lemmings
TM 
- inspired computer game. The game was appropriate in the 
current context because making errors was highly likely. The main objective of the game 
is to safely lead a group of penguins from the beginning to the end of a level with as 
small a number of casualties as possible. The penguins, if not properly guided, venture 
into various deadly situations (e.g., jumping off of cliffs). In order to make sure a certain 
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percentage of penguins reaches the end of a level, the player must develop strategies by 
using a set of functions that can be distributed to individual penguins, such as, bashing, 
blocking, and bridging. After each level, participants received feedback telling them 
whether they had succeeded or failed. If participants failed, they repeated the level until 
they managed to fulfil the requirements to pass or until the time limit for the practice 
was over. 
Following the experimental manipulation, participants were introduced to the 
goal of the game and to the game controls. After reading the instructions participants 
practiced the game for 25 minutes. During the allotted time participants finished as 
many levels as possible. The number of functions to use per level varied from 1 to 4, 
making it easy to know what functions to choose to complete a level. Everyone started 
from the same basic level and could not go on to the next one unless the current level 
was completed successfully.  
Dependent variables. After playing the game for 25 minutes, participants filled 
in the measures of the main dependent variables: on- and off-task thoughts. All items 
were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so), 
unless mentioned otherwise.  
On-task thoughts. In the present research, on-task thoughts were measured with 
a self-developed 6-item scale. We used a self-developed scale because other measures 
did not fit well in our context: most questionnaires we found were adapted to the work 
(e.g., Helton & Warm, 2008; Matthews, Campbell, Falconer, Joynard, Huggins, Gilliard, 
et al., 2002) or the academic testing context (e.g., Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, 1995). In 
addition, a lot of the scales we found intertwined on-task thoughts with stress, anxiety 
and negative emotions, whereas we wanted to use unambiguous items that concentrated 
only on on-task thoughts and not on the emotions associated with them. Example items 
are, “I found it easy to concentrate on the task” and “I found it easy to keep thinking 
about what I was supposed to do”. The scale had a high internal consistency (α =.87).  
Off-task thoughts. To measure off-task thoughts we used a 12-item modified 
version of Sarason and colleagues’(1986) Cognitive Interference Questionnaire (CIQ) 
which is a standard and widely used instrument for the assessment of intrusive thoughts. 
Although the original CIQ scale has mostly been used as a coherent scale (e.g., Sarason 
et al., 1986), a recent study by Yee et al. (2004) investigating the factorial structure of 
the first 10 items of the CIQ (note that we use those same items plus 2 items measuring 
general mind-wandering), indicated the existence of multiple factors. Specifically, Yee 
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et al. (2004) differentiated off-task thoughts into self-evaluative cognitive interference 
(i.e., self-evaluative off-task thoughts) and non self-related cognitive interference (i.e., 
non self-related off-task thoughts). In addition to the 10 items used by Yee et al. (2004) 
we also included two extra items to measure general mind-wandering: One from the 
original CIQ questionnaire “To what degree did your mind wonder off the task?” and a 
self-developed item, “While playing the game did you have any other things going 
through your mind besides thoughts about the game (e.g., did you think about what you 
will be doing later today, your friends or family, something you found funny, some 
homework or assignment you should work on”3. The self-evaluative off-task thoughts 
scale and the general mind-wandering scales had adequate internal consistencies (α =.74 
and α =.75, respectively), the non self-related off-task thoughts scale, however, showed 
very low internal consistency (α =.50), which could not be improved by removing any of 
the items, suggesting that the scale is not reliable. 
Confirmatory factor analyses. As the on-task thoughts scale was newly 
developed it was important to ascertain if the scale had discriminant validity when 
compared to the already established off-task thoughts scales. Specifically, we compared 
different plausible and theoretically driven models to a one-factor model combining on 
and off-task thoughts. It should be taken into account that off-task thoughts scales are 
not perfectly orthogonal, as they measure different but related aspects of a broad-base 
construct, which is why measures such as Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) discriminant 
validity test are not appropriate in the current context and why we focused on theory-
driven model testing instead. We conducted all confirmatory factor analyses in EQS, 
using the maximum likelihood estimation, in which all items were allowed to load only 
on their intended factor, factors were allowed to correlate among each other, and errors 
were not allowed to correlate. For the comparative fit index (CFI) values above .90 are 
considered acceptable and values above .95 are seen as showing excellent model fit (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999). For the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) index, Hu 
and Bentler (1999) suggest values ≤ .06 as indicating excellent fit. The suggested values 
for the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) index are ≤ .08 (Hu & Benter, 
1999). 
                                                 
3
 The distinction between non-self related off-task thoughts and general off-task thoughts is that the 
former are related to the task (e.g., “ I thought about how much time I had left”), whereas the latter are not 
(e.g., “My mind wandered off during the task”). Note that the distinction between on-task and off-task 
thoughts is that on-task thoughts are task-directed, whereas off-task thoughts can be task-related. The fact 
that an off-task thought is task-related does not make it task-directed. 
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A one-factor model, combining all on and off-task thoughts’ items, fit the data 
poorly. The chi-square statistic was significant, χ2 (135, N = 78) = 249.95, p < .001 and 
all indices indicated poor fit: CFI = .75, SRMR = .11 and RMSEA =.11. Next, we tested 
a two-factor model, distinguishing on- and off-task thoughts as separate factors. The 
second model fit the data significantly better than the one-factor model, Δχ²(1) = 32.27, 
p < .001, nonetheless, it also showed relatively poor fit, χ2 (134, N = 78) = 217.68, p < 
.001, CFI = .82, SRMR = .11, and RMSEA = .09.  
Finally, we tested a four-factor model, distinguishing between on-task thoughts, 
self-evaluative off-task thoughts, non self-related off-task thoughts, and general mind-
wandering. The four factor model showed reasonably good fit, χ2 (129, N = 78) = 
162.08, p = .027, CFI = .93, SRMR = .09, and RMSEA = .06. The four-factor model fit 
the data significantly better than the one-factor, Δχ²(1) = 87.87, p < .001, and the two-
factor solution, Δχ²(1) = 55.60, p < .001. The average factor loading for the newly 
developed on-task thoughts scale was .74 (loadings ranged from .63 to .87; see Table 
4.1), which is well above the required minimum loading value of .50 (Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). Additionally, the on-task thoughts scale had good 
composite reliability (CR = .83), well above the minimum value of .60 (Hair et al., 
2006). Three items, two from the self-evaluative off-task thoughts scale and one from 
the non self-related off-task thoughts scale had factor loadings lower than .50, but we 
decided not to remove these from scale construction, as they belonged to previously 
established scales (note that all results were identical independently of whether we kept 
or removed the low loading items). The composite reliability of the self-evaluative off-
task thoughts (CR = .71) and general mind-wandering (CR = .68) scales was sufficient. 
The composite reliability for the non self-related off-task thoughts scale, however, was 
.47, which together with the lower factor loadings (average factor loading was .45) and 
low scale reliability (.50) suggest that this scale is problematic although it has been 
previously used in earlier work (Yee et al., 2004). The intercorrelations between factors 
varied from low (.02 between on-task thoughts and non self-related off-task thoughts), to 
moderate (.27 between non self-related off-task thoughts and general mind-wandering) 
to high (.54 between self-evaluative off-task thoughts and general off-task thoughts; .56 
between self-evaluative off-task thoughts and non self-related off-task thoughts; -.65 
between on-task thoughts and general mind-wandering; -.70 between on-task thoughts 
and self-evaluative off-task thoughts). The current intercorrelations indicate that none of 
the factors measured were redundant, as implied by intercorrelations lower than .85 
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(Brown, 2006). All factor loadings, error variances, average variance extracted, and 
composite reliability values are presented in Table 4.1. 
  
TABLE4.1 
Study 1 Factor Loadings, Error Variances, Average Variance Extracted, and 
Composite Reliability 
  On-task thoughts 
Self-evaluative off-
task thoughts 
Non self-related 
off-task thoughts 
General mind-
wandering 
Convergent 
validity 
Item Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error AVE CR 
on1 .87 .49         
on2 .77 .64         
on3 .70 .72         
on4 .63 .77         
on5 .80 .60         
on6 .67 .75       .56 .83 
offself1   .76 .65       
offself2   .68 .73       
offself3   .40 .92       
offself4   .39 .92       
offself5   .53 .85       
offself6   .66 .75     .35 .71 
offnonself1     .49 .87     
offnonself2     .51 .86     
offnonself3     .23 .97     
offnonself4     .55 .83   .21 .47 
offgen1       .73 .69   
offgen2       .87 .50 .65 .68 
 
Note. AVE = Average variance extracted. CR = Composite reliability. On - on-task thoughts items. Offself - 
self-related off-task thoughts. Offnonself - non self-related off-task thoughts. Offgen - general off-task 
thoughts. 
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TABLE 4.2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Study Variables in Study 1 
    
Error 
Management 
Error 
Prevention                 
    
  Variable M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Condition - - - - -            
2 Age 21.60 3.54 20.47 2.75 .18 -           
3 Sex 0.40 0.50 0.53 0.51 -.13 .03 -          
4 Playing computer games in general 3.90 1.50 3.97 1.55 -.02 .09 .42** -         
5 
Playing a similar game before (e.g., 
Lemmings) 
0.63 0.49 0.55 0.50 .07 -.10 .25* .33** -        
6 
Level of experience with similar 
games 
2.05 1.08 2.08 1.22 -.01 -.12 -.28* -.36** -.44*** -       
7 On-task thoughts 4.34 0.62 4.04 0.65 .23* -.09 -.25* -.38** -.22† .33** -      
8 Self-evaluative off-task thoughts 2.48 0.57 2.71 0.91 -.15 .04 .06 .27* .19 -.28* -.58*** -     
9 Non self-related off-task thoughts 3.22 0.90 3.16 0.61 .04 -.16 -.34** -.22† -.06 .16 .02 .41** -    
10 General mind-wandering 2.24 0.91 2.42 1.25 -.08 -.12 .04 .20† -.04 -.13 -.50*** .39*** .16 -   
11 
Number of level repetitions during 
practice 
2.60 1.66 2.66 1.94 -.02 -.07 .11 .38** .27* -.29** -.26* .33** .07 .20† -  
12 
Total number of penguins lost 
during practice 
70.41 28.51 74.17 25.74 -.07 -.07 .02 .17 .17 -.14 -.17 .26* .11 .26* .60** - 
 
Note. N = 78, except for total number of penguins lost, for which N = 75. Error prevention = 0 and error management = 1. Sex: 0 = Man and 1 = Woman. Playing a similar 
game before (0 = Yes, 1 = No). Note that playing computer games in general, level of experience with similar games, on-task thoughts, and off-task thoughts were measured 
on a 5-point scale. 
† p < .10 . * p < .05 . ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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 Control variables. We controlled for gaming experience because we expected that 
more experienced participants would find it easier to stay task-focused than less experienced 
participants, which in turn could affect their on-task and off-task thoughts’ ratings. Gaming 
experience was measured with three items: “How often do you play computer games in 
general? (1 = almost never to 5 = every day), “Have you ever played a similar game before 
(e.g., Lemmings?)” (0 = yes, 1 = no), and “How experienced do you consider yourself in 
playing these kinds of games? (1 = beginner to 5 = expert). Additionally, in all analyses we 
also controlled for sex, because due to the random assignment the number of males and 
females differed between groups. 
 Manipulation check. As a manipulation check at the end of the study we asked all 
participants if they could recall what strategy to handle errors we had recommended to them 
at the beginning of the study. Participants could choose among four options: error 
management ("To err is human", "Errors really are not that bad" and "Try to learn as much as 
you can from your errors!"), error prevention ("Better safe than sorry", "Mistakes can be 
prevented through diligence" and "It is crucial to work faultlessly!"), another strategy (no 
additional information was provided for this option), and “Not sure”. Three participants could 
not properly recall which text they had read (note: no participant chose the “another strategy” 
or the “Not sure” options), suggesting that those three participants had not read the 
manipulation text properly, if at all. These three participants were removed from all 
subsequent analyses. 
Results  
 Table 4.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the 
experimental variables. Because making errors was integral to our theorizing we wanted to 
establish whether participants in both conditions indeed made errors during the game. For this 
purpose, we calculated the number of all penguins lost as well as the number of level 
repetitions, both of which can be seen as consequences of errors that were made. The total 
number of penguins lost ranged between 21 and 147 with a mean of 72.21 (SD = 27.10). The 
mean number of level repetitions was 2.63 (SD = 1.79). There were no differences 
betweenconditions on the total number of penguins lost, F (1,73) = 0.36, p = .552, η2p = 0.01, 
Cohen’s d = -0.14 or on the number of level repetitions, F (1,76) = 0.20, p = .897, η2p = 0.00, 
Cohen’s d = -0.03. Based on the abovementioned analyses we can conclude that the task we 
used induced errors independently of condition. 
 On-task thoughts. We expected that participants in the error management condition 
would have more on-task thoughts than participants in the error prevention condition. This 
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hypothesis was tested with an ANCOVA with error condition varied between subjects and 
game experience and sex as covariates. Supporting our expectations, participants in the error 
management condition (M = 4.34; SD = 0.62) reported having more on-task thoughts than 
participants in the error prevention condition (M = 4.04; SD = 0.66), F (1, 72) = 4.54, p = 
.037, η2p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = 0.48. There was also a significant effect of playing games in 
general, F (1, 72) = 5.11, p = .027, η2p = 0.07 (see Table 4.3). The current findings provide 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 
Results of Main Analyses in Study 1 
ANCOVA 
      Dependent variable: On-task thoughts 
 
df Error F p η2 p 
Control variables 
      Playing computer games in general 
 
1 71 5.11 .270 0.07 
Played a similar game before (e.g., 
Lemmings?) 
 
1 72 0.17 .679 0.00 
Level of experience with similar games 
 
1 72 2.94 .091 0.04 
Sex 
 
1 72 0.15 .704 0.00 
Independent variable 
      Condition 
 
1 72 4.54 .037 0.06 
       MANCOVA 
      
Dependent variables: Off-task thoughts 
Pilai's 
trace 
value 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df F p η2 p 
Control variables 
      Playing computer games in general 0.10 3 70 2.70 .052 0.10 
Played a similar game before (e.g., 
Lemmings?) 0.04 3 70 0.88 .456 0.04 
Level of experience with similar games 0.07 3 70 1.83 .150 0.07 
Sex 0.08 3 70 1.94 .130 0.01 
Independent variable 
      Condition 0.04 3 70 1.06 .370 0.04 
 
Note. N = 78. Playing computer games in general (1 = Almost never, 5 = Every day). Playing 
a similar game before (0 = Yes, 1 = No). Level of experience with similar games (1 = 
Beginner, 5 = Expert). Sex: 0 = Man, 1 = Woman. Condition (Error prevention = 0, Error 
management = 1). On-task and off-task scales were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = Not at 
all, 5 = Very much so). All tests are two-tailed. 
 
 
   
110 
Off-task thoughts. A MANCOVA with the covariates mentioned above and the three 
types of off-task thoughts (self-evaluative, non self-related, and general mind-wandering) as 
dependent variables, tested whether error management would result in fewer off-task 
thoughts than error prevention. Contrary to expectations, the MANCOVA (using Pillai’s 
trace) showed no significant effect for error instructions, V = 0.04, F (3, 70) = 1.06, p = .370 
(Cohen’s d self-evaluative off-task thoughts = -0.35; Cohen’s d non self-related off-task 
thoughts = -0.01; Cohen’s d general mind-wandering off-task thoughts = -0.15). Thus, 
participants who received error management instructions did not seem to have fewer off-task 
thoughts as compared to participants who received error prevention instructions (see Table 
4.3). Our findings did not support Hypothesis 2. 
Discussion 
The main goal of Study 1 was to provide an initial investigation of the proposed 
effects of error management on on- and off-task thoughts. As expected, participants who 
received error management instructions found it easier to focus on the task than participants 
who received error prevention instructions. No effect of error instructions on off-task 
thoughts was found, although we expected that error management due to its reappraisal of 
errors as learning opportunities would induce fewer off-task thoughts than error prevention. It 
is possible that because the task was highly engaging it left little room for off-task thoughts. 
This limitation was addressed in Study 2 by incorporating short breaks during the practice 
phase (Kanfer, Ackerman, Dugdale, Murtha, Dugdale, & Nelson, 1994) allowing participants 
to “wander off” the task.  
In Study 1 we selected a task during which - as is the case in real life - it was not 
always obvious if and when an error was made. Although using such a task increases the 
ecological validity of the experiment, it had the potential limitation that participants did not 
receive feedback after an error, rather feedback was provided after a level was completed, 
thus participants may have been unaware of an error if it did not immediately result in a 
negative consequence. Put differently, if an error and its consequence are separated in time, 
participants may not have realized which of their actions were erroneous, making it difficult 
to learn from the error. This limitation was addressed in Study 2 by selecting a task that 
provided an error message immediately after an error occurred.  
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design. The final sample consisted of 76 participants, all but one 
were students at the university of the first author (42 females and 34 males; Mage = 21.39, SD 
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= 3.22). Participants were recruited in the same way as for Study 1 – with flyers distributed in 
the university canteen. Participants were randomly assigned to either the error management 
(20 females and 19 males) or the error prevention condition (22 females and 15 males)
5
. 
While assigning participants we controlled for sex, so that we had an equal proportion of 
males and females in every condition, which is why our assignment may more correctly be 
characterized as quasi-random. Four participants of the initial sample were removed from all 
analyses: one participant was not reading the instructions/questions and three participants 
indicated to the experimenter during and after the experiment they were not proficient with 
computers
6
. All participants received € 10 for taking part in the research.  
Procedure. Study 2 lasted approximately 90 minutes including all manipulations, 
measures, practice and performance trials. At the beginning participants were seated in 
separate cubicles and were told that most instructions and all questions would appear on the 
computer screen. When participants were to receive additional instructions (for example, the 
train schedule to be used during the task practice) or when the next task trial was to start, a 
message would appear on the screen and tell participants to contact the experimenter. We 
presented participants with a cover story which enabled us to collect data on various 
personality variables (e.g., trait regulatory focus, trait self-efficacy) so that we could check 
whether our experimental groups were as similar as possible
7
. Namely, we told participants 
                                                 
5
 Originally, we included an additional condition, self-focused attention. Half of the participants in both groups 
received extra instructions that everything happening on the screen was being recorded and would be later 
evaluated. The purpose of those instructions was to make the situation more evaluative to test if more evaluative 
situations are differently affected by error training. However, both the manipulation checks and a correlational 
analysis indicated that the self-focused attention manipulation did not work. Self-focused attention did not 
significantly correlate with any dependent variables. No interaction effects were found for any of the analyses 
conducted. 
6
 Coincidentally, those participants were also considerably older than the rest of our sample, aged 36, 44, and 
63, accordingly. Results for all analyses were identical independently of including or excluding the three 
participants who indicated having less experience with computers, however, because those participants were 
different from the standard student sample in multiple ways (i.e., less computer experience and higher age), we 
reported the more conservative analyses which excluded these participants. 
7
 Previous work has found that certain personality differences could influence performance, or interact with our 
independent variables (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; Heimbeck et al., 2003). We 
measured individual differences in trait error-handling strategy (measured with two subscales from the Error 
Orientation Questionnaire by Rybowiak and colleagues , 1999: learning from errors and error competence), 
learning and performance goals (measured with the scale by VandeWalle, 1997), general self-efficacy 
(measured with the scale by Judge, Erez & Bono, 1998), trait self-control (measured with the scale by Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), trait regulatory focus (measured with the scale by Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, 
Idson, Ayduk & Taylor, 2001), and trait action/state orientation (measured with a shortened 21 item version of 
the scale by Kuhl, 1994). We conducted multivariate analysis of variance with error-handling strategy 
(management or prevention) as the grouping variable and the separate trait variables as the dependent variables. 
Using Pilai’s trace, there was no significant effect of group (error management vs. error prevention) on the trait 
variables, V = 0.16, F (11, 59) = 1.02, p = .44. We also conducted univariate analyses comparing the groups on 
each variable, but none of those were significant either. Based on these findings and the random assignment of 
participants to conditions, we feel it is unlikely that potential differences between the groups are responsible for 
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that we would first collect data on their personality, after which we would suggest to them a 
strategy that fits with their personality to use during the subsequent task.  
After participants had the chance to get acquainted with the task for five minutes they 
saw a screen indicating that based on their personality they should follow the strategy 
mentioned next, which was the error-handling strategy manipulation. Participants then read a 
text similar to that in Study 1 discussing the benefits of error management or error 
prevention, dependent on condition. Next, participants worked on the task for 20 minutes 
(two 10-minute sessions separated by a two-minute break). Participants then filled in the 
measures of on-task and off-task thoughts. Next, participants played two 10-minute 
performance trials of the train dispatcher game. The first performance trial measured 
analogical transfer, whereas the second performance trial measured adaptive transfer. To 
provide additional motivation to perform during the performance trials, participants were told 
that the person with the highest score will be awarded a prize of € 508.  
Simulation task. The task used in Study 2 was a free-source PC simulation called 
Train Dispatcher 2.0
©
 (Signal Computer Consultants, 1997). In this simulation, a participant 
acts as a train dispatcher who guides trains from their entry to their exit location as quickly as 
possible. In the simulation multiple trains share limited tracks. It is essentially the 
dispatcher’s role to make sure trains move efficiently (e.g., by directing trains to their correct 
destination; by moving trains as fast as possible through the open tracks). The dispatcher uses 
switches and signals to direct trains. Participants needed to learn strategic skills such as 
selecting the signals for the correct direction, throwing switches to change the track a train is 
on, understanding under what conditions a switch /a signal does not work, understanding 
what track different switches and signals correspond, and so on. A useful feature of the 
simulation is that if participants made an error they immediately receive an error message 
indicating that something is wrong (however, no error message is shown if participants send a 
train to the wrong end destination, but only if participants are using the wrong signals and 
switches or trying to do something impossible, e.g., stop a train while it is moving through a 
green signal). 
The software automatically calculated the scores
9
. The parameters awarded points 
were: miles travelled by the trains, correct train destinations and on-time arrivals for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the current findings of the effect of error-handling strategy on on-task thoughts, analogical, and adaptive transfer 
performance. 
8
 Because we expected performance differences between the groups which would mean not everybody had equal 
chance to win the prize we randomly selected a winner. 
9
 The final score calculation during the practice and analogical transfer trials was done automatically by the 
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passenger trains. Participants could choose to speed up or slow down the simulation by using 
a time multiplier. Faster speeds made the simulation more challenging and because of that 
added extra points to the final score.  
Task familiarization. All participants were presented with identical basic instructions 
outlining how to use the signals and switches, start and stop the simulation, zoom in and out, 
and check train destinations. Participants were then explained that the main goal was to guide 
as many trains as possible to their correct end destinations as quickly as one could. After 
reading the instructions participants had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
simulation for 5 minutes by guiding a train from its start to its end point. The experimenter 
gave participants a handout with detailed instructions on what the train number was, where 
the train would appear and where the train should be directed to. In addition, participants 
received a handout with the general task instructions presented before the familiarization 
trial. Participants worked on this first task alone for 5 minutes after which if they had not 
been able to guide the train to its end location the experimenter would explain and show how 
the task should be successfully completed. 
Manipulation error-handling strategy. After participants were familiarized with the 
simulation task we administered the error-handling strategy manipulation. Participants read 
instructions similar to the ones used in Study 1. Participants in the error management 
condition read that “making errors is a natural part of the learning process” and “making 
errors while learning is useful because they point you at what you can still learn”. In addition, 
participants read that “when one makes an error it is important to think of how it can be 
corrected, what can be learned from it, and how what you learn can help you with similar 
situations in the future”. Finally, participants read that “by successfully handling errors you 
will learn how to deal with the task more effectively” and “if you try to find the useful 
information errors provide, you will do better on the task”. Participants in the error 
prevention condition read that “errors should not be allowed to occur during the learning 
process” and “if you avoid making errors then you can learn the right steps from the start”. In 
addition, participants in this condition read that “it is important to think of how you can 
                                                                                                                                                        
simulation based on the following formula: 
(Total miles travelled x Time Multiplier) + (Correct Train Destinations x 50 x Time Multiplier) + (On-time 
Arrivals x 100 x Time Multiplier) = Final Score.  
The final score calculation during the adaptive transfer trial was based on the following formula: 
(Total miles travelled x Time Multiplier) + (Correct Train Destinations x 100 x Time Multiplier) + (On-time 
Arrivals x 100 x Time Multiplier) = Final Score. 
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prevent errors from occurring, what you can do to successfully detect situations possibly 
leading to errors and how what you know can help you with similar situations in the future”. 
Finally, participants in the error prevention condition read “by successfully preventing errors 
you will learn how to deal with the task more effectively” and “if you try to prevent errors 
from occurring you will do better on the task”.  
Before each practice trial the error-handling strategy manipulations were reinforced 
by presenting on screen four short statements (the procedure was adopted from Keith and 
Frese, 2005). In the error management condition those were: "Errors are a natural part of 
learning”, “Errors inform you about what you still do not know and can still learn”, “What 
counts is not whether you make errors, but how you handle them when they occur”, and 
“There is always a way to leave the error situation”. In the error prevention condition the 
statements were: “Errors can be prevented”, “The less errors you make, the more likely it is 
you learn things right from the first attempt”, “Avoid making errors so that you do not get 
stuck in a situation you cannot escape from”, and “The best way to follow your goals is 
without making errors”. Note that those statements were only included before the practice 
trials (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008).  
Manipulation check. After reading the manipulation texts we asked participants to 
write a short summary (maximum of 200 words) explaining the strategy mentioned in the text 
they had previously read. All participants provided summaries. The summaries were coded 
by two independent coders, knowledgeable of the error-handling literature (both coders 
belonged to a research group investigating errors that the first and second authors are a part 
of), and blind to experimental condition. The two coders had a 100% agreement on the type 
of strategy described by participants (management or prevention). For all participants, the 
summaries, as coded by the coders, matched the condition that participants belonged to, 
indicating that all participants had read the manipulation. 
Practice. After the manipulations were administered all participants began their task 
practice. The practice consisted of two 10-minute trials separated by a 2-minute break. The 
experimenter would pause the simulation during the break after which participants could start 
from where they left off. During the practice all participants were provided with a train 
schedule outlining when trains would appear on the screen (in simulation time) and what their 
start and end-destination was. The maximum number of trains participants could direct was 
20 (provided participants had a perfect performance and made no errors). The track territory 
during the practice trials had 4-main tracks and 11 entrances/exits. In addition to the train 
schedule, during the practice everyone received a copy of the full simulation manual 
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(including all available information on the simulation, not only the basic information 
provided during the familiarization trial). The simulation automatically calculated the overall 
score at the end of the 20-minute practice. 
 Dependent variables. 
On- and off-task thoughts. After the completion of the practice trials all participants 
had a 2-minute break before filling in the measures of on- and off-task thoughts which were 
identical to the measures used in Study 1. All ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). The internal consistency of the scales was 
respectively: on-task thoughts (α = .89), self-evaluative off-task thoughts scale (α =.75) , non 
self-related off-task thoughts scale (α =.54) and general mind-wandering (α =.83).  
Performance. Following the on-task and off-task thoughts measures participants 
completed two 10-minute performance trials. The performance trials were described as an 
opportunity to show what participants have learned (also see Keith & Frese, 2005). 
Participants were instructed to guide as many trains as possible to their correct end 
destinations. In addition, a prize of € 50 for the best performing participant was offered as an 
additional motivation to do one’s best during the performance phase. All participants 
received the appropriate train schedule before each of the two trials. 
The first 10-minute performance trial measured analogical transfer. The task in the 
analogical transfer trial had a level of difficulty comparable to that in the practice phase and 
involved similar procedures. The maximum number of trains participants could direct during 
this phase was 10 (provided participants had a perfect performance and made no errors) and 
was comparable to the number of trains participants directed during the practice phase in a 
10-minute timeframe. In addition, the track territory had a similar outlook to the track 
territory used during the practice phase: four main tracks and six entrances/exits. The final 
score at the end of the first performance trial was used as the measure of analogical transfer 
performance.  
After a two-minute break participants worked on the second 10-minute performance 
trial, the purpose of which was to measure adaptive transfer. The task in the adaptive transfer 
trial was more difficult than both the practice and the analogical transfer trials. The task 
included a more complex track territory with a higher number of tracks and trains, as well as 
new instruments and rules. The maximum number of trains participants could direct during 
the adaptive transfer trial was 46 (provided participants had a perfect performance and made 
no errors). Accordingly, participants had 36 more trains that could appear on screen than 
during the analogical transfer trial. In addition, the adaptive transfer trial was made more 
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difficult by the higher number of main tracks (22 in this trial) and entrances/exits (24 in this 
trial). Finally, four novel elements were present in the adaptive transfer trial (a) a new type of 
switches changing multiple tracks simultaneously, (b) tracks that required reversing the train 
to continue moving, (c) tracks connected to alternate areas of the track territory, and (d) track 
maintenance requests that made sections unavailable for limited periods of time, thus 
blocking train movement along certain tracks. The abovementioned characteristics required 
for participants to update the previously created mental model of the task, because the novel 
elements considerably changed how the simulation behaved as compared to the previous 
sessions which made performance trial 2 fit with adaptive rather than with analogical transfer 
(also see Bell & Kozlowski, 2002; 2008; Keith and Frese, 2005). The simulation 
automatically calculated the final score for the adaptive transfer trial. 
Control variables. We wanted to ensure that as expected participants did not know the 
simulation we used, which is why we asked, “Have you ever played this simulation task 
before?” (“yes” vs. “no”). None of the participants indicated having prior experience with this 
specific simulation task, which is why this item was not used as a covariate in the analyses. 
We did not include a question on general gaming experience, because the current simulation 
was extremely different from the type of games most people would play on a daily basis. We 
considered instead more indicative the question, “Do you have previous experience with 
similar tasks?” (1 = not at all, 7 = a lot of experience). It is possible that although the current 
simulation was not known, participants with extensive gaming experience could have played 
games involving similar type of simulations before. Additionally, because some participants 
could have agreed with the information outlined in the cover story more than others, we also 
asked participants, “Did you think the strategy we suggested for you fits you?”(1 = not at all, 
7 = completely). Finally, in all analyses we controlled for sex. 
Results 
 Table 4.4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations. To test whether 
the task was successful at inducing errors, we measured the number of errors by calculating 
the number of error messages (M = 41.30; SD = 28.48) participants saw during the two 10-
minute practice trials. No differences between conditions were found during practice trial 1, 
F (1, 72) = 2.25, p = .138, η2p = 0.03, Cohen’s d = 0.35, or practice trial 2, F (1, 72) = 0.29, p 
= .589, η2p = 0.00, Cohen’s d = 0.13. Finally, the total number of error messages received 
during the whole practice phase (practice trial 1 + 2) did not vary significantly between 
conditions, F (1, 72) = 1.15, p = .288, η2p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.25. Based on the latter results 
         
 
1
1
7
 
TABLE 4.4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between Study Variables in Study 2 
    
Error 
Management 
Error 
Prevention                 
      
 Variable M SD M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6  7     8      9       10        11    12     13 14 
1 Condition - - - - -              
2 Age 21.05 2.55 21.76 3.80 -.11 -             
3 Sex 0.51 0.51 0.59 0.50 -.08 .09 -            
4 Prior experience with similar simulations 1.97 1.48 2.05 1.43 -.03 -.08 -.16 -           
5 
Perceived fit between suggested strategy 
and one’s personality 
4.18 1.62 3.70 1.56 .15 -.23* -.15 .03 -          
6 On-task thoughts 5.81 1.05 5.21 1.07 .28* -.24* .00 .04 .31** -         
7 Self-evaluative off-task thoughts 3.32 1.11 3.83 1.23 -.21† .25* .15 -.08 .03 -.33** -        
8 Non self-related off-task thoughts 3.94 1.13 4.14 1.33 -.08 -.06 .09 .15 -.16 -.06 .49*** -       
9 General mind-wandering 3.21 1.68 3.68 1.70 -.14 .03 -.10 .09 -.41** -.40*** -.04 .09 -      
10 Practice performance after 10 minutes 0.16 1.08 -0.17 0.90 .16 -.18 -.19 .11 .25* .30* -.03 -.07 -.21 -     
11 
Practice performance after 20 minutes 
(end of practice) 
0.27 1.03 -0.28 0.90 .28* -.25* -.16 .12 .15 .40*** -.19† -.03 -.23* .85*** -    
12 Analogical transfer performance 0.30 1.17 -0.32 0.65 .31** -.15 -.14 .20† .09 .30** -.18 .01 -.09 .62*** .81** -   
13 Adaptive transfer performance 21.05 2.55 21.76 3.80 .27* -.19 -.24* .10 .18 .30** -.15 -.09 -.03 .42*** .56*** .65*** -  
14 
Number of error messages during 
practice 
1.51 0.51 1.59 0.50 -.13 .12 .01 -.09 -.01 -.30** .15 .06 .14 -.31** -.34** -.22† -.11 - 
 
Note. N = 76, except for number of error messages during practice and practice performance after 10 minutes, for which N =74. Error prevention = 0 and Error management = 1. Sex 
codes 0 = Man and 1 = Woman. Prior experience with similar simulations, perceived fit with between suggested strategy and one’s personality, on-task thoughts, and off-task 
thoughts were measured on a 7- point scale. Practice score, analogical transfer performance score, and adaptive transfer performance score are reported with standardized values. 
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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we conclude that participants in the two conditions made similar number of errors during the 
practice phase. 
Main effects. 
 On-task thoughts. An ANCOVA on on-task thoughts with error instructions 
(management vs. prevention) as the independent variable and experience with similar 
simulations, perceived fit of suggested strategy with one’s personality, and sex as covariates, 
showed that error instructions had a main effect on on-task thoughts, F (1, 71) = 4.71, p = 
.033, η2p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = -0.50. As hypothesized, error management (M = 5.81; SD 
=1.05) resulted in more on-task thoughts than did error prevention (M = 5.21; SD = 1.07). 
There was also a significant effect of perceived fit of the suggested strategy with one’s 
personality, F (1, 72) = 6.26, p = .015, η2p = 0.08, Cohen’s d = 0.57 (see Table 4.5). Our 
findings are consistent with those found in Study 1 and provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
 Off-task thoughts. A MANCOVA (using Pillai’s trace) with the covariates mentioned 
above and the three types of off-task thoughts (self-evaluative, non self-related, and general 
mind-wandering) as dependent variables, showed no significant effect for error instructions, 
V = 0.06, F (3, 69) = 1.47, p = .230, η2p = 0.06 (Cohen’s d self-evaluative off-task thoughts = 
-0.43; Cohen’s d non self-related off-task thoughts = 0.09; Cohen’s d general mind-
wandering off-task thoughts = 0.19). There was a significant effect of the covariate perceived 
fit of the suggested strategy with one’s personality on off-task thoughts, V = 0.20, F (3, 69) = 
5.90, p = .001, η2p = 0.20 (see Table 4.5), driven by the variable’s effect on general mind-
wandering, F (1, 71) = 15.13, p < .001, η2p = 0.18. The current findings indicate that 
participants who received error management instructions did not have fewer off-task thoughts 
as compared to participants who received error prevention instructions. Our findings did not 
provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
Practice performance. An ANCOVA, with experience with similar simulations, 
perceived fit of suggested strategy with one’s personality, and sex as covariates, indicated 
that error instructions had no effect on the first 10-minute practice score, F (1, 69) = 0.92, p = 
.341, η2p = 0.01, Cohen’s d = -0.22. However, error management participants (M = 0.27; SD 
= 1.03 standardized scores) performed significantly better than the error prevention 
participants (M = -.28; SD = 0.90 standardized scores) during the second 10-minute practice 
trial resulting in higher total practice score, F (1, 71) = 5.16, p = .027, η2p = 0.07, Cohen’s d = 
-0.52 (see Table 4.5). 
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TABLE 4.5 
Results of Main Analyses in Study 2 
ANCOVA 
      
Dependent variable: On-task thoughts 
 
df Error F p η2 p 
Control variables: 
      
Prior experience with similar simulations 
 
1 71 0.16 .687 0.00 
Perceived fit between suggested strategy and one’s 
personality  
1 71 6.26 .015 0.81 
Sex 
 
1 71 0.33 .569 0.01 
Independent variable: Condition 
 
1 71 4.71 .033 0.06 
MANCOVA Pilai's 
trace 
value 
     
Dependent variables: Off-task thoughts 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df 
F p η2 p 
Control variables: 
      
Prior experience with similar simulations 0.06 3 69 1.38 .255 0.06 
Perceived fit between suggested strategy and one’s 
personality 
0.20 3 69 5.90 .001 0.20 
Sex 0.05 3 69 1.10 .357 0.05 
Independent variable: Condition 0.06 3 69 1.47 .230 0.06 
ANCOVA 
      
Dependent variable: Practice performance 
 
df Error F p η2 p 
Control variables: 
      
Prior experience with similar simulations 
 
1 71 0.83 .365 0.01 
Perceived fit between suggested strategy and one’s 
personality  
1 71 0.61 .437 0.01 
Sex 
 
1 71 0.92 .341 0.01 
Independent variable: Condition 
 
1 71 5.16 .026 0.07 
ANCOVA 
      
Dependent variable: Analogical transfer performance 
 
df Error F p η2 p 
Control variables: 
      
Prior experience with similar simulations 
 
1 71 2.97 .089 0.04 
Perceived fit between suggested strategy and one’s 
personality  
1 71 0.06 .813 0.00 
Sex 
 
1 71 0.50 .483 0.01 
Independent variable: Condition 
 
1 71 7.69 .007 0.10 
ANCOVA 
      
Dependent variable: Adaptive transfer performance 
 
df Error F p η 
2
p 
Control variables: 
      
Prior experience with similar simulations 
 
1 71 0.38 .542 0.01 
Perceived fit between suggested strategy and one’s 
personality  
1 71 1.04 .312 0.01 
Sex 
 
1 71 2.88 .094 0.04 
Independent variable: Condition 
 
1 71 4.53 .037 0.06 
 
Note. N = 78. Prior experience with similar simulations (1 = Not at all, 7 = A lot of experience). Perceived 
fit between suggested strategy and one’s personality (1 = Not at all, 7 = Completely). Sex (1 = Man, 2 = 
Woman). On-task and off-task scales were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much so). 
All tests are two-tailed. 
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 Analogical transfer performance. An ANCOVA indicated that error instructions had 
a main effect on analogical transfer performance, F (1, 71) = 7.69, p = .007, η2p = 0.10, 
Cohen’s d = -0.64 (see Table 4.5). The results confirmed our prediction that error 
management (M = 0.30; SD = 1.17 standardized scores) would result in better analogical 
transfer performance than error prevention (M = -0.32; SD = 0.65 standardized scores). The 
findings support Hypothesis 3. 
Adaptive transfer performance. An ANCOVA showed that error instructions had a 
main effect on adaptive transfer performance, F (1, 71) = 4.53, p = .037, η2p = 0.06, Cohen’s 
d = -0.49 (see Table 4.5). The results indicate that error management (M = 0.26; SD = 1.14 
standardized scores) resulted in better adaptive transfer performance than error prevention (M 
= -0.27; SD = 0.74 standardized scores), as expected. The results support Hypothesis 4. 
 Mediation analyses. We predicted that both on-task and off-task thoughts would 
mediate the effect of error-handling strategy instructions on analogical and adaptive transfer 
performance. Mediation hypotheses assume that (a) the independent variable affects the 
mediator variable, (b) the mediator variable affects the dependent variable, (c) the mediator 
has an effect on the dependent variable when controlled for the independent variable and (d) 
the effect of the independent on the dependent variable is reduced when the mediator is 
entered simultaneously with the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Due to the 
small sample and the non-normality of the performance variables we used bias-corrected 
estimates for the indirect effects (see Hayes, 2009). Bootstrapping is a nonparametric 
procedure which does not assume normality of the sample distribution (see Bollen & Stine, 
1990; Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008) and is particularly useful for mediation 
analysis with relatively small samples. During bootstrapping the data is repeatedly sampled 
(in all analyses we extracted 5000 bootstrapped samples recommended by Hayes, 2009) after 
which an estimation of the indirect effect from the resampled distribution is calculated. The 
procedure produces a bias-corrected confidence interval (see Williams & MacKinnon, 2008) 
for the effect size of the indirect effect. If the estimated indirect effect values do not include 
zero between the lower and the upper bound then there is a 95% confidence that a significant 
indirect effect was observed (see Hayes, 2009). Hayes (2009) indicated that the 95% 
confidence interval is conceptually the same as the 5% level of significance. 
To conduct multiple mediation analyses we used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) SPSS 
multiple mediation script which allows multiple mediators to be entered simultaneously and 
automatically calculates bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (CI). The 
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Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) script includes the data on all steps outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986).  
Analogical transfer performance. The total indirect effect of all proposed mediators 
assessed simultaneously was not significant, B = 0.07, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.003, 0.17], 
which could be expected based on the lack of correlation between the different types of off-
task thoughts and error-handling strategy or transfer performance. After examining the 
mediators individually, the results indicated that only on-task thoughts mediated the effect of 
error-handling strategy on analogical transfer performance. The 95% CI for the effect size of 
the indirect path through on-task thoughts was 0.003 to 0.18 and did not include zero, 
indicating it was a significant mediator. We can conclude that Hypothesis 5a was supported 
by the data. As can be seen in Table 4.6 the 95% CI values for all three types off-task 
thoughts included zero, thus, off-task thoughts were not mediators. Hypothesis 5b was not 
supported. 
 
 
TABLE 4.6 
Indirect Effects Study 2 
Analogical transfer performance         
 
Product of 
coefficients 
Bootstrapping bias-
corrected 95% CI 
Indirect effects 
Point 
estimate SE Lower Higher 
On-task thoughts 0.06 0.04 -0.003 0.17 
Self-evaluative off-task thoughts 0.02 0.03 0.003 0.18 
Non self-related off-task thoughts -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.12 
General mind-wandering 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.02 
Total 0.07 0.04 -0.003 0.17 
Adaptive transfer performance 
    
 
Product of 
coefficients 
Bootstrapping bias-
corrected 95% CI 
Indirect effects 
Point 
estimate SE Lower Higher 
On-task thoughts 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.22 
Self-evaluative off-task thoughts -0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.04 
Non self-related off-task thoughts 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.07 
General mind-wandering 0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.01 
Total 0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.16 
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Adaptive transfer performance. The total indirect effect of all proposed mediators 
assessed simultaneously was not significant, B = 0.06, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.16]. The 
examination of individual mediators, however, showed that on-task thoughts mediated the 
effect of error-handling strategy on adaptive transfer performance. The 95% CI for the effect 
size of the indirect path through on-task thoughts was 0.02 to 0.22 and did not include zero, 
indicating on-task thoughts were a significant mediator (Hypothesis 6a supported). As can be 
seen in Table 4.6, the 95% CI values for the three types off-task thoughts included zero 
indicating that off-task thoughts did not mediate the effect of error-handling strategy on 
analogical transfer performance (Hypothesis 6b not supported). 
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 that error management results in more on-
task thoughts than does error prevention. In addition, confirming our predictions, error 
management resulted in both better analogical and adaptive transfer performance than error 
prevention. Interestingly, we found a main effect of error instructions on practice 
performance that was not expected. Looking more carefully into the data suggests that people 
performed similarly during the first 10 minutes of practice but performance differences 
became apparent during the second 10-minute practice trial. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that 10 minutes were enough for participants to develop task relevant declarative 
knowledge - the knowledge of rules and skills necessary to do a task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 
1989, p. 660) and during the second half of the practice the better learning of rules and skills 
manifested itself in improved scores.  
 Finally, our analyses indicated that on-task thoughts mediated the effects of error 
instructions on both analogical and adaptive transfer performance, whereas off-task thoughts 
did not. One can speculate that during short, time-intensive task practice off-task thoughts are 
less likely to consciously emerge than during longer practice. However, the abovementioned 
explanation should be received with caution and further tested in future research. 
General Discussion 
The current research had multiple goals. First, we wanted to investigate the effect of 
error-handling strategy instructions on on- and off-task thoughts. Second, we wanted to 
establish whether on- and off-task thoughts mediate the effect of error-handling strategy on 
performance. Third, we wanted to test whether by not confounding practice type (errorless vs. 
error-based) with type of instructions (error management vs. error prevention) we would still 
observe the expected positive effect of error management on performance. Fourth, we aimed 
to replicate prior findings from error management training studies using brief instructions and 
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short task practice. Finally, we intended to test whether previous findings can be generalized 
to tasks that offer participants the opportunity to use an error management or an error 
prevention strategy. 
We extend prior knowledge of cognition as a mediator (e.g., Keith & Frese, 2005) by 
investigating the effect of error-handling instructions on both on- and off-task thoughts. 
Overall, our findings indicate that error management benefits working toward a goal by 
activating more on-task thoughts than does error prevention. In addition, on-task thoughts 
mediated the effect of error-handling strategy on performance, with error management 
leading to more on-task thoughts, which in turn improved both analogical and adaptive 
transfer performance. Our findings suggest that error management enhances performance not 
by minimizing task-undirected (off-task) thoughts, but by making it more likely that people 
focus on the task at hand. Finally, we replicate prior findings on the positive effect of error 
management on performance as compared to error prevention (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; 
Frese, 1991; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; Keith & Frese, 
2008; Nordstrom et al., 2003) by using short error–handling instructions, brief practice 
instead of a training, and previously unused tasks.  
Theoretical Implications 
 Our findings both replicate and extend previous research. Our theoretical framework 
regarding cognitive resource allocation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) builds on Keith and 
Frese’s (2005) idea that error management affects performance by influencing cognitive 
functioning and that it affects cognition because it helps people reappraise errors in a more 
positive way (also see Richard & Gross, 2000). We extend Keith and Frese’s (2005) research 
and add to the error-handling literature by investigating the two previously untested, although 
implied, mechanisms of cognitive resource allocation: on-task and off-task thoughts. 
Surprisingly we did not find an effect of error-handling strategy on off-task thoughts. 
Based on previous theorizing in the error-handling literature implying that stress and worry 
due to errors would negatively affect cognition and lead participants’ thoughts away from the 
task (e.g., Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese et al., 1991; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 
2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998), we expected that error prevention instructions would result in 
off-task thoughts, thus harming performance. Our results suggest that error management 
leads to more on-task thoughts, rather than that error management leads to fewer off-task 
thoughts, or that error prevention leads to more, or fewer off-task thoughts. The important 
implication for both theory and research of these findings is that error management 
instructions may be having positive effects on cognition instead of error prevention having 
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negative effects on cognition. Currently theory suggests that both the positive and the 
negative paths are how error-handling strategy affects cognition, and performance (e.g., 
Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Our findings raise the question: what causes the effects we find - 
error management, error prevention, or the combination of the two. Answering this question 
would be of major importance for error-handling theory as it would clarify what effects are 
due to error management and what effects are due to error prevention. Unfortunately, the 
current research and previous existing research have not given us a clear answer. Our 
suggestion is that to understand the effects of error-handling strategy, future research should 
incorporate a full factorial design (error management instructions: yes vs. no x error 
prevention instructions: yes vs. no) that would allow us to disentangle how exactly error-
handling works. 
Operationally, our research is grounded in the work by Bell and Kozlowski (2008), 
Kanfer and Ackerman (1989), Kanfer et al. (1994), Keith and Frese (2005), and Nordstrom et 
al. (1998). Our error management manipulation was based on the manipulation by Keith and 
Frese (2005) but shortened in a way similar to that used by Nordstrom and colleagues (1998). 
We extend the work of Keith and Frese (2005) and Nordstrom et al. (1998) by making the 
manipulations of error management and error prevention vary on error-handling strategy 
only. Specifically, we kept the manipulation length similar in both conditions and framed 
both error management and error prevention strategies positively, as well as informed our 
participants that the respective strategy is good for learning and performance (e.g., you can 
learn more and perform better by paying attention to errors, or you can learn more and 
perform better by preventing errors). 
It can be argued that our measure of on-task thoughts shows some similarities with the 
concept of emotion control that has been shown to mediate the effects of error management 
on performance (Keith & Frese, 2005). However, it should be noted that emotion control 
refers to the self-regulation part of Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) cognitive resource 
allocation model, reflecting changes in resource allocation. Our measure, in contrast, 
represented on-task thoughts, which are conceptually different from self-regulation because 
they do not reflect such changes. Nevertheless, future work should include both measures of 
on-task thoughts and self-regulation simultaneously so that their effects can be compared. 
The manipulations we used are easier and faster to administer, making their 
application to real-life contexts less complex without the necessity of a whole training. 
Although we use shorter manipulations and practice, we nonetheless replicate prior findings 
for performance (for a meta-analysis see Keith & Frese, 2008), suggesting that the effects of 
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error-handling strategy on performance are robust. What is more, we managed to replicate the 
positive effect of error management on performance even though both the error management 
and the comparison error prevention group worked on an error-prone task. A previously 
outlined limitation of prior work is that the error management group received error-based 
practice while the error prevention group received errorless practice (Bell & Kozlowski, 
2008; Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2008). Only a few studies so far have attempted 
to dissociate whether (a) making errors or (b) the combination of making errors with error 
management instructions causes improved performance (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; 
Gully, Payne, Koles,& Whiteman, 2002; Heimbeck et al., 2003). Out of those, only a single 
study has included error based practice with error prevention instructions (i.e., Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008). However, no interaction effects between error instructions (error 
management vs. error prevention) and training type (exploratory vs. proceduralized) were 
provided, making our research the only one explicitly comparing a condition with error 
management instructions and exploratory task practice with a condition with error prevention 
instructions with exploratory task practice.  
Our results indicate that the usefulness of errors during practice depends on whether 
people receive error management or error prevention instructions. Even though both the error 
management and the error prevention groups made similar number of errors under the same 
practice conditions, the error management group was better able to stay task-focused and 
learn from the errors resulting in better analogical and adaptive transfer performance than the 
error prevention group. Accordingly, an important theoretical implication of the current 
research is that the combination of making errors and being able to reappraise them as 
learning opportunities is what makes error management more effective than error prevention 
even when both groups follow exploratory task practice (also see Heimbeck et al., 2003).  
Finally, the tasks we used in the current studies were carefully selected to ensure that 
our results were due to the manipulation only and not due to the task favoring a certain error 
strategy. An example of an error management strategy during Study 2 would be to speed up 
the simulation and move as many trains as possible without consulting the train schedule. 
Such a strategy is more error prone, but also allows a participant to adapt to the situation and 
learn from the errors made. An example of an error prevention strategy would be to carefully 
observe the train schedule, pause the simulation to click on all associated switches and 
signals and carefully guide the trains to their destination and only restart the simulation after 
the route of the trains is outlined. Such a strategy ensures that a participant makes fewer, if 
any, errors. Although participants had the possibility to use both error management and error 
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prevention strategies during the task, participants that received error management instructions 
performed better than participants who used error prevention instructions. While working on 
real-life tasks both prevention and management are necessary. Our point is not that 
prevention is bad, but rather that error management instructions better allow people to stay 
focused and to manage whatever goes wrong. 
Limitations  
A possible limitation is related to the measurement of on- and off-task thoughts. Like 
others (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Keith & Frese, 2005) we measured cognition with 
self-report items. However, other measures may be better suited to capture on- and off-task 
thoughts. Future work can attempt to address this limitation by measuring on- and off-task 
thoughts by asking participants to say out loud what they are thinking about during the 
practice itself. Nonetheless, the speaking out loud procedure has its own limitations: people 
are not always capable of verbalizing their thoughts and speaking may take attention away 
from the task itself, resulting in more off-task thoughts. Another issue is that the tasks we 
used may have been too attentionally intense to allow for off-task thoughts to consciously 
appear during the practice making it less likely for people to retrospectively report having 
off-task thoughts. In addition, even though participants could work with a pace that suited 
them, it is possible that the tasks were so engaging that participants’ attention was mostly 
concentrated on the task, allowing little room for off-task thoughts. Future work can address 
these potential problems by implementing a less engaging task or incorporating longer breaks 
(see Kanfer et al., 1994) or by asking participants to provide immediate verbal reports of both 
their on-task and off-task thoughts during the practice and breaks.  
Another potential limitation of the current research is the measurement of both 
analogical and adaptive transfer performance after the practice phase. Although the current 
procedure was purposefully selected because it has been validated in previous research on 
error-handling strategy (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008), we cannot exclude the possibility that 
it induced habituation in participants. Future research should try to replicate the current 
findings by having separate performance groups: one group with only an analogical transfer 
performance trial after the practice phase and a second group with only an adaptive transfer 
performance trial after the practice phase. Additionally, future work should investigate in a 
longitudinal design the effects of error-handling strategy over time. Based on the current and 
most previous research, it is unclear how long error management performance benefits last. 
Although some previous work has investigated the effects of error-handling strategy on 
performance a week after training (e.g., Heimbeck et al., 2003), to the best of our knowledge 
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no experimental study has tested performance on multiple occasions over a longer term (e.g., 
a month). 
Practical Implications 
Error management can possibly increase the efficiency of job-training by stimulating 
the trainees’ task-directed (on-task) thoughts. Additionally, our results indicate that even brief 
instructions can have beneficial effects on performance. The manipulations used in both 
studies were only three paragraphs long, yet, the participants that received error management 
instructions performed better than the people who received error prevention instructions. 
Incorporating error-framing instructions while instructing people to do a new task in the 
workplace (or elsewhere) is simple, easy, and efficient.  
Future research should attempt to replicate our findings in a more realistic setting with 
actual employees, to test whether the effects of error management instructions on on-task 
thoughts and performance can be generalized to the workplace. Additionally, future work 
should look into whether using error management instructions is beneficial only for new tasks 
or also for tasks employees have extensive experience with. Previous research by Van Dyck 
and colleagues (2005) provides evidence that organizational error management culture is 
positively linked to firm goal achievement and profitability. Note that, the research by Van 
Dyck et al. (2005) involves overall performance which is based on how companies, as a 
whole, and their employees, in particular, perform on both new and established tasks. If we 
link our findings to those of Van Dyck et al. (2005) we can speculate that error management 
instructions may be beneficial to performance not only on new, but also on well-learned by 
employees tasks. Such a suggestion, however, should be regarded as speculative. More 
research on the effects of error-handling instructions on performance in the workplace during 
novel and well-learned tasks is necessary to better understand whether and when error-
handling instructions affect employee performance. 
An interesting question that remains yet to be answered is whether our findings can be 
generalized to tasks with different level of difficulty within organizations. While some tasks 
are simple and routine, others are complex, difficult to learn, and challenging due to their 
complexity (e.g., flying an airplane, operating a nuclear power plant). Experimental research 
indicates that the benefits of error management for learning and performance can only 
become apparent for difficult but not for simple tasks because people make very few errors 
on simple tasks (e.g., Frese et al., 1991). Existing research, however, included a very limited 
number of simple trials. Over a longer timeframe, however, people start making errors even 
on simple tasks due to lack of attention or interest, exhaustion, or distraction (e.g., Reason, 
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1990). To the extent that error management can help people stay task-focused, as indicated by 
our results, it may also be beneficial to long-term performance even on simple tasks. Future 
research should investigate this possibility.  
Another interesting question regarding the generalizability of our findings is whether 
error management is always good. Under some circumstances making errors can have 
extremely severe negative consequences. For example, an error at a hospital can cause the 
death of a patient, an error by a pilot can cause a plane crash killing hundreds of people, an 
error at a nuclear power plant can have disastrous consequences for whole regions. What we 
argue is not that making errors per se is good, but rather that error management allows people 
to handle the existing errors so that their negative consequences are minimized or removed. 
An example of error management would be a surgeon who realizes she has made an error and 
tries to minimize the negative consequences for the patient, saving the patient’s life by fixing 
the error. Another example would be a pilot, who realizes an error has occurred in calculating 
the path of an airplane, and makes adjustments to evade a possible collision with another 
airplane. In both those cases the error has occurred, but through error management people 
minimize the negative consequences of the errors
10
. As noted earlier, error management 
differentiates the error from its consequences and attempts to control the damage of the error, 
whereas error prevention tries to evade the negative consequence by completely removing the 
error (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). Both prevention and management are important to 
organizations. Errors, however, cannot be eradicated (Reason, 1990) and it is when 
prevention fails that error management becomes vital for trapping the error and minimizing 
its negative consequences. 
 Finally, the current findings support the positive impact of error management on 
performance and in addition suggest that being able to focus on the task is what makes error 
management particularly effective in improving performance. Although more research 
applying error instructions in real organizations is necessary, our findings indicate that error 
management can be beneficial for organizations not only because it helps people with tasks 
similar to those previously practiced, but also because it teaches people how to successfully 
master errors and handle new problems. Similarly to Bell and Kozlowski (2008) we argue 
that it is not possible to prepare employees for everything that can potentially go wrong, thus 
error management rather than error prevention is likely to assist employees in becoming self-
                                                 
10
 A challenge to error management would be a situation where the consequence follows the error immediately, 
not allowing a person to catch the error. In such a situation, error management, in the sense of minimizing the 
negative consequence, would be impossible. Another example in which error management is impossible would 
be not realizing an error was made at all until the consequence becomes apparent. 
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dependent active learners. Organizational environments are becoming increasingly less 
predictable and more complex, necessitating the need for people to become more adaptive, 
flexible, and efficient (Kozlowski, Toney, Mullins, Weissbein, Brown, & Bell, 2001). In 
addition, staying task-focused with all the present day distractions is progressively more 
challenging. We suggest that error management can aid organizations in instructing the type 
of a resilient employee who can stay task-focused and successfully adapt quickly to new 
situations and problems. 
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Abstract 
All people make errors, but how people think and perform after errors is theorized to be 
affected by the way errors are framed. The literature differentiates between two error-
handling strategies: error prevention, which focuses on removing all errors, and error 
management, which focuses on catching errors, learning from them, and minimizing their 
negative consequences. In the present study we develop and test a theoretical model in order 
to establish whether it is the presence or absence of error management or error prevention 
instructions, or their combination that influence people's cognitions and performance. Our 
findings show that error prevention has negative effects on cognition (fewer on-task thoughts; 
more negative self-related off-task thoughts) and adaptive transfer performance (trend), while 
error management dampens people's appraisal of errors as threats. Thus, error prevention has 
more negative effects, whereas error management reduces negative effects rather than 
strengthening positive effects. The results indicate that the way error prevention and error 
management act and interact is more complex than previously thought and work that 
incorporates full-factorial designs is necessary in order to establish what drives the effects we 
find. 
  
 Keywords: error management, error prevention, cognitive appraisal, cognitive 
resource allocation, performance 
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Introduction 
 We make errors every day. Nonetheless, we know relatively little about how our 
dealing with these errors affects the way we think and perform. Should we try to prevent the 
occurrence of errors as not to suffer their negative consequences (i.e., error prevention)? Or 
should we accept errors as a part of life and put our effort in minimizing their negative 
consequences (i.e., error management)? What implications does using one strategy, the other, 
or their combination have for the way we appraise the errors that occur, for how focused (or 
not) we are on task completion, for how depleted the battle between our competing 
cognitions leaves us, for how we perform? 
 Existing research has shown that people who receive error management instructions 
rather than error prevention instructions are more focused on a task (Chapter 4), better at 
emotional and cognitive self-regulation (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), 
more motivated (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2000), 
less frustrated (Chillarege, Nordstrom & Williams, 2003; Frese, Brodbeck, Heinbockel, 
Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thieman, 1991), and better performing (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 
2008; Keith & Frese, 2005). The assumption explicitly made in most existing work on error-
handling is that error management is adaptive for a variety of outcomes. This perspective, 
which we will refer to as the error management advantage perspective has been adopted in 
most of the error-handling literature (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; 
Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese et al., 1991; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008).  
 An alternative perspective, the error prevention disadvantage perspective, focuses on 
error prevention as maladaptive. According to this perspective, the effects previously found 
are likely to be driven by the negative effects of error prevention rather than by the positive 
effects of error management (see Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, & Griffin, 2013). Such a 
perspective can be grounded in the positive-negative asymmetry effect, which shows that 
negative information affects people's cognitive processing and behaviors to a larger extent 
than positive information (for a review see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001). Nonetheless, the evidence to substantiate such claims in the error-handling literature is 
currently missing due to the methodological limitations present in the majority of existing 
work (e.g., lack of control groups, use of control groups that differ from the experimental 
groups on multiple dimensions, comparison of error management groups with exploratory 
practice to error prevention groups with procedural practice).  
 A third perspective, which also has been discussed in earlier theorizing, suggests that 
a combination of error prevention and error management will be even more adaptive than 
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using error management alone, because during most activities people need to balance 
prevention and management of errors (e.g., Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck, 2009; Van 
Dyck, Baer, Frese, & Sonnentag, 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Such a combination can 
amplify the strengths of the two strategies (e.g., people can prevent most errors and properly 
manage the errors that could not be prevented), while minimizing their weaknesses (e.g., 
error prevention does not tell people how to deal after an error has occurred; error 
management does not focus on initial prevention). Nonetheless, existing empirical research 
remains silent about the actual effects of combining error prevention and error management. 
 In the current paper we integrate theories on error-handling (action theory applied to 
errors, Frese & Zapf, 1994), cognitive appraisal (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Blascovitsch & Mendes, 
2000; Evans & Cohen, 1987; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Schachter & Singer, 1962), cognitive resource allocation (Kanfer & Ackermann, 1989), and 
learning transfer (e.g, Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000) in developing and testing a theoretical model 
outlining the cognitive processes through which error prevention and error management 
affect performance. Unlike previous research (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 
2003; Frese et al., 1991; Keith & Frese, 2005), which has mostly compared error prevention 
to error management, the method applied in this study - a full 2 (error management yes vs. 
no) x 2 factorial design (error prevention: yes vs. no) - helps us clarify whether it is error 
prevention, error management, or their interaction that drives effects on cognition and 
performance. 
Error-Handling Strategies 
 Because people usually equate errors with negative consequences from very early on 
they are socialized to prevent errors in order to escape from their potential negative 
consequences (Edmondson, 1996; Reason, 1990; 1997). In the error-handling literature the 
focus on removing the negative consequences of errors by not allowing errors to occur in the 
first place is called error prevention (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Frese, 1991; 1995; Hofmann 
& Frese, 2011; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008, Van Dyck et al., 2005). Nonetheless, even if 
people have the best of intentions, errors do occur (Reason 1990; 1970) and focusing solely 
on prevention has been linked to various negative outcomes, such as hiding errors, lowered 
learning from errors, negative error cascades, lowered psychological safety within teams, and 
worse performance (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2003, Van Dyck et al., 2005). 
 The other strategy discussed in the context of error-handling is called error 
management. Error management, unlike error prevention, differentiates between the error and 
its potential consequences. It is a strategy that "accepts that errors will occur, and is designed 
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to provide a second layer of defense, specifically one that intends to intercept and rectify the 
error prior to the accrual of significant negative consequences" (Hofmann & Frese, 2011, p. 
32), while maximizing potential positive consequences (e.g., learning, secondary error 
prevention). According to earlier research, error management as compared to error 
prevention, has positive effects on people's emotions (e.g., lower frustration and negative 
affect, Chillarege et al., 2003; higher emotion control, Keith & Frese, 2005), greater 
motivation (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Wood et al., 2000), cognitions (e.g., on-task thoughts, 
Chapter 4; metacognition, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005), and performance 
(Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; Frese, 1991; 1995; Frese et al., 1991; 
Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Hofmann & Mark, 2006; Keith & Frese, 2005; 
2008; Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998). 
 The error-handling literature theorizes that the different error framing provided by 
error prevention and error management will have implications for various cognitive, 
emotional, and motivational processes, which will in turn influence task performance (Bell & 
Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege et al., 2003; Edmondson, 1996, 1999; Frese, 1991; 1995; 
Heimbeck et al., 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998; Van Dyck et al., 2005; 
Wood et al., 2000). In the present research we primarily focus on the cognitive main and 
interaction effects of the two error-handling strategies, because none of the existing studies 
have applied methods that allow drawing conclusions on what actually drives the effects (i.e., 
error prevention, error management, or their combination) on cognition and subsequent 
performance. Additionally, cognitive explanations have received less attention in the error-
handling literature than emotion or motivation as potential mechanisms through which error-
handling strategies affect performance. Because some theories discussed in greater detail 
below (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) suggest that cognitive appraisal may be 
affecting the emotion, motivation, and higher-level cognition people experience, 
understanding the effects of error-handling on cognition presents a vital step for improving 
existing theorizing.  
 Researchers have proposed that error management and error prevention lead to 
different (re)appraisals of the errors participants face and it is these appraisals that eventually 
influence people's emotional and cognitive responses to errors, which in turn affect 
subsequent performance (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005). Earlier research 
(Chapter 4; Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005) has investigated whether the 
effects of error prevention and error management on performance are mediated by the 
different constituents of cognitive resource allocation (i.e., on-task thoughts, off-task 
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thoughts, and self-regulation). The mechanism proposed to influence cognitive resource 
allocation - cognitive appraisal – has been theorized but has not as of yet been empirically 
investigated as a potential mediator. In the current paper we develop and test an overarching 
theoretical framework building on earlier research on error-handling and integrating cognitive 
appraisal of errors in terms of threat and challenge, as predictors of cognitive resource 
allocation to on-task thoughts, off-task thoughts, and ego depletion (a proxy for self-
regulation), which in turn either boost or thwart task performance (for theoretical framework 
see Figure 5.1). 
Cognitive Appraisal 
 In the current paper we are most interested in the appraisal theories related to 
cognitive appraisal of stress and coping (e.g., Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) as these provide us with insights that can explain the different ways error 
management and error prevention affect error appraisal. Cognitive appraisal involves 
immediate and inherent categorization and evaluation of one's environment in terms of 
implications for personal well-being (i.e., primary appraisal: is what is happening irrelevant, 
benign or stressful) and potential coping responses (i.e., secondary appraisal: what can be 
done about the situation and are the necessary resources to do it available; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984).  
 The occurrence of errors usually induces stress in people (e.g., Frese, 1991; Frese et 
al., 1991; Chillarege et al.; 2003; Keith & Frese, 2008), which is why we expect that the part 
of primary appraisal most relevant to errors has to do with the appraisal of stress. Stress 
appraisal can be differentiated into harm/loss (damage to the self that has materialized), and 
threat and challenge (damage to the self that is anticipated). Unlike harm/loss, which is 
already present, both threat and challenge allow anticipatory coping. Threat focuses on 
potential harms (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and occurs when an individual perceives having 
insufficient resources to cope with the demands posed by the environment (Blascovich & 
Mendes, 2000). Challenge, in contrast, focuses on "the potential for gain and growth inherent 
in an encounter" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 33). It signals that an individual believes to 
have the necessary coping resources and a sense of control over oneself and/or the 
environment (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). Importantly, threat and challenge are theorized to 
be separate constructs, which implies that the same situation (e.g., an error) may 
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simultaneously affect both threat and challenge appraisals (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Finally, threat and challenge appraisals are adaptable in the sense that they can shift 
depending on changes in the person (e.g., a person may decide to focus on the positives rather 
than on the negatives and "make the best of a bad situation") or in the environment (e.g., a 
person who initially feels challenged by a situation, may later on feel threatened by it, if as 
the situation unfolds they realize that it is much more demanding or the stakes are much 
higher than initially expected). 
Error Handling and Cognitive Appraisal 
 Making errors is by default stressful for people (e.g., Frese et al., 1991), but the way 
that errors are framed may either be more or less likely to be conducive to stress. Specifically, 
error management frames errors as (1) neutral occurrences, (2) which if handled properly, do 
not materialize into negative consequences, and (3) which can be utilized as potentially 
beneficial learning opportunities. The realization that errors are inevitable is liberating and 
makes them appear less threatening in the sense that it removes the stigma most people 
associate with errors. It also implies that if errors are indeed so common one should have the 
necessary resources to cope with them, thus enhancing the experience of challenge in the face 
of error (Edmondson, 1996; Reason, 1990; 1997; Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005). 
Moreover, highlighting the inherent benefits of errors shows that a person has a potential to 
improve and grow, which is associated with challenge rather than with threat appraisals. 
Finally, the differentiation between the error and its consequences present in error 
management theorizing fosters greater sense of control, that is, making an error, is not 
immediately equated with its potential negative consequences because a person can still trap 
the error and in this way prevent or lessen its negative consequences, without preventing the 
error itself (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Van Dyck, 2009). This sense of 
control associated with error management is likely to lead to appraising errors more as 
challenges. 
Hypothesis 1: Error management as compared to no error management leads 
to appraising errors more as challenges. 
 Error prevention, in contrast, (1) presents errors as negative, preventable occurrences 
and (2) equates errors with negative consequences. The realization that one has made an error 
that could have been avoided and that has potential negative consequences is likely to make 
most people question their competence, implying that the individual does not have the 
necessary resources (e.g., mastery of the task, knowledge) to face the demands of the 
environment. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:  
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Hypothesis 2: Error prevention as compared to no error prevention leads to 
appraising errors more as threats. 
Cognitive Resource Allocation 
 People have limited cognitive capacity (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Kahneman, 1973) and 
according to cognitive resource allocation theory mental resources are distributed among on-
task thoughts, off-task thoughts, and self-regulation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). On-task 
thoughts are defined as attention directed towards a specific task (Smallwood, Obonsawin, & 
Heim, 2003), whereas off-task thoughts involve disengaging attention away from goal-
directed action (Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davis, 2006). The final element of cognitive 
resource allocation - self-regulation - is needed to redirect cognitive resources from off-task 
thoughts to on-task thoughts. Importantly, the cognitive resource allocation theory postulates 
that engagement in any of the three motivational processes depends on limited attentional 
resources. Therefore, allocating attentional resources to one activity implies that there will be 
fewer resources for another. For example, while learning a new task, participants may attempt 
to concentrate on proper task execution thus engaging in on-task thoughts. However, if one 
makes errors while working on the task one may start to wonder whether one has the 
necessary knowledge or ability, thus allocating cognitive resources to off-task thoughts. The 
person may then try to take control of their mental activities by self-regulating and attempt to 
limit the number of off-task thoughts and increase goal-directed on-task thoughts. 
Error-Handling, Cognitive Resource Allocation, and Cognitive Appraisals as Mediators 
 We propose that receiving error management or error prevention strategy instructions 
while working on a task creates a different framing of errors. While error management 
suggests that errors are valuable learning opportunities and a person can control their 
consequences, error prevention sees them as preventable, and every new error signals that the 
person is failing at prevention, which will likely have a negative impact on the person's self-
perceived competence. We predict that error management will lead to more on-task thoughts 
because people do not have to constantly question themselves and their ability while working 
on the task, which makes it easier to stay task focused. When errors are seen as learning 
opportunities, making an error does not divert attention away from the task as much as when 
errors are seen as indicators of poor ability.  
 Similarly to Kanfer, Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale, and Nelson (1994) we differentiate 
between general off-task thoughts (i.e., daydreaming and various thoughts that do not 
necessarily assist in task goal achievement) and negative affective self-related off-task 
thoughts (i.e., thoughts that involve a negative self-evaluation). We predict that error 
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prevention will induce more off-task thoughts (both types), but expect that the effect will be 
stronger for negative self-related off-task thoughts. Specifically, making errors signals that a 
person is failing at prevention, leading the person to question their abilities, thus resulting in 
self-focused attention ("I am not good at this task") rather than in attention toward the task. 
Additionally, a person may attempt to escape from the negative context created by errors 
under error prevention instructions by engaging in general task-unrelated thoughts and 
daydreaming. The person then undermines the importance of the task itself by focusing on 
something else. 
 The cognitive appraisal theory of stress (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) suggests that 
experiencing challenge is more activating for people than experiencing threat. Challenge 
suggests that something can be done and is therefore expected to result in more task 
engagement as evidenced by more on-task thoughts. In line with this prediction, earlier 
research findings showing that challenge but not threat appraisals induce greater self-reported 
(Maier, Waldstein, & Synowski, 2003) and physiologically measured task engagement 
(Seery, Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 2009). Threat, in contrast, is expected to divert people's 
attention to off-task thoughts. Supporting our reasoning, previous findings show that when 
people make threat appraisals of a situation, the likelihood that they will engage in 
rumination and negative self-related off-task thoughts increases (e.g., Eppel, Daubenmier, 
Moskowitz, Folkman, & Blackburn, 2009). Combining cognitive resource allocation theory 
and cognitive appraisal theory we propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: Error management as compared to no error management leads 
to (a) more on-task thoughts and (b) this effect is mediated by appraising 
errors as challenges. 
Hypothesis 4: Error prevention as compared to no error prevention leads to (a) 
more off-task thoughts and (b) this effect is mediated by appraising errors as 
threats. 
 Self-regulation becomes particularly important when people are dealing with difficult 
goals. People's capacity to self-regulate is a costly limited cognitive resource (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), which if overused can become temporarily depleted, 
resulting in what is known as ego depletion (i.e., "a state in which the self does not have all 
the resources it has normally" Baumeister & Vohs, 2007, p. 116). Ego depletion results from 
a person using self-regulation (Baumesiter et al., 1998) and its presence shows that a person 
working on a task needed to redirect cognitive resources from off-task thoughts back to on-
task thoughts (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Thus, the more ego depleted a person is, the more 
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they had to self-regulate during a task. We predict that people receiving error prevention 
strategy instructions will perceive errors as threats to be averted. These threat appraisals will 
in turn increase participants’ need to cope with new experienced errors, while the making of 
errors itself will induce more off-task thoughts, increasing the need to self-regulate in order to 
return to on-task thoughts, resulting in greater ego depletion over time. People receiving error 
management instructions, in contrast, are less likely to become ego depleted because there is 
less of a need for them to divert their thoughts from off-task thoughts to on-task thoughts.  
Hypothesis 5: Error prevention as compared to no error prevention leads to (a) 
more ego depletion and (b) this effect is mediated by appraising errors as 
threats. 
Cognitive Resource Allocation and Performance 
 Existing work differentiates between two types of performance: analogical and 
adaptive transfer performance (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005; Frese et 
al., 1991). Analogical transfer "involves using a familiar problem to solving a problem of the 
same type" (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 1967), whereas adaptive transfer involves “using 
one's existing knowledge base to change a learned procedure, or to generate a solution to a 
completely new problem" (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000, p. 1968).  
 Earlier research has consistently shown that off-task thoughts, especially negative 
self-related off-task thoughts are detrimental to performance because they take away valuable 
resources people need to focus on a task (e.g., Blankstein, Toner, & Flett, 1989; Carver, 
1996; Carver & Schreier, 1981; Dweck, 1999; Dickhäuser, Buch, & Dickhäuser, 2011; Elliot, 
2005; Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, 1995; Sarason & Sarason, 1990; Sarason, Sarason, Keef, 
Hayes, & Shearin, 1986; Yee, Hsieh-Yee, Pierce, Grome,& Schantz, 2004). On-task 
thoughts, in contrast, involve being focused on the task, which makes it possible for people to 
perform better (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Accordingly, we 
predict that off-task thoughts will be related to lower analogical and adaptive transfer 
performance, whereas on-task thoughts will be related to better analogical and adaptive 
transfer performance. Regarding ego depletion, earlier work has shown that when a person 
becomes ego depleted, their performance on subsequent tasks suffers (for a meta-analysis see 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010), which is why we expect ego depletion to be 
negatively related to both analogical and adaptive transfer performance. 
Hypothesis 6: On-task thoughts are (a) positively related to analogical transfer 
performance, while (b) off-task thoughts and (c) ego depletion are negatively 
related to analogical transfer performance. 
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Hypothesis 7: On-task thoughts are (a) positively related to adaptive transfer 
performance, while (b) off-task thoughts and (c) ego depletion are negatively 
related to adaptive transfer performance. 
Regarding error-handling and performance, an earlier meta-analysis has shown that 
receiving error management training as compared to other types of training (e.g., step-by-step 
proceduralized error-prevention training; pure exploratory training similar to our control 
condition) results in better analogical and adaptive transfer performance (Keith & Frese, 
2008). The results from this meta-analysis thus suggest that the observed effects on 
performance are due to error management being good for performance, rather than on error 
prevention harming performance. Nonetheless, a replication of these effects in a study using a 
full-factorial design is necessary, before we can conclude that error management is what 
drives the effects previously found. 
Combining Error Prevention and Error Management 
 Although it has been suggested that both error prevention and error management are 
necessary (e.g., Hofmann & Frese, 2011; Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005) we do not yet 
know whether, how, and when the two error-handling strategies interact with each other. The 
existing theorizing and research on error-handling has primarily focused on comparing and 
contrasting error prevention and error management (e.g., Frese, 1991; Hofmann & Frese, 
2011; Keith & Frese, 2005; 2008; Nordstrom et al., 1998). In most situations, however, 
people use a combination of both, in the sense that they first prefer not to make an error, but 
if they do, they adapt and focus on dealing with it, and hopefully minimize its negative 
consequences (Hofmann & Frese, 2011). It is also possible that reminding people of the 
appropriate steps when dealing with errors (first prevent, if possible, if not - manage) 
provides them with universal and easy cognitive scripts to follow while working on a task. If 
that is the case, the combination of prevention and management may be more than the sum of 
its parts: people will not only proactively prevent errors, but also constructively handle the 
errors that could not be prevented, resulting in more beneficial cognitive and performance 
outcomes as compared to pure error prevention or pure error management.  
 Although most existing theorizing suggests a positive interaction between error 
prevention and error management, it is possible that people struggle with simultaneously 
applying the two strategies while learning a new task, which may result in higher cognitive 
load, inability to cope with the demands of the task, and poor performance. The current study 
aims to provide the first empirical investigation clarifying whether error prevention and error 
management interact and how (positively or negatively). 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited at the university of the first author both by the first author 
and by students who found participants in exchange for course credits. In total 114 people 
participated in the study, out of whom 48 men (Mage = 21.58; SDage = 2.51) and 66 women 
(Mage = 22.32; SDage = 2.96). While keeping the gender ratios between groups similar, 
participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (error management instructions: yes vs. no) x 2 
(error prevention instructions: yes vs. no) between-participant design. The distribution of 
participants between the four conditions was as follows: Group 1 (EM: yes, EP: no) consisted 
of 12 men (Mage = 20.83; SDage = 2.21) and 17 women (Mage = 22.82; SDag e= 3.32); Group 2 
(EM: no; EP: yes) consisted of 12 men (Mage = 21,17; SDage = 2.48) and 17 women (Mage = 
22.00; SDage = 2.48); Group 3 (EM: yes; EP: yes) consisted of 12 men (Mage = 21,92; SDage = 
2.07) and 16 women (Mage = 22.63; SDage = 3.20); Group 4 (EM: no; EP: no) and consisted of 
12 men (Mage = 22,42; SDage = 3.15) and 16 women (Mage = 21.82; SDage = 2.93).  
Procedure 
 After participants arrived at the research laboratory they were greeted and directed to 
separate cubicles. Most instructions were presented on a computer screen. If additional 
instructions were to be received by the experimenter (e.g., giving participants the train 
schedule; see below) or if participants had to start a new trial, a message would appear on the 
computer screen and instruct participants to contact the experimenter. The experiment lasted 
about 80 minutes and was presented as a study of the different types of thoughts people have 
while learning a novel task. No participants opted out. As remuneration for their 
participation, participants received € 9 or course credits. 
 Simulation task. In the current experiment we used a free-source PC simulation 
called Train Dispatcher 2.0 
© 
(Signal Computer Consultants, 1997). This task was selected 
because it allows people to make multiple errors and participants can follow an error 
prevention strategy, an error management strategy, or a combination of the two. Additionally, 
although the task was relatively complex to master, it was easy enough to understand its 
basics within a short amount of time (e.g., 20 minutes). In the simulation the participant acts 
as a train dispatcher whose main goal is to ensure that trains reach their correct end 
destinations. To move the trains to their exit location the dispatcher uses switches (to switch 
between tracks) and signals (to direct the trains in the desired direction). 
 Task familiarization. All participants received basic instructions outlining the 
general rules of the simulation (e.g., how to use the switches and signals, how to start and 
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stop the simulation, how to check the end destination of a train). After the brief introduction 
participants had five minutes to familiarize themselves with the task by guiding a train to its 
end destination. For that purpose, participants received a handout from the experimenter 
outlining which train they had to dispatch, its arrival time, and its end destination. 
Participants who did not manage to guide the train within five minutes were shown by the 
experimenter the correct procedure. 
 Manipulation. After getting familiarized with the task all participants received the 
manipulation of error-handling strategy instructions. The instructions for Group 1 (EM: yes, 
EP: no) and Group 2 (EM: no, EP: yes) are identical to those used in an earlier study (Chapter 
4) and are based on the error-handling instructions developed by Keith and Frese (2005). 
Specifically, in Group 1 (EM: yes, EP: no) participants read a short text indicating that 
“making errors is a natural part of the learning process” and that “when one makes an error it 
is important to think of how it can be corrected, what can be learned from it, and how what 
you learn can help you in similar situations in the future”. The text also stated that “by 
successfully handling errors you will learn how to deal with the task more effectively” and “if 
you try to find the useful information errors provide, you will do better on the task”. 
Participants in Group 2 (EM: no, EP: yes) read that “errors should not be allowed to occur 
during the learning process” and “it is important to think of how you can prevent errors from 
occurring, what you can do to successfully detect situations possibly leading to errors, and 
how what you know can help you with similar situations in the future”. Participants also read 
that “by successfully preventing errors you will learn how to deal with the task more 
effectively” and “if you try to prevent errors from occurring you will do better on the task”. 
Participants in Group 3 (EM: yes; EP: yes) received a combination of the instructions 
provided to Groups 1 and 2, which were reworded in a way that stated that both prevention 
and management are important for performing well on the task. Participants read that they 
should "first try to prevent errors, but remain open to the possibility that errors will 
nonetheless occur during learning". Participants next read that "What is important is how you 
deal with errors and how you can prevent errors in the future. When you make an error it is 
important to think about how this error can be corrected, what you can learn from it, what 
you can do to successfully detect situations possibly leading to errors, and how what you 
know can help you with similar situations in the future so that you prevent similar errors”. 
Group 4 (EM: no; EP: no) was a control group and received a neutral text that was 
comparable in size to the instructions received by the other groups, but contained no 
information about error management or error prevention. Specifically, the text mentioned 
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what a train is and what types of trains exist. Although related to trains, the information 
provided was selected to be as general as possible so that it could not give an unfair 
advantage to the control group. 
 Task practice. Task practice consisted of two ten-minute trials, separated by a two- 
minute break (procedure was identical to that in Chapter 4). All participants were given a 
train schedule which included information on the name of trains, their arrival time, entry 
point, and exit destination. Additionally, during the task practice trials participants had access 
to the full simulation manual.  
 In-between the two practice trials participants were reminded of the manipulation 
instructions by receiving four manipulation enforcing statements (see Chapter 4; Keith & 
Frese, 2005). For Group 1 (EM: yes; EP: no) those were: “Errors are a natural part of 
learning”, “Errors inform you about what you still do not know and can still learn”, “What 
counts is not whether you make errors, but how you handle them when they occur”, and 
“There is always a way to repair an error”. Group 2 (EM: no; EP: yes) participants read that 
“Errors can be prevented”, “The less errors you make, the more likely it is you learn things 
right from the first attempt”, “Avoid making errors so that you do not get stuck in a situation 
you cannot escape from”, and “The best way to follow your goals is without making errors”. 
In Group 3 (EM: yes; EP: yes) participants read “Errors are a natural part of learning”, “By 
learning from errors you can prevent future errors”, “Errors inform you about what you still 
do not know and can still learn”, and “What matters is how you handle errors when they 
occur and how you can prevent similar errors in the future”. Participants in the control 
condition (EM: no; EP: no) received no manipulation reminder statements.  
Dependent Variables 
 Cognitive appraisal. Participants filled in the measures of cognitive appraisal after 
the task practice. The items focused on participants' error appraisal during practice. 
 Challenge. We measured perceived challenge appraisal after the practice trials with 
two self-developed items: “I viewed my errors during practice as challenges I could 
overcome” and “I viewed my errors during practice as something I could successfully 
handle” (α = .76). Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very much so). 
 Threat. Participants’ perceived threat appraisal was measured with two self-
developed items: “I viewed my errors during the training as threats that needed to be 
avoided” and “I viewed my errors during the training as dangers” (α = .72). Ratings were 
made on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so). 
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 Performance. The procedure used during the performance trials was identical to that 
mentioned in Chapter 4. After filling in the measures of threat and challenge, participants 
completed two 10-minute performance trials. Participants were told that the purpose of the 
performance trials was to show what was learned during practice and instructed to guide as 
many trains as possible to their end destinations. Before each trial participants received the 
train schedule applicable to the trial. The final task score was calculated automatically based 
on the total miles travelled, correct destinations, on-time arrivals, and task speed (for exact 
calculation see Chapter 4). 
 Analogical transfer performance. The first 10-minute performance trial measured 
analogical transfer and had a level of difficulty comparable to that of the practice session (the 
number of trains to be dispatched was similar to that during the practice session; the track 
territory had a similar number of main tracks and entrances/ exits). We used the final score 
automatically calculated at the end of the first performance trial as a measure of analogical 
transfer performance. 
 Adaptive transfer performance. Next, after a two-minute break participants started 
working on the final 10-minute performance trial. The track territory selected for the adaptive 
transfer trial was much more complex than the track territories presented during all previous 
trials. Specifically, the number of trains that could potentially be dispatched was almost four 
times higher than that in prior trials. Additionally, the number of tracks was five times higher 
than in previous trials and so was the number of entrances/exits (three times higher). The 
final performance trial also included a new type of switches that completely changed the 
behavior of the tracks as well as tracks that could only be reached by reversing the train. 
Because the final performance task required adapting and reshaping one’s existing 
knowledge (e.g., using the new switches and reversing trains) and generating solutions to the 
new problems caused by the multi-track switches, it was used for measuring adaptive rather 
than analogical transfer performance (see Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Keith & Frese, 2005). 
The final score automatically calculated by the program was used as our measure of adaptive 
transfer performance.  
 Cognitive resource allocation. After the two performance trials participants filled in 
measures of on-task thoughts, off-task thoughts, and ego depletion. All answers were given 
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so). 
 On-task thoughts. To measure on-task thoughts experienced during the performance 
trials we used an abbreviated version of the scale in Chapter 4. Participants were told that the 
questions are concerned with the thoughts experienced during the performance phase. The 
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scale included the following items: “I found it easy to concentrate on the task”, “I found it 
easy to keep thinking about what I was supposed to do”, “I could keep my mind on the task”, 
and “It was easy to concentrate on what I was doing” (α = .87). The scale showed reliability 
similar to that found with the original 6-item scale in prior research (Chapter 4; Study 1, α = 
.87; Study 2, α = .89). 
 Off-task thoughts. We measured two separate kinds of off-task thoughts: general off-
task thoughts and negative self-related off-task thoughts.  
 General off-task thoughts were measured with six items from Kanfer et al. (1994). 
Sample items are: “I daydreamed while doing the task” and “I thought about other things that 
I had to do” (α = .77). 
 Negative self-related off-task thoughts were measured with three items previously 
used by Dickhaüser et al. (2011). The items were: “I thought about how poorly I was doing”, 
“I thought about how dissatisfied I was with my achievement”, and “I thought about how 
unskilled I was in this task” (α = .87). 
 Ego depletion. To measure ego depletion we used the short version of the Ciarocco, 
Twenge, Muraven, and Tice (unpublished manuscript) State Self-Control Capacity Scale. The 
scale consists of 10 items (Sample item: “Right now I feel drained”) and has good reliability 
(α = .88). 
Control Variables 
 In all analyses we controlled for participant’s sex, age, prior experience with similar 
simulations, and interest in participating in another study with the train task in the future. 
While sex and age are relatively straightforward controls, we included prior experience with 
similar simulations because more experienced participants may be responding differently to 
the task than less experienced participants (e.g., feel less threatened in general). The measure 
of interest in participating in another study with the train task in the future was used as a 
proxy for enjoyment/motivation of working on the task (e.g., people who disliked the task 
could perform worse simply due to lack of interest and motivation).  
Results 
All correlations between the study variables are presented in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 
includes the means and standard deviations of study variables per group. 
  
1
4
8
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.1 
Correlations Between Study Variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Age -    
         
2 Sex .13 -   
         
3 
Prior experience with similar 
simulations 
-.07 .05 -  
         
4 
Interest in participating in future train 
task studies 
-.29** -.22* .17† - 
         
5 Challenge -.10 -.02 .18† .37*** - 
        
6 Threat -.18† -.00 -.01 -.02 -.09 - 
       
7 On-task thoughts -.05 -.01 .02 .24** .20* -.10 - 
      
8 General off-task thoughts .09 .08 -.07 -.33*** -.16 .23* -.51*** - 
     
9 Negative self-related off-task thoughts -.00 -.03 .05 -.23** .01 .17 -.39*** .34*** - 
    
10 Ego Depletion .06 -.06 -.13 -.34*** -.25** .17 -.44*** .42*** .42*** - 
   
11 Practice -.08 -.18† -.00 .23* .31** -.14 -.10 -.21* .10 -.02 - 
  
12 Analogical transfer performance -.11 -.26** .03 .21* .30** -.08 .01 -.29** .08 -.09 .67*** - 
 
13 Adaptive transfer performance -.09 -.11 -.00 .07 .18 -.11 .09 -.25** .08 .02 .40*** .48*** - 
 
Note. Sex: 0 = Man and 1 = Woman.  
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Means and Standard Deviations for all Study Variables per Group 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
 
(EM: yes; EP: no) (EM: no; EP: yes) (EM: yes; EP: yes) (EM: no; EP: no) 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Age 22.00 3.04 21.66 2.47 22.32 2.75 22.07 2.98 
Sex 0.59 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Prior experience with similar simulations 2.28 1.16 1.79 1.26 2.07 1.09 1.64 0.91 
Interest in participating in future train task 
studies 
3.10 1.24 2.62 1.29 2.86 1.35 2.68 1.34 
Challenge 3.26 0.80 3.45 1.16 3.57 0.88 3.14 1.01 
Threat 2.16 1.01 2.67 1.12 2.13 0.91 2.36 0.83 
On-task thoughts 3.81 0.79 3.16 1.10 3.45 1.08 3.64 0.83 
General off-task thoughts 2.50 0.73 2.76 0.96 2.71 0.94 2.60 0.67 
Negative self-related off-task thoughts 2.55 1.10 3.17 1.25 3.25 1.04 2.96 1.15 
Ego Depletion 2.60 0.77 3.00 0.85 2.79 0.90 3.06 0.96 
Practice -0.08 0.94 0.00 1.20 0.07 1.01 0.01 0.87 
Analogical transfer performance -0.22 0.54 -0.15 0.77 0.15 1.36 0.23 1.12 
Adaptive transfer performance 0.00 0.74 -0.15 1.04 -0.19 0.82 0.35 1.28 
 
Note. Sex: 0 = Man and 1 = Woman. The scores for practice, analogical and adaptive transfer performance are standardized.
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Effects of Error-Handling Strategy on Cognitive Appraisal  
Challenge. A two-way ANCOVA on perceived challenge during the practice trials 
revealed a main effect of error prevention instructions, F (1, 106) = 4.38, p = .039, η2p = 0.04, 
no main effect of error management instructions, F (1, 106) = 0.02, p = .888, η2p = 0.00, nor 
an interaction effect, F (1, 106) = 0.06, p = .811, η2p = 0.00. Interest in participating in 
another study with the train task had a significant effect on challenge appraisal, F (1, 106) = 
15.79, p < .001, η2p = 0.13. The findings show that people who received error prevention 
instructions (M = 3.20, SD = 0.90) were more likely to appraise errors as challenges as 
compared to people who receive no error prevention instructions (M = 3.51, SD = 1.02). 
Threat. A two-way ANCOVA on perceived threat revealed a main effect of error 
management instructions, F (1, 106) = 3.93, p = .050, η2p = 0.04. No main effect of error 
prevention instructions, F (1, 106) = 0.57, p = .453, η2p = 0.01 nor an interaction effect, F (1, 
106) = 0.99, p = .322, η2p = 0.01 were observed. The results show that people who receive 
error management instructions (M = 2.14, SD = 0.95), independently of whether the 
instructions are mixed with error prevention instructions or not, felt less threatened by the 
task than people who received no error management instructions (M = 2.52, SD = 0.99). 
Effects of Error-Handling Strategy on Cognitive Resource Allocation 
Because our cognitive resource allocation measures correlated with each other (see 
Table 5.1), we first conducted a two-way MANCOVA with on-task thoughts, general off-task 
thoughts, negative self-related off-task thoughts, and ego depletion in order to account for the 
relationships between the dependent variables. The analysis, using Pillai’s trace revealed a 
main effect of error prevention on cognitive resource allocation, V = 0.92, F (4, 101) = 2.56, 
p = .043, η2p = 0.09. Separate univariate two-way ANCOVAs on the dependent variables 
showed a main effect of error prevention on on-task thoughts, F (1, 104) = 6.97, p = .010, η2p 
= 0.06 and on negative self-related off-task thoughts, F (1, 104) = 4.10, p = .045, η2p = 0.04. 
According to our findings, people who received error prevention instructions before task 
practice experienced fewer on-task thoughts during performance (M = 3.30, SD = 1.09), and 
more negative self-related off-task thoughts (M = 3.21, SD = 1.15) than people who received 
no error prevention instructions (on-task thoughts: M = 3.73, SD = 0.81; negative self-related 
off-task thoughts: M = 2.75, SD = 1.13). No main effects of error management or interaction 
effects were found (all Fs < 2.05, all ps > . 155). The separate univariate ANCOVAs also 
showed that interest in participating in another study with the train task had a significant 
effect on general off-task thoughts, F (1, 104) = 7.78, p = .006, η2p = 0.07, negative self-
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related off-task thoughts, F (1, 104) = 6.62, p = .011, η2p = 0.06, and ego depletion, F (1, 104) 
= 10.68, p = .001, η2p = 0.09. 
Threat and Challenge Appraisals as Mediators 
 To test the potential mediating role of threat and challenge appraisals on the effect of 
error-handling strategy on on-task thoughts, general off-task thoughts, negative self-related 
off-task thoughts, and ego depletion, we conducted four mediated moderation analyses (one 
for each dependent variable) using the Process macros developed by Hayes (2013; Model 7). 
In all analyses we controlled for sex, age, prior experience with similar simulations, and 
interest in participating in another study with the train task in the future. We included error 
prevention (yes vs. no) as the independent variable and error management (yes vs. no) as the 
moderator variable. Note that conducting the analyses in this way allowed us not only to test 
for main effects of error prevention and error management but also for potential interactions. 
The results of the four mediated moderation analyses show, against our predictions, 
no indirect effects of either threat or challenge, nor any interactions between error prevention 
and error management (all CIs included 0). Table 5.3 gives a detailed overview of all 
mediated moderation results. The current findings do not provide support for the theorized 
model, as neither threat nor challenge appraisals mediated the effects of error-handling on 
cognitive resource allocation. 
Cognitive Resource Allocation and Performance 
 To test the relationship between cognitive resource allocation and performance we 
conducted two hierarchical regression analyses including the four control variables in step 
one, followed by on-task thoughts, general off-task thoughts, negative self-related off-task 
thoughts, and ego depletion in step two (see Table 5.4). The first regression analysis showed 
that only general off-task thoughts were negatively related to analogical transfer performance, 
β = -.33, t(103) = -3.30, p = .001. The findings of the second regression analysis were 
identical, in the sense than only general off-task thoughts were related to adaptive transfer 
performance, β = -.35, t(103) = -2.97, p = .004. Both regressions showed no relationship 
between on-task thoughts, negative self-related off-task thoughts, ego depletion, and 
performance (see Table 5.4). 
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TABLE 5.3 
Results of All Mediated Moderation Analyses 
Mediator variable model: Threat Coeff. SE t p             
EP 0.32 0.26 1.24 .219             
EM  -0.19 0.27 -0.72 .476             
EP x EM -0.37 0.37 -0.99 .322             
Sex -0.38 0.19 -1.98 .050             
Age 0.01 0.03 0.27 .785             
CONT3 0.02 0.09 0.18 .858             
CONT4 -0.04 0.08 -0.48 .634             
Mediator variable model: Challenge Coeff. SE t p             
EP 0.32 0.24 1.31 .193             
EM  -0.07 0.25 -0.27 .790             
EP x EM 0.08 0.34 0.24 .811             
Sex 0.02 0.18 0.11 .916             
Age 0.02 0.03 0.61 .541             
CONT3 0.10 0.08 1.24 .216             
CONT4 0.28 0.07 3.97 <.001             
 On-task thoughts General off-task thoughts Self-related off-task thoughts Ego depletion 
Dependent variable model Coeff. SE t p Coeff. SE t p Coeff. SE t p Coeff. SE t p 
Challenge 0.18 0.10 1.76 .081 -0.07 0.09 -0.80 .426 0.10 0.12 0.82 .414 -0.12 0.09 -1.28 .204 
Threat  -0.06 0.09 -0.62 .536 0.16 0.08 2.05 .043 0.18 0.11 1.63 .105 0.13 0.08 1.63 .107 
EP -0.46 0.18 -2.52 .013 0.14 0.15 0.88 .379 0.36 0.21 1.68 .096 0.04 0.16 0.25 .803 
Sex 0.01 0.19 0.03 .977 0.06 0.16 0.34 .732 -0.08 0.23 -0.36 .721 -0.04 0.17 -0.22 .823 
Age 0.01 0.03 0.40 .690 0.01 0.03 0.17 .862 -0.04 0.04 -0.96 .340 -0.003 0.03 -0.10 .917 
CONT3 -0.05 0.08 -0.58 .564 -0.002 0.07 -0.03 .975 0.10 0.10 1.02 .311 -0.04 0.07 -0.59 .558 
CONT4 0.14 0.08 1.73 .088 -0.18 0.07 -2.64 .009 -0.27 0.09 -2.84 .005 -0.20 0.07 -2.76 .007 
Direct effect of EP -0.46 0.18 -2.52 .013 0.14 0.15 0.88 .379 0.36 0.21 1.68 .096 0.04 0.16 0.25 .803 
Conditional indirect effects: Threat Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI 
EM (low) -0.02 0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.20 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.25 -0.04 0.05 -0.22 0.20 
EM (high) 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.05 -0.16 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.28 -0.05 0.05 -0.20 0.07 
Conditional indirect effects: Challenge Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI Coeff. SE LLCI ULCI 
EM (low) 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.22 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.20 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.25 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.20 
EM (high) 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.24 -0.01 0.05 -0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.06 -0.17 0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.07 
 
Note. EP = Error prevention, EM = Error management, EP x EM = Interaction effect of error prevention and error management, CONT3 = Prior experience with similar 
simulations, CONT4 = Interest in participating in future train task studies, LLCI = Low level confidence interval, ULCI = High level confidence interval. The mediator 
variable models are identical between analyses because they investigate the effects up to the mediator variables, excluding the dependent variables. All tests are two-tailed.
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TABLE 5.4 
Hierarchical Regressions on Analogical and Adaptive Transfer Performance 
 Analogical transfer 
performance 
Adaptive transfer 
performance 
Control variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Age -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 
Sex -0.22* -0.20* -0.11 -0.08 
Prior experience with similar simulations 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Interest in participating in future train task studies 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.01 
Independent variables     
On-task thoughts  -0.17  0.02 
General off-task thoughts  -0.37**  -0.35** 
Negative self-related off-task thoughts  0.19†  0.17 
Ego Depletion  -0.03  0.13 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.06 0.13 -0.01 .06 
∆ R2  0.07*  0.07* 
F 2.66* 3.12** 0.62 1.81† 
 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients are used.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. 
 
Effects of Error-Handling Strategy on Performance 
Practice. A two-way ANCOVA on practice performance revealed no main effects of 
error prevention instructions, error management instructions, nor an interaction effect (all Fs 
> 0.33, all ps > .604). These findings indicate that people performed similar independent of 
the experimental condition they were in during task practice. 
 Analogical and adaptive transfer performance. We conducted a two-way 
MANCOVA with analogical and adaptive transfer performance as the dependent variables. 
This analysis using Pillai’s trace revealed no significant effects of error prevention, error 
management, and their interaction on overall performance (all Vs < .05, all Fs < 2.72, all ps > 
.071). Nonetheless, a separate univariate two-way ANCOVA showed a significant interaction 
effect on analogical transfer performance, F (1, 106) = 5.45, p = .022, η2p = 0.05. Observing 
the standardized mean values for analogical performance showed that people who received 
no error relevant instructions (M standardized score = 0.24, SD = 1.12) and people who received a 
combination of both error management and error prevention instructions (M standardized score = 
0.15, SD = 1.36) performed better than either the error management only group (M standardized 
score = -0.15, SD = 0.77) or the error prevention only group (M standardized score = -0.22, SD = 
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0.54). A contrast analysis confirmed that the control group and the mixed group 
outperformed the "pure" error management and "pure" error prevention groups, F (1, 106) = 
5.45, p = .022, η2p = 0.05. Another separate two-way ANCOVA showed a trend for a main 
effect of error prevention on adaptive transfer performance, F (1, 106) = 3.28, p = .073, η2p = 
0.03. The trend indicated that people who received error prevention instructions (M standardized 
score = 0.17, SD = 0.93) performed worse than people who did not receive error prevention 
instructions (M standardized score = -0.17 , SD = 1.05). 
Discussion 
In conducting the present research we had two goals. First, to examine what is it that 
drives the effects of error-handling strategy on cognition and performance – error prevention, 
error management, or their combination. Second, to test a theoretically derived model 
investigating cognitive appraisal and cognitive resource allocation as the processes through 
which error-handling strategies affect performance. 
It is commonly thought that error management drives the effects found in previous 
research. Our findings, however, indicate that it is error prevention that negatively affects 
cognitive resource allocation and to some extent adaptive transfer performance. Error 
prevention instructions made people less task-focused (fewer on-task thoughts, more negative 
self-related off-task thoughts), rather than error management instructions making people 
more task-focused. This finding is theoretically relevant because it may change the 
interpretation of some earlier findings in the error-handling literature. Namely, earlier work 
has been focusing more on the benefits of error management in affecting people's cognitions 
and performance rather than on the harmful effects of error prevention (e.g., Chapter 4; Keith 
& Frese, 2005; Frese et al., 1991). The current findings advance the error-handling literature 
by suggesting that error prevention is driving the effects on cognition and performance rather 
than error management. An important implication emerging from this finding is that error 
prevention during training may be bad for task-focus and performance, rather than error 
management being good for it. Note that such a conclusion is in line with a recent paper by 
Loh and colleagues (2013) who similarly to us suggest that error prevention is more harmful 
than error management is beneficial. More specifically, Loh and colleagues (2013) found no 
significant main effect of error management training (EMT) on performance, when 
comparing it to a control group that received identical information and training (active 
exploration) and similarly to us stated that "...the positive effects of error encouragement 
reported in prior EMT research may actually be attributable to the deleterious impact of error-
avoidance training" (p. 444). 
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Regarding error management, our findings show that error management instructions 
lower the level of threat experienced by people, rather than increasing people's challenge 
appraisals of errors. Thus by not allowing negative threat appraisals to get out of hand, error 
management does not make people appraise errors in more positive light, but in a less 
negative light. It has been suggested more than once in the error-handling literature that error 
management is good for coping (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 
2003; Frese et al., 1991; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998; Wood et al., 2000), but 
what our results suggest is that error management does not positively affect coping per se, 
rather, error management instructions alleviate stress appraisals by making errors seem less 
threatening. Such a finding indicates that error management leads to lower need of coping, 
rather than to more efficient coping. 
Prior research shows that error-handling strategy has an effect on self-regulation (e.g., 
metacognition, Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; metacognition and emotion control, Keith & Frese, 
2005). Nonetheless, this earlier research did not simultaneously include on-task and off-task 
thoughts as outcomes. It is possible that the strong theoretical overlap between on-task 
thoughts and off-task thoughts with self-regulation (self-regulation is activated when there 
are many off-task thoughts and fewer on-task thoughts) manifests itself as a strong statistical 
overlap. Accordingly, when we conducted a multivariate analysis of variance the weaker 
effect of ego depletion as a proxy of self-regulation activation and cognitive resource (over) 
use during performance was cancelled out by the effects of on-task and off-task thoughts. An 
implication of this finding, which should be empirically investigated further, is that some of 
the effects previously found on metacognition and emotion control may disappear when on-
task and off-task thoughts are taken into account. 
Our findings indicate that analogical transfer performance was best in the combined 
error prevention and error management group and in the control group, whereas both the 
"pure" error prevention and the "pure" error management groups scored lower. This is a novel 
finding implying that the transfer of similar skills works better when people are not told 
anything related to errors or when they receive information to both prevent and manage. The 
current findings are different from those of a recent meta-analysis (see Keith & Frese, 2008), 
which looked at the effects of error-handling on analogical and adaptive transfer 
performance, showing that error management was better than other training methods (i.e., 
exploratory training without error management instructions, exploratory training with error 
prevention instructions, proceduralized training, proceduralized training with error prevention 
instructions).  
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With the exception of the findings for analogical transfer performance, the current 
study did not show that combining error prevention and error management offers some 
additional benefits for cognitive appraisals, cognitive resource allocation, or adaptive transfer 
performance. We are, however, cautious with dismissing the idea that a combination of the 
two strategies would not affect other outcomes (e.g., affect, motivation, attitudes). 
Theoretical Relevance to the Error-Handling Literature 
We add to the error-handling literature by re-examining the error management 
advantage perspective that has dominated recent error-handling research. Overall, the picture 
that emerges from our data suggests that error prevention dampens positive effects and 
amplifies negative effects, whereas error management only dampens negative effects. 
Accordingly, our findings support the error prevention disadvantage perspective - which 
postulates that error prevention is more harmful than error management is helpful, at least 
when it comes to cognitive resource allocation and adaptive transfer performance. Although 
going against most recent theorizing, which focuses on the benefits of error management, 
such a finding is in line with the original action theory framework of Frese and Zapf (1994), 
which advocates error management as an alternative to error prevention, due to the negative 
effects of error prevention (but not due to the positive effects of error management). An 
observation of the effects found in earlier work suggests that there are bigger differences 
between groups when error management is compared to error prevention than when error 
management is compared to pure exploration (see Keith & Frese's 2008 meta-analysis). Thus, 
the interpretations included in many earlier studies might have been to some extent 
misguided because instead of realizing that it is error prevention that drives the effects, 
researchers (us included) assumed it was error management. Nonetheless, we note the need of 
replication of our findings before such a conclusion can be made. 
The second implication of our findings is that although error management is seen as a 
strategy that improves people's coping and thinking mechanisms (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 
2008; Keith & Frese, 2005; Nordstrom et al., 1998), it may not necessarily affect 
performance in the ways previously theorized. In fact, such a conclusion goes in line with 
some earlier findings that show no difference on performance between an error management 
group that included additional emotional coping instructions and a pure error management 
group (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008) or between an error management group with added 
metacognitive instructions compared to a pure error management group (Keith & Frese, 
2005). If error management influences performance positively, shouldn't boosting the 
elements (emotional coping and metacognition) that supposedly induce the effects be even 
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more beneficial for performance? Based on the abovementioned research this does not seem 
to be the case. Our reasoning, however, by suggesting that it is error prevention that drives 
the previously uncovered effects, provides a more parsimonious explanation that fits better 
with previous and present empirical findings. Although more research including a full-
factorial design is necessary to replicate and extend the current findings, our paper raises 
important questions the answer to which may lead to substantial rethinking of what we now 
know about error-handling and the mechanisms through which it operates. 
The present findings show specialized effects of error prevention on challenge 
appraisal, on-task thoughts, negative self-related off-task thoughts, and adaptive transfer 
performance (marginal), and a specialized effect of error management on threat appraisal. 
Discovering specialized effects rather than additive ones suggest that instead of affecting the 
same variables, error management and error prevention have unique outcomes. An important 
theoretical implication of these findings is that the two error-handling strategies may be 
influencing performance through a dual pathway model (with a negative cognitive pathway 
due to error prevention and a neutralizing affect pathway due to error management), a 
proposition that should be tested in the future by extending the present model. 
Finally, the finding that combining error prevention and error management 
instructions or not mentioning errors at all was better for analogical transfer performance than 
instructions focusing solely on error prevention or on error management provides us with 
another important implication. Based on this finding it seems that for tasks similar to what is 
already known by people, not thinking about errors or thinking about both preventing and 
managing them is more beneficial than focusing only on a single error-handling strategy. 
Thus, for working on simple tasks that do not require relearning skills or changing one's 
existing cognitive model, error neutral or combined error instructions are sufficient. When a 
task, however, requires adaptation, error prevention instructions tend to harm adaptive 
transfer performance, rather than error management instructions boosting it. Although the 
findings for adaptive transfer were showing only a trend and should first be replicated before 
stronger conclusions can be drawn, they are in line with the results for on-task and negative 
self-related off-task thoughts, and with the error prevention disadvantage perspective. The 
current results suggest that error prevention instructions may be damaging to performance 
while learning tasks that require mental adaptability. In contrast, for learning tasks that 
require the application of what is already well known, without the need to adapt to changes, 
the negatives of prevention can be counteracted by also providing error management 
instructions (or by not saying anything about errors).  
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Although our study offers novel and valuable findings, some limitations should be 
addressed. First, in the present research we primarily focused on cognition, rather than on 
affect because it is the less researched and understood factor of the two in regard to error-
handling and performance. By not including affect, however, we do not imply that it does not 
play a role. Cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) postulates that appraisals 
affect not only subsequent cognitions, but also emotions. Similarly, Keith and Frese (2005) 
also theorized and demonstrated effects on both cognition and emotion. We recognize our 
exclusion of affect from the currently tested model as a limitation that should be addressed in 
future work by integrating various aspects of emotion (e.g., valence, strength, type). It is 
likely that cognitive appraisals first affect emotion, which in turn influences cognitive 
resource allocation. It is also likely that while challenge results in more approach directed and 
positive emotions, threat leads to more avoidance directed and negative emotions (e.g., 
Higgins, 2011). These propositions should be further investigated so that the complex 
interplay between cognition and emotion in the relationship between error-handling strategies 
and performance can be better understood. 
Second, we found a surprising positive effect of error prevention instructions on 
challenge appraisal. One interpretation of this finding is that during practice, most 
participants did not consider the task to be particularly difficult, which is why a main positive 
effect of error prevention was found. For a stressful situation to be perceived as threatening 
the person should feel as though they do not have the necessary resources to deal with the 
task. If, however, people believe that they can prevent errors because they underestimate the 
difficulty of the task, errors may be experienced as challenges that can be properly dealt with 
and even mobilize people. During the adaptive transfer performance phase, however, the 
level of difficulty of the task increased and participants may have started to consider errors 
less as challenges and more as threats. Note that such changes in appraisals over time are 
consistent with cognitive appraisal theory, which suggests that if the person's view on the 
situation or the situation itself change, cognitive appraisals are also affected (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984).  
In order to separate effects in time to properly test for mediation we measured 
cognitive resource allocation during the practice phase and cognitive resource allocation 
during the performance phase. It is possible that although this was a strength of the methods 
applied, it weakened the observed effects, because people's threat and challenge appraisals 
may differ between practice, which involves learning, vis a vis the performance phase, which 
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involves demonstrating what has been learned. The measurement of cognitive appraisal 
during practice and cognitive resource allocation during performance can also potentially 
account for the lack of mediational effects currently found. This limitation can be addressed 
in future research by including questions about cognitive appraisal immediately after an error 
occurs and questions about cognitive resource allocation at the end of a phase, be that 
practice or performance. 
Third, idiosyncrasies of our sample may have affected some of the results. Many 
participants were recruited by students of the first author as a course requirement, thus some 
participants may have only participated in the study as a favor to a student friend. We 
included willingness to participate in a similar study in the future as a control variable in 
order to account for this possibility (e.g., if people only participated as a favor they are less 
likely to say they want to participate again). However, we cannot rule out that the motivation 
of participants to work and perform on the task was affected by the recruitment methods 
beyond what can be measured with this control variable. In fact, lack of motivation may 
explain some of the (non) findings between cognitive resource allocation and performance. 
Specifically, observing the effects of cognitive resource allocation on both analogical and 
adaptive transfer performance revealed only an effect of general off-task thoughts and no 
performance effects of on-task thoughts, negative self-related off-task thoughts or ego 
depletion. General off-task thoughts are consistent with low task motivation because the mind 
wanders off away from the task and the current setting. Experiencing more negative self-
related off-task thoughts and higher ego depletion, however, suggests that a person is 
invested in the task. Similarly, being focused implies that the person is motivated to work on 
the task. Consequently, finding only a significant negative relationship between general off-
task thoughts and performance may signal that participants were having a relatively low 
motivation throughout the study. Future research should incorporate general motivation 
measures in order to account for this possibility.  
Fourth, and related to the previous point, the task may also have affected motivation 
as it was not focused on skills participants necessarily wanted or needed to learn for a specific 
purpose going beyond the experiment itself. During training in organizations, in contrast, 
there are more incentives for learning new skills, whereas the task used in our experiment 
could have been seen by participants as unrelated to their goals, resulting in general 
amotivation. That being said, if in the current artificial setting with relatively unmotivated 
participants we find effects, it is even more likely to find stronger effects with actual trainee 
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samples. We encourage conducting research in naturalistic organizational settings with 
working samples in order to test the external validity of our findings. 
Finally, although our results did not provide much support for combining error 
prevention and error management instructions, except for a positive interaction effect on 
analogical transfer performance, we are convinced that more research is necessary. Life 
requires us to both prevent and manage errors, but it is possible that most people are not 
particularly good at doing both at the same time and may thus engage in serial error 
prevention and error management (switching when necessary). Future work should shed light 
on individuals' serial and simultaneous application of error prevention and error management 
strategies. Additionally, the combination of error prevention and error management strategies 
poses important questions for organizations. According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) an 
organization that is highly reliable is capable of both preventing and managing errors. Yet, it 
is unclear if the people within an organization are preventing and managing errors 
simultaneously during every task. Also, it is unclear if teams perform better when all 
members of a team focus on prevention, on management, or on a combination of the two. A 
related question is whether it is useful to have some members within a team focus on 
prevention, while others focus on management aspects. Finally, it would be worthwhile 
investigating what is the best proportion of people preventing and managing within a team, 
and if this proportion is influenced by context and task specifics (e.g., in R&D departments it 
may be good to have a majority of error management strategy people and a minority of error 
prevention strategy people to ground them while working on creative tasks). 
Practical Relevance 
Although the primary focus of the present study was mainly theoretical integration, 
clarification, and extension, the present results offer some valuable practical implications. 
First, including error prevention in training appears to be detrimental for thinking and 
performance. Accordingly, training using prevention instructions should be reconsidered as a 
good manner of learning new information. By instructing people to prevent errors, everything 
that subsequently goes wrong activates distracting negative self-related off-task thoughts and 
lowers on-task thoughts. Second, for simple tasks similar to the training, adding error 
management instructions may temper some of the negative effects of error prevention on 
performance. For complex tasks that require subsequent learning going beyond the training 
itself, however, adding error management instructions to supplement prevention instructions 
does not seem to affect performance. Overall, error prevention instructions are harmful, 
which is why the alternative of using error management instructions is to be preferred. 
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Conclusion  
The current research had the aim to investigate the drivers and the cognitive 
mechanisms through which error-handling strategies affect performance outcomes. Our 
results show that error prevention instructions have negative effects on cognitive resource 
allocation and on adaptive transfer performance (trend), while error management instructions 
dampen the appraisal of errors as threats. Thus, error prevention drives negative effects, 
rather than error management driving positive effects. The present findings are novel and 
valuable in the sense that they challenge and extend existing theorizing on error-handling 
strategies and raise many new questions, the answers to which will help researchers 
understand why and when error prevention, error management, and their combination 
influence thinking, affect, motivation, behavior, and performance.  
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 The main question that I set out to answer in this dissertation was whether error-
handling strategy affects people’s thoughts and subsequent outcomes. I approached this 
question by looking at both (a) how error-handling strategy affects others' thoughts about the 
person using a strategy and at (b) how error-handling strategy affects one's own thoughts 
while working on a task. More specifically, I focused on others’ thoughts in the form of 
perception and evaluation by followers of a leader and at own thoughts in the form of 
cognitive appraisal and cognitive resource allocation during task practice and performance.  
 Overall, the findings of the dissertation show that an error management strategy is 
beneficial, while an error prevention strategy is harmful to both how others' perceive a person 
and to how people think during a task. Additionally, the findings show that error management 
positively relates to other outcomes beyond perception and cognition, namely, satisfaction 
with a leader, motivation, trust, and performance, while error prevention negatively relates to 
trust and performance. The results show that perceived leader warmth (measured as 
sociability) and perceived leader morality mediate the effects and relationships found in the 
first part of the dissertation (Chapters 2 and 3). The results in Chapter 4 highlight on-task 
thoughts during practice as a mediator of the effect of error-handling strategy on 
performance. Finally, Chapter 5 opens up many new questions the answers to which will 
hopefully be addressed in future research. 
Theoretical Implications and Directions for Future Research 
 The findings of this dissertation challenge, extend, and refine what we know about 
error-handling, perception, cognition, and performance. I focus on two main categories of 
theoretical implications that subsume many of the topics outlined in greater detail in the 
previous chapters. First, the present dissertation shows the importance of investigating the 
effects of error-handling on the interindividual dyadic level. Second, error-handling affects 
individual cognition and performance. 
Error-Handling Strategy and the Interindividual Dyadic Level 
 The studies described in Chapters 2 and 3 show that the strategy applied by a leader 
affects how followers think about the leader in terms of sociability, morality, and 
competence. These findings add to the literature by revealing that the error-handling strategy 
of a person has implications not only for one's own self (i.e., cognition and performance), but 
also for others (i.e., perception, satisfaction, motivation, trust). Such a realization is valuable 
because it highlights the need to broaden error-handling theorizing by incorporating 
interindividual dyadic level effects, which are more basic than team or organizational level 
effects and may explain how, why, and when error-handling should be used in teams and 
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organizations. Additionally, the present research shows that although there may be fears 
regarding error management and its application by leaders, those fears are not substantiated 
by the current findings. On the contrary, leaders using an error management strategy were 
perceived more favorably than error prevention leaders or leaders exhibiting less error 
management. 
 Second, error prevention and error management are distinct strategies and it is 
important to see which of them drives the effects we find at the interindividual dyadic level. 
The findings of Study 2 in Chapter 2 and Study 1 in Chapter 3 show that error management is 
related to followers' perceptions of leaders, satisfaction with leaders, motivation, and trust. 
Error prevention was (negatively) related only to trust, but not to the other variables of 
interest. An important theoretical implication of these results is that error management, rather 
than error prevention may be driving most interindividual dyadic level effects. Note, 
however, that in the experimental Study 2 in Chapter 3 followers with an error prevention 
leader perceived the leader as less sociable and moral than a neutral leader, while the 
followers of an error management leader perceived the leader only as more sociable than a 
neutral leader, while no effect was found on morality. These findings suggest that in the lab 
setting it may be error prevention that is more important for perception, thus error prevention 
may drive perception effects rather than error management. Subsequently, a question that 
should be answered in future research is whether error management drives effects in natural 
settings while error prevention drives effects in lab settings and why. I can speculate that in 
most organizations and settings error prevention is the status quo, thus by applying error 
management a leader can stand out and profit from improved image in the eyes of followers. 
In the experimental setting followers work on a novel task and learning new skills usually 
involves making more errors than applying already existing skills, thus error prevention may 
be relatively challenging to use. Accordingly, under such circumstances error prevention may 
be more detrimental than error management is useful, because in learning environments error 
management may be the status quo. These possibilities should be further investigated by 
conducting research in organizations comparing different settings (e.g., training vs. daily 
work settings), industries (e.g., information technology vs. safety industries), departments 
(e.g., R&D vs. production), and task types (e.g., novel vs. already well known tasks). Only 
then can we know whether some contexts are by default seen as consistent with error 
management or with error prevention and test whether applying an inconsistent strategy (e.g., 
a leader using error management during daily work activities associated with error 
prevention) affects followers to a larger extent.  
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 Third, the findings identify leaders' error-handling strategy as a predictor of followers' 
trust. Such an effect has previously been theorized (e.g., Edmondson, 1996; 1999; 2004a, 
2004b; Van Dyck, 2009; Van Dyck et al., 2005), but not yet empirically tested within the 
error-handling literature. The results from the experimental and field questionnaire studies 
were consistent in that error management was positively linked to trust. A question to be 
addressed in future research is whether the effects of leaders' error-handling on trust can be 
extended to various previously identified outcomes of trust such as follower job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, OCBs, and job performance, to name a few. Additionally, the 
present studies add to the trust literature by identifying morality and competence as more 
important antecedents of trust than sociability. The current results go against earlier 
theorizing that benevolence, integrity, and ability - the trust literature proxies for sociability, 
morality, and competence – all have independent effects on trust (see Mayer, Davis, and 
Schoorman, 1995)
1
.  
 Fourth, the present studies answer a recent call for research examining the factors 
influencing followers' warmth and competence perceptions (Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 
2011). My dissertation highlights the role of leaders' error-handling strategy, a factor that has 
not previously been researched in this context, but which is to a larger degree under the 
conscious control of leaders (put differently error-handling is trainable, while some earlier 
discussed factors cannot be consciously changed). Additionally, the dissertation adds to the 
person perception literature by showing that the distinction between sociability and morality 
found in recent group research (e.g., Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Leach, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), can also be applied to individuals. Such a finding is valuable 
because it emphasizes the importance of including measures of both sociability and morality, 
rather than treating them as interchangeable constructs, which is how they have been treated 
in earlier research on warmth and competence (for a review see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 
2008). Future work can investigate the unique effects of sociability and morality. Moreover, 
research should definitely look into other dyadic, team, and organizational level factors 
potentially influenced by leaders' and by followers' sociability, morality, and competence.  
                                                 
1
 Although such a finding has important implications for theorizing on trust and its antecedents, more evidence 
from different settings and with different measures (e.g., by applying the same measures used by Mayer et al., 
1995) is necessary before we can conclude that sociability or benevolence are overpowered by the other 
antecedents of trust. Additionally, future research should look deeper into the similarities and differences 
between measures from the trust literature (benevolence, integrity, ability) and from the person and group 
perception literatures (sociability, morality, and competence). 
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Error-Handling Strategy and Others’ Thoughts - Directions for Future Research  
 Future research should give answers to questions such as: does one's own error-
handling strategy influence one's interactions with others with a similar or a different error-
handling strategy, how, and when? The homophily principle states that we like and prefer to 
be around others who are similar to us (for a review see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001). Thus, we can expect that people would prefer to interact with others with a similar 
rather than with a different error-handling strategy. Moreover, my theory-based speculation 
would be that just as a regulatory fit (Higgins, 2011) can often be beneficial, so can an error-
handling strategy fit between leaders and followers or between teammates. An implication of 
this may be that followers prefer and enjoy more working with leaders with a similar error-
handling strategy to their own and vice versa. Another implication may be that over time, 
followers adapt the strategy they use in the work context to match the strategy of the leader, 
facilitating fit. Moreover, it is possible that when there is error-handling strategy fit, followers 
perceive the leader more favorably than without a fit (e.g., leader is perceived as more 
sociable, moral, competent). However, this preference for similarity may have an unintended 
negative effect of not allowing people to learn and grow. In order to improve, we need to be 
aware of other and different ways than our own. Although challenging, working with others 
not sharing our own error-handling strategy can nonetheless be beneficial by teaching us 
something new. The learning process itself may not be pleasant, nor easy, yet, it is necessary. 
Additionally, in uncertain or dynamic situations, having people with different error strategies 
can potentially boost agility. 
 It is also valuable to investigate how leader error-handling strategy is linked to 
leadership styles. The studies in the dissertation focused only on leaders' error-handling 
strategy. It is likely, however, that certain aspects of error management or error prevention 
are facilitated by or co-occur with different leadership styles. For example, I expect a 
transformational leader to show more characteristics and behaviors consistent with error 
management, while a transactional leader to exhibit attitudes and behaviors consistent with 
error prevention. Future research should investigate the extent to which leadership styles 
interact with error-handling strategies. Additionally, the distinctiveness of error-handling 
over and beyond leadership style should be examined.  
 Another interesting question to be answered is: how does a leader's error-handling 
strategy affect followers' well-being and efficiency in the long term? Based on the current 
dissertation findings I can speculate that error management strategy of the leader is better for 
followers' well-being and efficiency in the long run. The use of error management by a leader 
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has been positively linked to better team climate (psychological safety, e.g., Edmondson, 
1996; 1999) and performance (learning from errors, Edmondson, 1996; 1999), while team 
error management climate (Hofmann & Mark, 2006) has been positively related to employee 
(and patient) satisfaction. Based on these correlational findings I argue that researchers 
should seriously consider and investigate the possibility that leader error management 
strategy is likely to have long term benefits for employees in terms of well-being, job 
satisfaction, and performance.  
 Another promising research venue lies in investigating how middle-managers' error-
handling strategy affects peers' and top-managers' perceptions and behavior toward the 
middle-managers. A question that may need to be answered first is "do the followers and 
teams of error management leaders perform noticeably better than those of error prevention 
leaders"? If peers and top-level managers see that a leader is successful in influencing others, 
they may attribute that success to various characteristics of the leader, error-handling strategy 
being one. Accordingly, if it is the case that leaders exhibiting error management rather than 
error prevention are also seen as better at influencing others to successfully and effectively 
achieve a common goal, we can expect them to be perceived favorably by peers and 
superiors. Earlier work provides primary evidence supporting the benefits of error 
management for performance in teams and organizations (Edmondson, 1996; 1999; Hofmann 
& Mark, 2006; Van Dyck et al., 2005), but it remains yet to be explored whether this better 
performance is consciously associated with middle-manager's error-handling strategy by 
peers and superiors.   
 Until now my focus was mostly on leader error-handling strategies, but it may well be 
that followers' error-handling strategies affect leaders' perception of and behavior toward 
followers. Leadership is a two-way street. As followers are influenced by a leader's error 
handling strategy, so can leaders be influenced by a follower's error-handling strategy. For 
example, leaders may be more prone to trust an employee with an error management strategy 
or feel more motivated in their interactions with such employees (there may, of course, be an 
interaction with the leader’s strategy). Alternatively, it is also possible that leaders are not as 
accepting of error management among their followers as are followers of error management 
by leaders (e.g., error prevention may be seen as more desirable in followers). Moreover, 
followers’ error-handling strategy may influence leader behavior. For example, if a leader has 
to choose between a follower showing high error management or a follower showing high 
error prevention for a task that requires adaptability, innovation, and risk-taking, the leader 
may decide to give the task to the employee exhibiting error management. Future research 
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should investigate the role of follower error-handling strategy and the extent to which leaders 
are affected by it in their thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors toward followers. 
Error-Handling Strategy, Own Cognition, and Performance 
 First, Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to scientific knowledge by investigating cognitive 
appraisals and cognitive resource allocation as potential mediators of the effects of error-
handling instructions on performance. More than once researchers have suggested that error-
handling strategies affect performance through influencing the thinking of people during task 
practice and performance (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Chillarege, Nordstrom, & Williams, 
2003; Frese, 1991; Frese, Brodbeck, Heimbokel, Mooser, Schleiffenbaum, & Thiemann, 
1991; Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003; Keith & Frese, 2005, Nordstrom, 
Wendland, & Williams, 1998). Accordingly, I focused on broadening the error-handling 
literature by investigating the potential mediating role of cognitive appraisals (threat and 
challenge), and on-task, off-task thoughts, and ego depletion, which although mentioned in 
earlier theorizing (e.g., Keith & Frese, 2005) have not been empirically investigated before. 
The findings in Chapter 4 show that error-handling strategy affects on-task thoughts, which in 
turn affect performance. People who received error management instructions performed 
better than people who received error prevention instructions because they were more 
focused on the task during the practice phase (i.e., showed more on-task thoughts).  
 Second, the aim of Chapter 5 was to broaden the findings of Chapter 4 by 
investigating (1) what is it that drives the effects we previously found on cognition and 
performance – error prevention, error management, or their combination and (2) whether as 
previously suggested by Keith and Frese (2005) and Loh, Andrews, Hesketh, and Griffin 
(2013), (re)appraisal of errors is the mechanism through which error-handling strategies 
influence cognitive resource allocation and subsequent performance. Chapter 5 shows that the 
effects found in Chapter 4 are not driven by the positive effects of error management. Rather, 
error prevention diminishes on-task thoughts, increases negative self-related off-task 
thoughts, and harms adaptive transfer performance (trend effect). In Chapter 5 error 
management was found to only drive the effect on perceived threat, lowering it. Such a 
findings goes against the idea that error management leads to better coping, but suggests 
instead that it leads to lower need to cope with errors as threatening stressors. These results 
lead us back to the initial theorizing by Frese and Zapf (1994), stating that "error 
management tries to overcome the potential negative side effects of error prevention" (p. 
292). Thus, the implication for researchers is not to forget the origins of error prevention and 
error management theorizing. In the current literature it is noticeable that over the years the 
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idea of error management as a way to overcome the potential negative effects of error 
prevention slowly has developed into error management as beneficial for a variety of 
outcomes. Researchers should be aware that it may be the negative effects of error prevention 
that actually make error management preferable. 
Third, all experimental studies reported in this dissertation provide evidence that short 
error-handling instructions influence a variety of outcomes even when people have a short 
task practice time. Earlier research has mostly focused on longer training-based studies (e.g., 
Chillarege et al., 1998; Frese et al., 1991; Nordstrom et al., 1998) or confounded the effects 
of error-handling instructions with training type (exploratory training with error management 
instructions and procedural training with error prevention instructions; for a more detailed 
discussion of this issue see Chapter 4). The studies reported in this dissertation add to the 
error-handling literature by investigating error-handling instructions, while all experimental 
and control groups engaged in the same type of practice. I show that the effects on 
performance found earlier with long training and confounding instructions and type of 
training can be replicated with more robust methods. It is not making errors during task 
practice per se that explains the previously found effects of error prevention and error 
management on performance, but how errors are framed.  
 Finally, in Chapter 5 I explore the possibility that a combination of error prevention 
and error management can be better than using either element on its own. Sitkin (1992), Van 
Dyck and colleagues (2005), and Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) suggest that organizations need 
to be able to both prevent and manage errors in order to be successful. Under most 
circumstances being able to both prevent and manage can come in handy, so that errors are 
either not made, or not allowed to cause negative consequences if made. Nonetheless, 
existing research has not yet delved into the potential benefits of using a combination of error 
prevention and error management strategies. The experiment in Chapter 5 was the first 
attempt to go beyond pure prevention and management at the individual level while 
integrating the strengths of both approaches. The findings show that in the present context 
such a combination was only more beneficial for analogical transfer performance. However, 
these findings should not discourage researchers from trying to balance prevention and 
management at the individual, interindividual dyadic, team, or organizational levels. The 
current research provides only a cautious first step, which does not take into account the 
multitude of factors that can be affecting the results (e.g., level of task knowledge: novice vs. 
expert; own error-handling strategy; analogical vs. adaptive transfer).  
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Error-Handling Strategy and Own Thoughts and Performance - Directions for Future 
Research  
 A question that should receive attention in future work is what are the boundary 
conditions for the effects currently found on cognition and performance. Earlier research on 
error management training has looked into individual differences on cognitive ability, 
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, trait goal orientation, and age (e.g., 
Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Carter & Baier, 2010; Cullen, Muros, Rasch, & Sackett, 2013; 
Gully, Payne, Koles, & Whiteman, 2002), yet it is necessary to test if those moderators act 
similarly when applied to the effects of error-handling instructions rather than error 
management training. Moreover, task difficulty, time between practice and performance, 
order of performance phases, and personal error-handling strategy are other good moderation 
candidates that should receive more attention in future work. Additionally, task requirements 
may moderate the effects of error-handling strategy on performance. That is, during some 
tasks people may benefit more from a certain error-handling strategy. For example, tasks that 
require learning and adaptation may profit more from an error management strategy than 
tasks that involve application of existing knowledge. These propositions should be tested 
further so that the conditions under which error-handling works are better understood. 
 Another important question that the current research did not delve into is the potential 
interplay between cognitive and affective mechanisms. The theorizing by Keith and Frese 
(2005) regarding the effects of error-handling on performance includes both cognitive and 
affective/motivational mechanisms, yet, based on existing theorizing and empirical research 
we can say little about whether and how these mechanisms work together. In the present 
research I focus on cognition rather than on affect. Nonetheless, I do expect that many of the 
effects found for cognition (and performance) may stem from or interact with affective 
responses to error-handling instructions. For example, after making an error, people who 
receive error prevention instructions may experience more negative affect, which in turn 
activates negative self-related thoughts, and harms performance. Regarding affect-cognition 
interactions, if affect feeds into the negative effects of error prevention on cognition and 
performance, inducing positive affect in people may potentially ameliorate these effects. 
Therefore, future research should incorporate both affect and cognition in order to better 
explain the effects of error-handling strategy on cognition and performance. 
 Error-handling research has portrayed error prevention negatively, yet, prevention in 
itself is useful and even necessary for people and organizations (e.g., Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). This raises the question: can the positives of error prevention (e.g., planning, 
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vigilance) be separated from the negatives (e.g., fear of errors, unwillingness to admit errors; 
risk aversion) and how? One of my reasons to study the combination of error prevention and 
error management was the expectation that synergy between the strategies can boost the 
positives of the individual strategies while limiting their negatives. Theorizing explaining 
whether and when the two strategies have additive or subtractive effects, however, is 
currently lacking. I identify this as an important limitation of the existing literature, but also 
as a fruitful and valuable new theoretical and research direction. 
Limitations  
 Most studies in the dissertation suffered from the common methodological limitations 
associated with experimental research: use of a student sample, artificial setting, and a 
relatively low ecological validity. That being said, an experimental design is often preferred 
because it allows establishing causality, provides a controlled environment, and rules out 
selection biases (note: most studies had a quasi-random design to keep the number of men 
and women comparable among groups). I supplemented the experimental studies in Chapters 
2 and 3 with field questionnaires to examine the robustness and generalizability of the 
findings (triangulation; Scandura & Williams, 2000). Although most findings were 
consistent, there was one result that differed between experimental and field studies in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Namely, no effects of leaders' error-handling strategy on perceived leader 
competence were observed in experimental studies. In the field studies with actual followers, 
however, error management was positively associated with perceived leader competence. 
Understanding why there are differences between studies has potential important theoretical 
implications, as it would uncover the boundary conditions under which competence is 
affected by error-handling strategies. Earlier research shows that warmth/morality judgments 
outweigh competence judgments as more important to people, unless competence of the 
other, in this case the leader, becomes relevant to the self and to one's own outcomes 
(Wojciszke, 2005). Under such circumstances, followers are more likely to take into account 
competence information. Whereas in the field studies leaders' competence was important for 
the followers' own outcomes, in the experimental lab studies, it was not. This may have 
influenced followers' decision making, rendering leader competence information irrelevant 
and shifting focus solely to warmth (sociability and morality) information, a proposition that 
can be tested in future work by manipulating whether followers' outcomes are dependent on 
leaders' competence. 
 Second, data on leaders' error-handling strategy in the field questionnaire studies 
(Chapters 2 and 3) was collected from followers, rather than from leaders. Although this can 
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be considered a limitation (single source), the present method was selected on purpose. The 
perceptions followers have of their leaders’ error-handling strategy may be more informative 
and less affected by positive self-presentation biases. Additionally, according to the romance 
of leadership view "...followers react to, and are more influenced by, their constructions of 
the leader’s personality than they are by the “true” personality of the leader. It is the 
personalities of leaders as imagined or constructed by followers that become the object of 
study, not “actual” or “clinical” personalities per se" (Meindl, 1995, pp. 330-331). In line 
with Meindl (1995), I focused on the perceptions of followers about their leader's error-
handling strategy, rather than on the "actual" error-handling strategy of leaders. In a related 
vein, by not viewing leader traits as fixed, the romance of leadership perspective implies that 
by changing their error-handling strategy leaders can change the perceptions of their 
followers, a proposition that remains to be tested. 
 Third, error management and error prevention are relatively broad constructs which 
makes operationalizing them somewhat difficult. This difficulty is exacerbated by 
researchers’ (us included) focus on different aspects of the constructs in experimental and 
field studies (e.g., for experimental operationalization see Keith & Frese, 2005; for field 
questionnaire operationalization see Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999 or Van Dyck et 
al., 2005). In this dissertation the manipulation of error management focused on acceptance 
of and learning from errors, while the manipulation of error prevention focused on preventing 
errors from occurring. Such operationalization views error-handling more from a 
motivational perspective. In the field studies, however, the focus was on leaders' error-
handling attitudes and behaviors. For example, error management was measured by looking 
at leaders' thinking about errors once errors have occurred and leaders' attitudes toward 
sharing errors. Error prevention was measured by followers' ratings of leaders' worry about 
making errors, leaders' stress and irritation after errors, and leaders' unwillingness to discuss 
errors openly. That being said, although the operationalizations were not identical, findings 
were mostly consistent between studies (exception: competence). The replicability of 
findings with operationalizations measuring different elements of the same theoretical 
construct is a strength, which suggests that results are robust. Nonetheless, for the future 
development of error-handling research it is vital to explicitly conceptualize whether the 
constructs are motivational, attitudinal, behavioral, or all of the above. 
 Fourth, the findings for off-task thoughts and performance showed some differences 
across studies. Specifically, (1) error-handling affected self-related off-task thoughts in 
Chapter 5, but that was not the case in Chapter 4, (2) in Chapter 5 there were no differences 
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between the error management and the error prevention groups on performance, although 
such differences were found in Chapter 4, and (3) in Chapter 5 on-task thoughts did not 
mediate the effect of error-handling on analogical and adaptive performance, whereas in 
Chapter 4 they did.  
 A potential explanation for finding an effect of error-handling strategy on self-related 
off-task thoughts in Chapter 5, but not in Chapter 4 is the use of a different measure 
specifically targeted to negative self-related off-task thoughts. This suggests that error-
handling strategy may have different effects on non-negative (positive and neutral) self-
related off-task thoughts than on negative self-related off-task thoughts. Our finding implies 
that future work should attempt to differentiate even further among the various types of off-
task thoughts participants can engage in. 
 Study 2 in Chapter 4 showed an effect of error-handling strategy on analogical 
transfer performance, yet, when the pure error management and pure error prevention groups 
in Chapter 5 were compared, no such effect was found. It is possible that the effect did not 
reach significance due to lack of power (there were ten participants less per group in the 
experiment in Chapter 5). Keith and Frese's (2005) meta-analysis showed that the effects of 
error-handling on analogical transfer performance (i.e., error management leading to better 
analogical transfer performance than error prevention) are much weaker than those on 
adaptive transfer performance, thus having a large enough sample is vital for finding such 
effects. 
 The lack of mediation by on-task thoughts in Chapter 5 can be explained by observing 
the timing of measures more carefully. In Chapter 4, on-task thoughts were measured after 
the practice phase, while in Chapter 5, they were measured after the performance phase and 
pertained to cognitive resource allocation experienced during the performance phase. 
Observation of the correlations between variables in Chapter 5 shows that on-task thoughts 
and negative self-related off-task thoughts experienced during performance did not correlate 
with analogical nor with adaptive transfer performance. An implication of this finding is that 
the cognitive resource allocation experienced during learning may be more important to 
subsequent performance than the cognitive resource allocation during performance.   
 Finally, all studies in the dissertation were conducted with Dutch participants. It 
cannot be ruled out that the Dutch culture provides a specific context that is different from 
that found in other countries (e.g., Hofstede, 2001). Accordingly, it is important to replicate 
the current findings with other national samples in order to establish their reliability and 
validity. 
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Practical Implications 
 The studies in this dissertation have various important implications for practice. First, 
the results show that leaders can benefit from using an error management strategy. Image 
management (morality and competence) and trust have been identified as vital tools that 
leaders may use in order to motivate followers to reach common goals (Chemers, 1997, 2000; 
2001). Chapters 2 and 3 show that by applying error management, leaders are perceived more 
favorably, resulting in more motivated, satisfied, and trusting the leader followers. Although 
the research on the interindividual effects of leaders' error-handling on followers is in its 
infancy, the current findings indicate that managers and leaders should not be afraid of being 
stigmatized by their followers because of using error management. If anything, followers are 
more likely to prefer to be lead by a leader using an error management strategy. Additionally, 
error-handling strategy, unlike other aspects known to influence a leaders' sociability, 
morality, and competence evaluations, can potentially be trained. This realization calls for 
research investigating the effects of error management training in the work context and its 
effects on followers' motivation, satisfaction with leader, trust in leader, well-being, work 
engagement, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and performance. 
 Second, the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that organizations can benefit by 
applying error management rather than error prevention in order to increase employees' task-
directed thoughts, lower task-undirected thoughts, and support higher performance. In many 
organizations making errors is a taboo due to the constant focus on error prevention and 
various forms of punishment, yet these preventive mechanisms do not seem to work as well 
as intended in minimizing the negative consequences of errors that they were initially 
designed to avert (e.g., Edmondson, 2004a; Reason, 1990; 1970). From earlier work we 
already know that organizations scoring higher on error management are more successful in 
terms of firm goal assets, return on assets, firm goal achievement, and firm survivability (Van 
Dyck et al., 2005). Our findings show that error management can be an alternative to error 
prevention, which does not per se influence thinking and performance positively, rather it 
mitigates the negative effects of error prevention. The principles outlined in this dissertation 
can be used by leaders, managers, or instructors as clear and simple guidelines to how to 
frame errors in order to reap the benefits of error management while minimizing the 
drawbacks of error prevention. Finally, adaptive transfer becomes a valuable strategic 
advantage because organizational environments are becoming increasingly more unstable, 
uncertain, and fast-paced, which necessitates that employees become more resilient, efficient, 
and effective in dealing with potential errors (Kozlowski, Toney, Mullins, Weissbein, Brown, 
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& Bell, 2001). Our findings suggest that employees adept at error management will be better 
able to survive and prosper under such circumstances due to their task-focus and superior 
adaptability to new conditions.  
Conclusion 
 This dissertation investigated the effects of error-handling strategy on thinking and 
subsequent outcomes. I shed light on (1) how error-handling of a leader affects the thoughts 
of followers about the leader and how these thoughts in turn influence various outcomes and 
on (2) how error-handling strategy affects one's own thoughts and performance on a task. 
Overall, the findings show that an error management strategy is beneficial, while an error 
prevention strategy is harmful to both how others' perceive a person and to how people think 
during a task. Additionally, the results show that followers' thoughts mediate the relationship 
between leaders' error-handling strategy and followers' motivation, satisfaction with the 
leader, and trust. The results also show that one's own thoughts during a task mediate the 
relationship between error-handling strategy and own performance. The current findings have 
valuable theoretical and practical implications that can help both scientists and practitioners 
to better understand error-handling and its outcomes for oneself and for others. 
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 The main goal of the research in this dissertation was to investigate the question: 
"Does error-handling strategy affect people's thoughts and subsequent outcomes?" There are 
two error-handling strategies: (1) error management, a strategy focusing on catching errors, 
learning from them, and minimizing their negative consequences and (2) error prevention, a 
strategy focusing solely on preventing errors. In Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation I looked 
at the interindividual effects of leaders' error-handling strategy on followers' thoughts about 
leaders (perceptions of leader warmth, incorporating sociability and morality, and leader 
competence) and satisfaction with the leaders, motivation, organizational goal-fulfillment, 
and trust. In Chapters 4 and 5, I investigated the effects of manipulated error-handling 
strategy on one's own thoughts (on-task and off-task thoughts), cognitive appraisals 
(challenge and threat), and subsequent individual task performance (analogical and adaptive 
transfer performance). 
 The findings of Chapter 2 show that error management leaders are perceived as 
warmer in terms of sociability (all studies) and equally (Chapter 2, experimental Study 1a and 
1b) or more competent (Chapter 2, questionnaire Study 2) than error prevention leaders. 
Additionally, in Study 2 leaders' error management strategy was positively related to 
followers' satisfaction with the leader and follower motivation, with warmth perceptions 
mediating this relationship. Although both researchers and practitioners have voiced concerns 
regarding the perception of leaders using an error management strategy, it can be concluded 
that error management is not bad for leaders' image. On the contrary, error management is 
beneficial for perception and associated with more satisfied and motivated followers. 
 Chapter 3 showed that being seen as an error management leader is positively 
associated with trust in the leader (field Study 1). The opposite was the case for error 
prevention leaders. Additionally, the relationship between leaders' error-handling strategy and 
followers' trust was mediated by perceived morality (field Study 1 and experimental Study 2) 
and competence (field Study 1 only) of the leader, once again showing that the thoughts of 
followers about error management leaders were more positive. The conclusion that can be 
drawn based on these findings is that being seen as an error management leader rather than an 
error prevention leader is associated with being trusted more by one's followers because one 
is perceived as more moral and competent. 
 In Chapter 4 I investigated the effect of error-handling instructions on on-task and off-
task thoughts (experimental Study 1), the effect of error-handling instructions on performance 
(experimental Study 2), and the potential mediation of on-task and off-task thoughts on the 
effect of error-handling on performance (experimental Study 2). The results show that 
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receiving error management instructions led participants to report more on-task thoughts 
(both studies). Additionally, Study 2 shows the expected positive effects of error management 
on analogical and adaptive transfer performance, which were mediated by on-task thoughts. 
In other words, the findings of Chapter 4 show that error management not only affects 
positively the thoughts of others about the person using this strategy, but also one's own 
thoughts, which in turn improve task performance. 
 The experiment reported in Chapter 5 extended the findings of Chapter 4 by 
investigating whether it was error management, error prevention, or both that drove the 
effects on thoughts and performance observed in Chapter 4. The results show that error 
prevention dampened positive effects and amplified negative effects on thinking and 
performance (i.e., fewer on-task thoughts, more negative self-related off-task thoughts, lower 
adaptive transfer performance), whereas error management dampened negative effects (lower 
threat appraisals). These findings show that error management is a more positive strategy to 
use because of the negative consequences associated with an error prevention strategy. 
Consequently, when faced with errors, it is best to approach them using an error management 
strategy as it more positively impacts one’s cognition and performance. 
 Overall, the results of this dissertation show that error management is better than error 
prevention as it (1) more positively affects others' thoughts about you, making them perceive 
you in a more positive light, and (2) more positively influences your own thoughts, making 
you better able to focus on the task at hand. What is more, error management rather than error 
prevention is associated with more positive outcomes for the self (i.e., task performance), and 
for others (higher motivation, satisfaction, and trust). We can thus conclude that it is in our 
best self interest and in the interest of those around us to rethink errors as something to be 
managed instead of solely focusing on their prevention. 
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 Het belangrijkste doel van het onderzoek in deze dissertatie was om een antwoord te 
krijgen op de vraag: “Beïnvloedt een foutenbenadering de gedachten die mensen hebben en 
andere uitkomsten die hieruit voortvloeien?” Er zijn twee foutenbenaderingen: (1) 
foutenmanagement, een strategie gericht op het constateren van fouten, er lering uit proberen 
te trekken en tegelijkertijd de negatieve gevolgen te minimaliseren, en (2) foutenpreventie, 
een strategie louter gericht op het voorkomen van fouten. In Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 van de 
dissertatie keek ik naar de interpersoonlijke effecten van de foutenbenadering van 
leidinggevenden op hun ondergeschikten wat betreft de gedachtes die ze hebben over de 
leidinggevende (dat wil zeggen, de mate waarin de leidinggevende wordt gezien als 
warmtevoller, wat zowel sociabiliteit als moraliteit omvat, en de mate waarin de 
leidinggevende als competent wordt gezien), hun tevredenheid over de leidinggevende, hun 
motivatie, de mate waarin organisatiedoelen vervuld worden, en hun vertrouwen in de 
leidinggevende. In Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 onderzocht ik de effecten van een gemanipuleerde 
foutenbenadering op de eigen gedachten (taakgericht en niet-taakgericht), cognitieve 
evaluatie (uitdaging dan wel bedreiging) en de daaruit voortvloeiende prestaties op 
individuele taken (analogical en adaptive transfer performance). 
 De bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 2 laten zien dat leidinggevenden die een 
foutenmanagementstrategie hanteren worden waargenomen als warmtevoller wat betreft 
sociabiliteit (alle studies), en als even competent (Hoofdstuk 2, experimentele Studies 1a en 
1b) als, of meer competent (Hoofdstuk 2, Vragenlijststudie 2) dan leidinggevenden die een 
foutenpreventiestrategie hanteren. Verder was de foutenmanagementstrategie van de 
leidinggevenden in Studie 2 positief gerelateerd aan enerzijds de mate waarin 
ondergeschikten tevreden waren met de leidinggevende en anderzijds aan hun motivatie. De 
mate waarin de leidinggevende als warmtevol werd waargenomen medieerde deze effecten. 
Ofschoon zowel onderzoekers als mensen uit de praktijk zorgen hebben geuit over hoe het 
hanteren van een foutenmanagementstrategie de perceptie van een leidinggevende beïnvloedt, 
kan geconcludeerd worden dat foutenmanagement niet slecht is voor het imago van een 
leidinggevende. Integendeel, foutenmanagement heeft juist positieve effecten op hoe 
leidinggevenden worden waargenomen en is gerelateerd aan een hogere tevredenheid en 
motivatie onder ondergeschikten. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 liet zien dat voor leidinggevenden die in de ogen van hun 
ondergeschikten een foutenmanagementstrategie hanteren, er een positieve samenhang is met 
de mate waarin zij vertrouwen wekken in hun ondergeschikten (Veldstudie 1). Het 
tegenovergestelde was het geval voor leidinggevenden die in de ogen van hun 
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ondergeschikten een foutenpreventiestrategie hanteren. De relatie tussen de 
foutenmanagementstrategie van de leidinggevende en het vertrouwen dat ondergeschikten in 
de leidinggevende hebben, werd gemedieerd door de waargenomen moraliteit (Veldstudie 1 
en experimentele Studie 2) en de competentie van de leidinggevende (enkel Veldstudie 1). 
Dit laat nogmaals zien dat ondergeschikten positiever denken over leidinggevenden die een 
foutenmanagementstrategie hanteren. De conclusie die op basis van deze resultaten kan 
worden getrokken is dat leidinggevenden, van wie wordt waargenomen dat ze een 
foutenmanagementstrategie hanteren in plaats van een foutenpreventiestrategie, kunnen 
rekenen op een groter vertrouwen onder hun ondergeschikten omdat ze als moreler en 
competenter worden gezien. 
 In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht ik de effecten van foutenbenaderingsinstructies op 
taakgerichte en niet-taakgerichte gedachten (experimentele Studie 1), en op de taakprestatie 
(experimentele Studie 2), waarbij ik verder onderzocht of taakgerichte en niet-taakgerichte 
gedachten het effect van foutenbenaderingsinstructies op prestatie medieerden (experimentele 
Studie 2). De resultaten laten zien dat deelnemers meer taakgerichte gedachten rapporteerden 
wanneer zij foutenmanagementinstructies ontvingen (beide studies). Studie 2 toonde verder 
de verwachte positieve effecten van foutenmanagement op analogical en adaptive transfer 
performance, waarbij dit effect werd gemedieerd door taakgerichte gedachten. Met andere 
woorden, de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat foutenmanagement niet enkel een 
positieve invloed heeft op de gedachten van anderen over de persoon die de strategie 
hanteert, maar ook op de eigen gedachten, die op hun beurt de eigen taakprestatie doen 
verbeteren. 
 Het experiment dat gerapporteerd wordt in Hoofdstuk 5 bouwt voort op de 
bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4. Hier is onderzocht of de effecten op gedachten en prestatie 
worden veroorzaakt door positieve effecten van foutenmanagement, negatieve effecten van 
foutenpreventie, of door beide. De resultaten laten zien dat foutenpreventie positieve effecten 
afzwakte en negatieve effecten versterkte op gedachten en prestatie (d.w.z., minder 
taakgerichte gedachtes, negatievere zelfgerelateerde niet-taakgerichte gedachtes, lagere 
adapative transfer performance), terwijl foutenmanagement de negatieve effecten afzwakte 
(fouten werden als minder bedreigend ervaren). Deze bevindingen laten zien dat 
foutenmanagement een positievere strategie is om te hanteren, vooral vanwege de negatieve 
consequenties geassocieerd met een foutenpreventiestrategie. Wanneer je met fouten wordt 
geconfronteerd is het beter deze te benaderen middels een foutenmanagementstrategie, omdat 
deze een positievere uitwerking heeft op de eigen cognities en taakprestatie. 
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Alles tezamen genomen laten de resultaten in deze dissertatie zien dat 
foutenmanagement een betere strategie is dan foutenpreventie, omdat 1) foutenmanagement 
een positiever effect heeft op de gedachten die anderen over jou hebben, waardoor ze jou als 
positiever ervaren, en omdat 2) foutenmanagement je eigen gedachten positiever beïnvloedt, 
waardoor je je beter op een taak kunt focussen. Bovendien hangt foutenmanagement, in 
vergelijking tot foutenpreventie, samen met positievere uitkomsten zowel voor de persoon 
zelf (d.w.z., taakprestatie), alsook voor anderen (hogere motivatie, tevredenheid en hoger 
vertrouwen). We kunnen dus concluderen dat het zowel in ons eigen belang als in het belang 
van anderen is, dat we anders over fouten nadenken, namelijk als afwijkingen die we kunnen 
‘managen’, in plaats van als obstakels die voorkomen moeten worden. 
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